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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that a Weberian process of bureaucratisation poses a 
serious threat in itself to the central values and ideals of liberal democracy.  
Such a threat arises not only from the bureaucratic pathology of ‘goal 
displacement’ of substantive ends by instrumental means, but also, because 
of this pathology, its tendency to mask and embed ideological challenges to 
liberal democracy. An effective liberal political constitution is therefore 
necessary to maintain the democratic control of bureaucracy while exploiting 
the efficiency benefits of bureaucratic administration. Such a political 
constitution is in fact contained in the Westminster tradition of liberal 
constitutionalism, based on the principles of parliamentary sovereignty, 
ministerial responsibility and political neutrality. Through this theoretical lens, 
the thesis proceeds to examine the trajectory of public sector reforms against 
the changing political contexts in New Zealand over the past 20 years and its 
constitutional implications. The NPM reforms in New Zealand, whether 
intended or unintended, displaced the political and constitutional safeguards 
implicit in the traditional model of public service with managerial norms which 
simultaneously serve to embed the neoliberal ideology. Despite the claim of 
NPM reformers to control bureaucracy, the paradoxical effects of the reform 
have been to accelerate the process of bureaucratisation and attenuate 
democratic control. Recent initiatives aimed to address some apparent 
weaknesses of NPM, have not changed the fundamentals of the managerial 
system, and thus fail to reverse this trend of declining democratic control of 
bureaucratic power. A reassertion of the fundamental norms of the 
Westminster system is recommended to arrest this decline of liberal 
democracy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Public Service in New Zealand has undergone radical reforms during 
the past few decades.  Reforms promise new things: new theories, new 
technologies, and ultimately new hopes of finding a new solution to the old 
problem of democratic control over the bureaucracy. Westminster, by 
contrast, inspires a very different kind of imagination. It is a legacy, which 
New Zealand inherited more than a century ago. It symbolises continuity 
and tradition. It seems old.  
 
It is not surprising then that the discontent of public management theorists 
with Westminster is rising. Some have argued that the commitment to 
Westminster is the problem (Chapman 2000). Others have questioned 
whether Westminster is dead in Westminster, or indeed in Wellington 
(Eichbaum and Shaw 2005b; Rhodes 2005). In 2004, the tension evolved 
into a minor scandal when the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
labelled the Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill1, which had 
been presented as “setting the benchmark of public management” by the 
Government, a “trojan horse” and “virus-like” (Newberry and Pallot 2004). 
And yet, a year later, a parliamentary inquiry into New Zealand’s existing 
constitutional arrangements concluded that New Zealand’s constitution is 
“not in crisis” (Constitutional Arrangements Committee 2005).  
 
Crisis or not, it may be time to set aside the “it isn’t broke” mentality and 
look carefully at the tension between public service reforms and the 
constitutional framework. The aim of this thesis is to try to explore this 
issue, using an eclectic probing approach, through a broader political 
perspective. The main questions that this essay seeks to answer are in 
two parts.  Firstly, what is the nature of the relationship between 
bureaucracy and liberal democracy within a liberal political order, and how 
does the Westminster system fit into this picture? Secondly, what has 
                                                 
1
 The Bill was eventually passed with significant amendments in response to the Clerk’s 
submission, in December 2004. 
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changed in the bureaucracy as a result of the reforms in the past twenty or 
so years and what are the implications for New Zealand’s Westminster 
constitutional system? 
 
Politics is key to answering these questions. Public management reforms, 
as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004:143) point out, “cannot be adequately 
comprehended without reference to the crucial relationships between 
administration and politics, and between administrators and politicians”. 
There is clearly an increasing awareness of the political dimension of 
public management reform amongst commentators. However, the 
attempts so far are mainly from the perspective of the public management 
itself. Politics is still regarded as something beyond “the frontier” (ibid.). 
Such an approach can yield valuable insights but it also has its limitations. 
This essay, by contrast, takes politics as a starting point. 
 
In a sense, this thesis is also about “relearning old lessons”.  As Olsen 
(2006) argues, it might be time to “rediscover” bureaucracy and its 
implications for democratic governance. Olsen is referring to Weber’s 
analysis of bureaucracy. This thesis will argue that there is also a need to 
rediscover the wisdom of political liberalism, J S Mill’s theory of 
bureaucracy and the Westminster system of constitution. Having 
established this theoretical model, the thesis will turn to the practices of 
public management and the effects of the reforms on the constitutional 
framework.  
 
It must be stated that while this thesis draws together a broad range of 
perspectives, it is not an attempt at a comprehensive theory of liberalism, 
or bureaucracy, or the Westminster constitution. Rather the objective here 
is to explore possible arguments about public management from a liberal 
political perspective. And bearing in mind the challenges of evaluating 
systemic changes (Boston 2000), neither does it try to evaluate all aspects 
of the Public Sector reforms over the last twenty years. This thesis is a 
starting point.  
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The thesis is in two parts, organised as follows: 
 
Part I deals with theoretical issues. Chapter 2 outlines a defence of 
political liberalism, in contrast with communitarianism and libertarianism. It 
discusses liberalism’s fundamental values, its conception of the 
relationship between the society and the individual, and the centrality of 
politics within liberalism.  
 
Chapter 3 lays out an analytical model by combining the theories of Max 
Weber and J S Mill on bureaucracy and seeks to explore the 
interdependent, yet contradictory, relations between bureaucracy and 
liberal democracy, against the political-philosophical background outlined 
in the previous Chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 sets out the Westminster styled political constitution. It 
discusses the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial 
responsibility and public service neutrality. It demonstrates that, despite its 
critics, the political constitution of Westminster is an integral part of the 
liberal-democratic order and still offers the best constitutional safeguard of 
democratic control over bureaucracy.  
 
Part II discusses the New Zealand public services reforms and their 
interactions with and impacts on the constitutional framework. Chapter 5 
examines the New Zealand Public Service prior to the reform. It argues 
that the bureaucratic attributes of the traditional Public Service are 
paradoxically constrained by the complex and contradictory politics of the 
Welfare State that underpinned it.  Constitutional constraints also played 
an important role, although their effectiveness was severely limited by a 
strong majoritarian electoral system.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the New Public Management reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s. It surveys the radical changes made to the traditional New Zealand 
public service and explains the paradoxical results of “de-
bureaucratisation”. It contends that the NPM reforms have made the public 
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service more, rather than less, bureaucratic. It is further argued that the 
NPM reforms, intentionally or unintentionally, had undermined the 
constitutional constraints on bureaucratic power in crucial areas.  
 
Chapter 7 turns to the incremental changes made to the public services 
after 1999. While it shows certain changes of the NPM reforms have been 
reversed, the essential core of the NPM models, and the institutional and 
political commitment to certain ideas underpinning the NPM model, 
remains unchanged. This may actually compound the risk of further 
bureaucratisation, which might get in the way of repairing the damages 
done to the Westminster system in the past decade.  
 
Chapter 8 provides the concluding arguments.  
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 2 In Defence of Liberal Politics 
 
The relationship between bureaucracy and democracy is doubtlessly 
political. Indeed, the managerial reforms over the last twenty years are as 
much a result of changing political ideologies in Western liberal countries 
as a consequence of different administrative or managerial paradigms. It is 
necessary therefore to find a firm political foundation on which the 
discussion can be based.  
 
Liberalism in recent years has come under pressure for some time, firstly 
from the advent of neoliberalism, and more recently, from the Third 
Way/Communitarian critiques. But the argument here is that liberalism and 
liberal politics must be defended, especially given the need for democratic 
control over bureaucracy. 
 
Central to the liberal ideology is the supreme value of human autonomy – 
the Kantian idea of treating all persons as ends in themselves, not means 
to some one else’s ends, and therefore the demand for equal respect and 
concern (Kelly 2005; Freeman 2002). In other words, liberals believe that 
individuals should be free to pursue their own conception of the good life, 
that is, to make free choices over substantive values, within the limits of 
justice that ensures the same freedom for others.  
 
Autonomy and equality can be spelled out in more concrete terms as the 
equality of basic liberties. Liberals differ on what these liberties might be, 
but for all of them several things are often centrally important, such as, 
freedom of conscience, speech, movement, and association. These basic 
rights and liberties often overlap with “civil rights” or what Isaiah Berlin 
(1969) calls “negative liberty” i.e. freedom from interference of others. 
Negative liberty has no doubt obtained a special place in contemporary 
liberal democratic polities. But this does not mean that liberty can be taken 
for granted, even in its narrow “negative” sense, let alone fully realised. 
For example, the passing of the Patriot Act in America in response to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks reminds one that even when these liberties 
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are constitutionally enshrined and supposedly sacrosanct, they can still be 
truncated, rightly or wrongly, for something else (Brown 2003; Dworkin 
2006; Haque 2002; Waldron 2003).  
 
Indeed, the “post-September-11” world has brought clearly into focus what 
has made liberalism attractive in the first place, that is, the reality that 
there are fundamentally different and potentially conflicting conceptions of 
what constitutes a good life, as well as what the basic rights are. 
Liberalism was, after all, born out of religious conflicts and social 
upheavals. For liberals, this “endemic disagreement” over ends represents 
a challenge. But it also opens up endless possibilities. For this reason, 
liberals must embrace plurality of values, which cannot, and should not, be 
reduced to a single presupposed truth. This is not because, as some 
alleged, that liberals place the right to choose above every other possible 
ends. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because these ends are so 
important intrinsically that, given the context of diversity, it is paramount 
that one cannot settle on any one version of a good life simply by 
assumption, and thus preclude or demean many other possibilities. In 
other words, freedom to choose requires ability to exercise judgments. The 
priority of autonomy for liberals entails that no goals or ends, whether self-
chosen or inherited, should be exempt from critical evaluation by the 
people themselves (Kymlicka 1989). Thus liberalism does not end with 
negative liberties. It must also provide for development of individual 
capacity for critical reflection so that freedom of choice can be 
meaningfully exercised.  
 
This logic can be extended one step further. The freedom and ability to 
make choices, as critics of liberalism often point out, are vacuous in 
themselves because they say nothing about whether these diverse ends of 
individuals can be achieved in reality (Taylor 1985). Liberalism is empty 
without “positive liberties”. But liberals from Mill to Rawls have never 
denied the importance of fair distribution of power and resources in order 
to create basic conditions for human flourishing and in fact have endorsed 
radical proposals of redistribution (Kymlicka 2001). Liberalism is meant to 
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be impartial about the ends that people choose, not indifferent or uncaring. 
They only point out that the pursuit of positive liberty has inherent risks, 
because it requires far more complex and ambiguous judgments about 
both substantive ends and means, which will always be open to debate. 
Yet, just because of that the stakes are high, there is no reason to shirk 
responsibility by putting positive liberty in the “too hard” basket. Rather it 
simply means that caution and vigilance are necessary, so that one is 
capable of “defending freedom from interference when it ought to be 
defended” (Gutmann 1996:70).  
 
So instead of a shopping list of pre-determined values, liberalism is better 
conceptualised as an attempt to construct some common ground on what 
it means to be human. Liberals aspire to do this without suppressing 
disagreements through a framework anchored by a shared commitment to 
autonomy and equality (Kelly 2005; Dagger 2004).  This indeterminacy or 
vagueness does not make liberal values any less “basic” in a sense that 
they are “fundamental” and “inalienable”, which cannot be bargained away 
for something else (Freeman 2002:109). It is simply a reflection of that fact 
that they are constitutive parts of the humanity that is itself fluid and 
diverse.  
 
Despite the superficial connection through the emphasis on negative 
liberties, libertarians embrace a very different scheme of values. For 
libertarians, the fundamental value flows from the autonomy of property 
ownership rather than the autonomy of persons. Indeed, libertarians often 
construct humanity as “self ownership”. Libertarian values thus are not so 
much about liberty as such, as it is about “protecting and reinforcing 
absolute property and contract rights”, “whatever consequences for 
individuals’ freedom, independence, or interests” (Freeman 2001:133). It is 
to this value that everything else, and ultimately the moral worth of human 
beings themselves, can be measured against and therefore inevitably 
instrumentalised. As a consequence, libertarianism circumvents the liberal 
commitment to value pluralism and quietly replaces it with a distinctive 
morality and ethics of entrepreneurialism and  “self-care” (Brown 2003; 
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2006). In this way, libertarianism has implicitly assumed a particular truth 
about the good life while depriving other “truths” of their intrinsic worth and 
recognition. This might help explain why for instance Margaret Thatcher or 
Ronald Reagan was able to preach both “Victorian” values and individual 
choices. It is not because they are inherently compatible, but rather the 
hegemony of the latter over other values, as Wendy Brown (2006) argues, 
prepares the ground for the authoritarian features of the former.  
 
Communitarianism provides another alternative. While liberal emphasis on 
autonomy, which leaves open the question of what constitutes the good 
life, the communitarian value order is explicitly based on certain 
preconceptions of the good life, consisted of certain “higher, strongly 
evaluated moral goods”, often with an appeal to tradition (Taylor 1989, 
quoted in Bell 2005). This suggests a strong instrumental vision, which is 
primarily concerned with the means to achieve pre-given ends. It says 
nothing about how these ends – the communities worth preserving – are 
chosen in the first place, on what standards and by whom? 
 
Secondly, because of its emphasis on individual freedom, liberalism is 
often mistaken for abstract methodological individualism. However, as 
Kelly (2005) points out, no liberal is required to claim that there is no such 
thing as society but individuals. Nor must they deny the existence of 
“public interest” or “the common good”. Quite the contrary, liberals have 
circumvented methodological individualism “by allowing or even insisting 
that conceptions of individual rights, liberty, and autonomy are of necessity 
socially constituted” (Beiner 1988:40).   
 
There has always been a recognition of the dialectical nature of concepts 
such as “society” or “community” or “culture” in liberal philosophy. While 
these concepts cannot be reduced to their individual parts, they are 
nonetheless outcomes created by the individuals through their complex 
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relations with each other over time, and not reified “things in themselves”2. 
They may well embody traditions and customs that are “presumptive 
evidence” of valuable lessons taught by experience, and “as such have a 
claim to [one’s] deference”, as Mill has argued (Mill 1962:116). But, to Mill, 
“intelligent following of custom, or even occasional intelligent deviation 
from custom, is better than a blind and simple mechanical adhesion to it”.  
 
Thus the concept of “society” is actually critical to the liberal ideology, 
because it constitutes a public realm where autonomy and equal respect 
among individuals can be realised. The question here is not about the 
priority of individuals or society, but what sort of society is most compatible 
with liberal values. And the answer to that is implicit in the parameters 
governing people’s relations with each other. To put it in another way, 
liberals are concerned about the preservation of autonomy and equality of 
individuals as social beings.  
 
Implicit in this understanding of the social is an important point: the 
construction of concepts such as societies and communities are inevitably 
value-laden. There is an inherent risk when employing such concepts that 
one forgets the “endemic disagreements” that characterise human 
relations. To use them as the start and end point of analysis thus runs 
counter to liberal commitment of value pluralism, because their implicit 
values too often become the presumed or imposed “truth” under the guise 
of their “objective” or “organic” existences independent of human beings.   
 
By contrast, libertarianism and communitarianism are both prone to the 
problem of reification. Libertarian philosophers such as Hayek often 
criticise liberals for making a category mistake to think of society as a thing 
in itself. Yet libertarians simply replace one form of reification, which 
arguably was never endorsed by liberals, with others. The reified universe 
of libertarianism ultimately boils down to the absolute priority of property 
                                                 
2
 The concept of reification is used here to refer to ‘the apprehension of human 
phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human and possibly supra human 
terms’ (Berger and Luckmann 1984). 
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rights, buttressed by the imagery of self-regulating economy or market. For 
libertarians, property rights is simply a given, the justification of which, as 
Kelly (2005) argues, invariably falls back on some contestable 
metaphysical claims about natural law. Against this presumption, liberty 
becomes formal and secondary. As Narveson (1987:66) claims, “liberty is 
property…the libertarian thesis is really the thesis that a right to our 
persons as our property is the sole fundamental right there is”. This in turn 
implies what amounts to the reification of human beings themselves 
“namely that a person has the moral capacity to make of himself a fungible 
thing” (Freeman 2001:131). There is no room for human persons as such.  
This of course is consistent with the dogmatic assumption of singularly 
“rational self interests”  – one might see this as the reification of market 
rationality – as substitutes for the diversity and complexity of human 
nature, which underpins a range of technocratic and political theories, 
such as Public Choice theory. The danger is that such seemingly innocent 
assumptions become normalised “self-fulfilled prophecies” which may 
serve to change human beings themselves.  
 
By contrast, liberals recognise that the system of property is socially 
constructed and therefore must be shaped by its institutional context of the 
kind of rights, powers, duties and liabilities people have in relation with 
each other (Freeman 2001). This inevitably entails value choices that 
cannot be presumed by taking a particular property system for granted. 
This is why liberals refuse to give property rights absolute priority over 
other constitutive parts of liberty. Mill notably excludes property rights from 
his scheme of basic rights and liberties. “There is no place within the 
liberal conceptual order”, Freeman (2001:113) argues, “for the political or 
legal recognition of people as property or as anything less than persons 
with basic rights”.  
 
In this regard, the rise of communitarianism could be seen as a 
consequence of, rather than a departure from, libertarianism. The appeal 
to “the community” as a reified thing in the former serves as a gap-filler for 
the vacuum created by methodological individualism of the latter. As 
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William Outhwaites (2006) observes, there is an underlying connection, a 
“dialectic”, “in which individualism produces its opposite to complement it”. 
Communitarians often talk of “the community”, or its traditions and 
customs, as a given, unquestionably good thing. In comparison, the liberal 
conception of community is captured by the novelist James Baldwin that it 
“simply means our endless connection with, and responsibilities for each 
other” (Baldwin 1986:122). So there are inevitably many different 
communities, corresponding with many possible values that individuals 
may share, for whatever reason, with each other and as such have a claim 
to equal respect. The reification of community then represents a danger 
that the claims of one particular community might undermine a wider 
sense of communities and a deeper feeling of belonging. There is a risk 
that the often conservative and exclusive vocabulary of values offered by 
communitarians simply becomes a roundabout way to assert the 
presumptive truth of deeply contestable values (Weeks 1995; 2000). 
Advocacy for spirit of neighbourhood or traditional family might sound 
more like apology for gated communities and heterosexual patriarchy – a 
sort of “white picket fence” nostalgia – rather than genuine attempt at a 
dialogue, in the eyes of others who have struggled for the recognition of 
their own communities. This is the crux of the liberalism-communitarianism 
debate. 
 
Such difficulties have particular resonance for the current popularity of 
social capital. For Putnam, one of the leading advocates, social capital is 
equated with reciprocity, trustworthiness and ultimately “civic virtue” 
(Putnam 2000: 19). Such an assumption of the inherent goodness of 
social capital typically glosses over not only the complicated sets of social, 
political, cultural and economic relations of trust and distrusts between 
people themselves, but also the value judgments that sustain and shape 
those relationships, which could be either good or bad (Bryson and 
Mowbray 2005; DeFilippis 2001; Harriss 2001; Mowbray 2005). It says 
nothing about power, politics and history (Szreter 2002). Indeed for some 
critics on the left, the concept of social capital is not so much about the 
“social” as it is about the depoliticised and reified “capital”, which serves to 
  13 
mask the unequal power relations between the rich and the poor, and the 
rich communities and the poor communities (Fitzsimons 2000; Fine 2001; 
Roberts 2004). It does not necessarily mean that social capital theories 
are simply a variant of capitalism, but clearly one must be wary of the 
tendency of social capital theories to avoid, rather than confront, old 
political struggles and conflicts, and their inability to provide any guarantee 
of freedom and equality for those less privileged. 
 
Finally, the liberal commitment to a value-puralistic society gives rise to the 
perennial question, namely 
 
How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society 
of free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by 
reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines? (Rawls 
2005:4) 
 
If people were to live together, clearly there must be some way to resolve 
the conflicts between their values. Yet this entails “radical choices between 
rival goods and rival evils” which inevitably involve “loss and sometimes 
tragedy” for some (Gray 1996 quoted in Spicer 2007). In other words, 
actually making the choice – as opposed to having the capability and 
context to do so – necessarily involves the exercise of power. This 
becomes particularly problematic given the structural inequalities of private 
power amongst individuals and communities in contemporary societies.  
There is an inherent risk that the interactions between individuals within 
unequal power-relations might descend into domination by force. This in 
turn increases the likelihood of resistance through violence, which further 
undermines both social justice and stability3. Hence there is a need to 
                                                 
3
 This is related to the concept of freedom as non-domination. While this idea is often 
attributed to republican thinkers, it is not exclusively a republican idea. It can be derived 
directly from liberal values. Clearly liberalism would be practically irrelevant if a large 
section of society are vulnerable to coercion by others. Liberals, like republicans, 
recognise power imbalance itself as a threat to liberty. J S Mill, for instance, argues that 
the state should keep a vigilant control over one’s exercise of power over others, and 
accordingly argues for state intervention in family, prima facie, given the power imbalance 
between parents and children (Mill 1974).  
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control the exercise of power and to secure its legitimacy, especially for 
the disadvantaged4.  
 
For liberals the solution to this problem lies in “the primacy of politics”. The 
concept of politics, in its liberal democratic sense, is simply the 
commitment to make collective decisions through compromise and 
conciliation, without resorting to outright coercion or undue violence (Crick 
2005; Stoker 2006). It implies, Crick (2005:4) argues, “at least some 
tolerance of differing truths”. This is somewhat an understatement of what 
makes politics particularly attractive from a liberal perspective. “Politics 
does not settle things”, as Elizabeth Frazer (2007:256) argues.  Instead of 
dismissing opposition by appeal to a final authoritative truth, it offers full 
acknowledgement of the loss and disadvantage while insisting on the 
“openness” of political process so that whatever decisions reached “are 
always revisitable and always will be revisited” (ibid.). In this way a 
pluralistic society is reconciled by the need for collective decisions or 
desires for the common good.  
 
This does not mean that anything goes in liberal politics. While liberal 
politics does not require people to make particular judgements or 
decisions, it does require constraints on how such decisions are made. In 
other words, liberal politics is concerned with controlling, as Frazer 
(2007:255) puts it, “the power to decide how we are going to decide”. This 
is where democracy comes in. It makes the exercise of power public, and 
subjects it to public authority. Here liberal democracy can be seen as an 
institutional safeguard of fundamental liberal values. It takes as its starting 
point the liberal values of autonomy and equality between citizens as 
decision makers, and institutionalises this principle in the form of formal 
equality of votes. This in turn ensures that all citizens have a voice in 
political discussion and decision-making, and hence a share of political 
                                                 
4
 Legitimacy is of course a slippery term. There are different kinds of legitimacy. Max 
Weber for instance, argues that there are three forms of legitimacy, based on different 
types of authority: charismatic, traditional and legal rational. But for liberals such as J S 
Mill, legitimacy in a liberal society means far more than merely allowed by law; it depends 
on ‘the consent and authorization of the people’ themselves (Baum 2000:96) 
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power. Democracy, as Stoker (2006:9) points out, delivers at a very basic 
level: “it cannot guarantee you a happy life, but it makes government and 
power-holders in society inclined to look after your basic necessities”. 
Influence in turn provides scope for action. On one hand, the formal 
political equality between citizens as decision makers makes it possible for 
those disadvantaged to challenge the deeply entrenched social and 
economic inequalities, rather than being forced to accept the definition of 
“equality” or “equity” of those already privileged. Of course, this implies 
that social or economic privileges should not automatically translate into 
political inequality and dictate political deliberation. On the other hand, 
liberals such as Mill and Rawls put a high premium on the educative role 
of democracy (Wolff 1998; Zakaras 2007). They believe that political 
participation through voting and other political activities will help people 
become better, more critical citizens. In doing so citizens can empower 
themselves. Thus, although democracy does not always lead to good 
decisions, over time people will learn to be good judges of ends of their 
own and of others themselves. Therefore liberal democratic politics is 
“what makes us free” (Tomkins 2002), both in relation to others and to 
people themselves5.  
 
Politics provides no easy solution to settle conflicts of values. But if the 
society is serious about respecting people as moral equals and about the 
values they hold, the resolution of conflicts between them must be done 
the hard way, by people themselves.  
 
It is not surprising then that both libertarianism and communitarianism 
exhibit certain aversion of politics – that is not to say that they are not 
themselves political – as a way to legitimise the exercise of power. They 
both begin by denying the diversity and conflicts of values. And there can 
be no politics without conflict. Libertarians do this by reducing complex 
social and political relations between individuals to presumably voluntary 
                                                 
5
 It must be pointed out that Tomkins specifically links this view to republicanism of Philip 
Pettit and Hannah Arendt. But it is not difficult to derive the essential values of democratic 
politics from a liberal point of view.  
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economic transactions between economically rational and self-interested 
agents. As Freeman (2001) argues, the liberal conception of political 
power bears a striking resemblance to feudalism where political power is 
exercised privately for private ends. Freeman, however, overlooks an 
additional connection between feudalism and libertarianism, that is, both 
seek to legitimise the exercise of power by referring to taken-for-granted 
regimes of truth, rather than political reason. Divine authority and the 
invisible hand of the market serve a similar function to justify inequalities 
and dominance, which cannot be justified amongst human beings 
themselves.   
 
The absence of politics and struggle is also evident in communitarianism 
and its social capital variant in community (Navarro 2002). The 
communitarian rhetoric of the “natural” or the “organic” characteristics of 
the communities promotes, in Brent (2004:218)’s words, “a depoliticizing 
myth by which social inequality becomes natural difference” because such 
rhetoric obscures the fact that the supposedly “natural” facets of humanity 
are always “riddled with and constituted through power”. Unsurprisingly, 
orthodox communitarian thinkers, as Adrian Little (2002:154) observers, 
see politics as “something to be overcome to the greatest possible extent”. 
For them the decision-making process ought to be driven by an apolitical 
morality rather than representative democracy.   
 
The argument here is that liberalism provides the best guarantee that 
individuals in a value-pluralistic society can nevertheless live together and 
resolve their conflicts through participation in politics, without sacrificing 
their claims to autonomy and equal respect to the false gods of the market, 
or the community, or something else.  
 
Of course, liberalism is more than a philosophical idea. It is also a system 
of social and political institutions, such as democracy, Parliament, free 
press and many others. These two concepts of liberalism are 
interdependent: liberal values and beliefs shape the liberal institutions. 
Conversely how these institutions are designed and run determines 
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whether the promise of liberalism can be delivered. So what then is the 
place of bureaucracy within the liberal democratic institutional order?     
  
  18 
3 Liberal democracy and bureaucracy: Dialogue between 
Mill and Weber 
 
There is no easy fit between bureaucracy and liberal democracy. But as 
Paul du Gay (2000; 2004) argues, an abstract celebration or denunciation 
of “bureaucracy” would make little sense, as there are many different kinds 
of bureaucratic organisations. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify certain 
characteristics that make organisations “bureaucratic” and possibly 
problematic, based on which one can then conceptualise different 
bureaucratic organisations and differing degrees of compatibility with 
liberal democracy. Weber’s theory of bureaucracy as an “ideal type” thus 
provides an important tool to understand bureaucracy.   
 
As Warner (2001) argues, the Weberian account can be usefully 
supplemented by that of J S Mill, which is clearest in his essay, 
Consideration on Representative Government. One reason for the utility of 
Mill’s theory is that Mill explicitly posits bureaucracy within representative 
government. This enables Mill to connect his account directly with liberal 
political philosophy, while Weber’s account is mainly analytical and 
descriptive. Mill’s theory is fundamentally concerned with how the 
relationship between democracy and bureaucracy can be configured to 
reduce the danger of bureaucratisation, while Weber, as Campbell and 
Peters (1988:80) comment, might be seen as “attempting to protect the 
State from the excess of politicians”.  
 
A useful starting point would be the meaning of bureaucracy. Here the 
Weberian theory becomes slightly fuzzy, as Weber never explicitly defined 
bureaucracy, at least in its general sense (Albrow 1970). Nonetheless, 
Weber’s specific concept of modern bureaucracy can be understood by 
reference to his idea of “legal-rational” authority. Here modern 
bureaucracy is characterised by its increasingly “rational” orientation, that 
is, it derives political authority from adherence to law or other explicit 
formal rules, which in turn is based on formal knowledge (Weber 1978). 
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy is highly legalistic, which reflects the 
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Rechtstaat tradition of continental Europe (Lynn 2006). This partly explains 
the differences between Mill’s and Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. Rather 
than taking the abstract concept of law and enlightened knowledge as a 
starting point, Mill goes directly after those who control them. Thus, “the 
essence and meaning of bureaucracy” for Mill is that “the work of 
government has been in the hands of governors by profession” (1962: 
245). In doing so Mill circumvents the reified myth of legal authority: after 
all, law is not a thing in itself. Nonetheless Mill shares Weber’s emphasis 
on knowledge. It is the claim to professional knowledge, rather than 
adherence to rules as such, that underlines professional and bureaucratic 
power. The relationship between bureaucracy and democracy therefore 
can be understood as a balance between technical competence and 
political participation.  
 
In this light it is easy to see why, despite their contradictions, bureaucracy 
and liberal democracy need each other, a point which is often lost in the 
single-minded attacks on the alleged bureaucratic inefficiency. 
Bureaucratic knowledge provides the instrumental means for whatever the 
substantive ends chosen through the political process. In Weber’s word, 
“the fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other 
organisations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical 
modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the 
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction 
and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point 
in a strictly bureaucratic administration” (Weber 1978:214). While 
bureaucratic organisations may not necessarily possess the “technical 
superiority” or “efficiency” as Weber envisages – a point which will be 
discussed further below – without bureaucracy of one form or another, 
modernity would have been impossible because of the enormous demand 
on society, economy and the state.  However bureaucracy also serves an 
important substantive purpose within the liberal democratic order. As du 
Gay (2000:76) argues, the formal rationality of bureaucracy is “not 
consequent with the development of an attitude of amoral instrumentalism, 
but on the cultivation of a liberal-pluralist ethics of responsibility which 
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does take into account the consequences of attempting to realize the 
essentially contextable values that frequently come into conflict with other 
values”. In other words, the bureaucratic ethos of impersonality without 
“regard to persons” can be regarded as an expression of liberal impartiality 
between values. Thus Weber has good reason to insist that “the choice is 
only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism” (1978:223).  
 
Mill is certainly not blind to the benefits of bureaucracy. In Mill’s view, 
bureaucracy and democracy can and must be complementary. 
“Government by trained officials cannot do, for a country, the things which 
can be done by a free government; but it might be supposed capable of 
doing some things which free government cannot do” (Mill 1962:247). 
However a subtle but nonetheless important difference that sets Mill and 
Weber apart, is that Mill is clear that the benefits of bureaucracy must be 
measured against the fundamental value of freedom. Without bureaucratic 
means, Mill argues, “freedom cannot produce its best effects and often 
breaks down together”. It is because the fundamental importance of 
freedom that bureaucracy is essential. Yet, it is a matter of principle that 
“there cannot be a moment’s hesitation between representative 
government…and the most perfect imaginable bureaucracy” (ibid.). For 
bureaucracy, as Mill sees it, poses fundamental challenges to liberal 
values.  
 
Firstly, there are potential conflicts between bureaucratic and liberal 
values. But first of all one must be clear about what exactly the values of 
bureaucracy are. One potential candidate is “efficiency”. Yet, the notion 
that bureaucratic organisations are “efficient”, which had been mistakenly 
attributed to Weber (Gregory 2007a), seems almost incomprehensible, 
especially against the popular image of bureaucratic inertia and red tape. 
This does not mean that one must abandon Weber’s account, however. 
The problem, some argue, is that something has been lost in translation 
(Gajdunshek 2003). As Albrow (1970) argues, the Weberian concept of 
bureaucracy is based more on the idea of rationality, rather than efficiency. 
Arguments over whether or not bureaucracy is efficient, or whether it could 
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be made more efficient, are no doubt important, but they miss the point. 
Efficiency, after all, is in the eye of the beholder. In its basic sense as 
employment of means to achieve a given ends, it simply evokes the 
uncertainty and complexity of defining the ends in the first place6.  
 
So that bureaucracy is “inefficient” does not make bureaucracy less 
attractive or less bureaucratic. (Conversely making bureaucracy more 
efficient does not make it less bureaucratic.) It simply means there are 
disagreements over the bureaucratic definition of efficiency. Yet this is 
precisely where the central value of bureaucracy lies. What it offers is not 
“efficiency” as such, but rather, as an alternative to democracy, fewer 
disagreements. Bureaucracy is in one sense “simply the way of 
transforming social actions into rational actions” (Gregory 2007a:226). 
Appeals to reason, or rationality, are supposed to settle argument and thus 
reduce uncertainty. It is in this sense that Weber links rationality with 
efficiency (Gajduschek 2003; Hummel 1994). 
 
This concept of bureaucracy can be understood through the lens of 
instrumental and substantive rationality (or Zweckrationalitat and 
Wertrationalitat). The former is primarily concerned with the “objective” 
selection of best means towards given ends, whatever those ends might 
be. The latter by contrast relates to substantive choices between values, 
which are ends in themselves and not means to some other ends 
(Brubaker 1984). For Weber, instrumental rationality defines bureaucratic 
expertise, while substantive rationality characterises democratic politics.  
 
This conception makes plain the tension between the bureaucratic virtue 
of uncertainty reduction and the democratic freedom of plurality of values. 
                                                 
6
 The libertarian thinker, Murray Rothbard, has argued that  ‘social efficiency is a 
meaningless concept because efficiency is how effectively one employs means to reach 
given ends. But with more than one individual, who determines the ends toward which the 
means are to be employed? The ends of different individuals are bound to conflict, 
making any added or weighted concept of social efficiency absurd’ (Rothbard 1982: n.8). 
Yet, as a libertarian, he would have denied that individuals’ ends are in fact socially 
chosen and that efficiency is inevitably social. Another interpretation would be to 
recognise that all these different possibilities of ‘efficiency’ are equally valid.   
  22 
The instrumentally rational bureaucracy is vulnerable to the problem of 
“goal displacement” (Blau 1955; Bohte and Meier 2000; Merton 1968). In 
bureaucratic organisations, means have a tendency to become ends in 
themselves, which, as Gregory (2007a: 226) argues, is “not so much a 
form of bureaucratic irrationality as a paradox inherent in all large 
organisations”. That paradox, in Weberian terms, is the domination of 
instrumental rationality over substantive rationality. But the real danger of 
“goal domination” is not that bureaucratic instrumentality creates a moral 
or ethical vacuum, or that it displaces certain valuable ends (there would 
inevitably be disagreements over what those ends actually are, at any 
rate).   Rather, it provides no robust public process for debates or 
deliberation about the chosen ends.   
 
In other words, the outcome of “goal displacement” – there might be 
legitimate reason for reconstructing some means as ends, or vice versa 
and in any case the means/ends dichotomy is a false one – is less 
important than the process by which this happens. Goal displacement is 
not so much a result of intentional capture, or “corruption” by political 
interests, but rather it arises out of the separation between bureaucratic 
and political processes of decision-making, or the politics/administration 
dichotomy. There is a risk that the instrumentality becomes an easy 
excuse for arriving at value judgements that would not stand the scrutiny 
of the democratic process (Turner 1994).  Philip Selznick similarly 
highlights the risk that political purposes could be subverted by pragmatic 
organisational responses to local political imperatives, in his work on 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (Selznick 1949; Gregory 2007a). J Q 
Wilson (1989:73), by contrast, argues that what happens to TVA is a result 
of “law, experience and professional norms” rather than “sinister private 
interest”. There is no necessary conflict between these two explanations7. 
The point is that, when decisions are made purely on instrumental 
considerations, some substantive ends must be presumed to be true or 
                                                 
7
 It could be argued that Wilson’s explanation is predicated on a false dichotomy. After all 
law, experience and professional norms are themselves shaped by different interests, not 
limited to professions’ own.     
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worthwhile of pursuing, whatever they are. Wilson does make the point 
that focusing solely on particular “sinister” interests will not solve the 
problem of goal displacement.  Even if it succeeds in eliminating one 
interest, there are many others.  
 
The emphasis on uncertainty reduction through instrumental reason is 
related to the second problem. That is, the dehumanising effects of 
bureaucracy. The subjectivity and caprice of human beings, and the 
complexity of their social interaction with each other, obviously run counter 
to this desire. Weber explains that 
 
[Bureaucracy] develops the more perfectly, the more it is 
‘dehumanised’, the more it succeeds in eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and 
emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific 
nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue (Weber 
1947:216). 
 
Interestingly, both Weber and later Hummel note that this dehumanising 
effect is consistent with the need of a capitalist market economy in which 
the predictability of potential customers is a prerequisite of modern mass 
production (Weber 1947: 215; Hummel 1994).  
 
The conventional charge of dehumanisation against bureaucracy is that it 
reifies the relations between human beings (between bureaucrats and 
citizens, and amongst citizens themselves) as if “things in themselves”. If 
bureaucracy is conceived as a legal rational authority (rather than, say, 
“governors by profession”), then reification seems unavoidable. “In 
administering the law, how can a bureaucrat avoid reifying the law”, asks 
Farmer (1995:35). The bureaucracy as an embodiment of the law and 
reason, stands as foreign objects towards human beings and demands 
their obedience, while the human architects of these social structures – 
those who control the bureaucracy and those who make law – remain 
hidden in the background. Bureaucracy, in Hannah Arendt’s words, is the 
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“rule of nobody” (Arendt 1963). This “unavoidable” reification in turn 
fragments the full personhood of individuals and reduces them to 
impersonal “cases” to be administered “without regard to persons”, and 
simultaneously transforms bureaucrats themselves into “cogs in a 
machine” supposedly without their own moral agency. Of course reified 
things are, in the end, myths. But they are powerful myths that act on 
human consciousness and thus can have very real consequences, as 
exemplified by the actions of bureaucrats in the Nazi regime.  
 
This conventional view has been challenged by Paul du Gay (2000), who 
attempts to justify the bureaucratic capacity to treat individuals as cases 
on the basis of the liberal-pluralist ethics of equality. But du Gay appears 
to have overlooked the qualitative differences between the impartiality of 
bureaucracies within a liberal democracy and the impersonality of a 
Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy. These two are superficially similar, 
just as the “equality” between customers is superficially similar to equality 
between citizens. It is simply not necessary to truncate one’s humanity in 
order to gain equality. And indeed “to treat individuals as cases, apart from 
status and ascription”, as du Gay (2000:42) prescribes, by definition fails 
to treat all individuals as equals with inherent rights to challenge their 
unequal status and ascriptions. It says nothing about how these “cases” 
are to be treated by bureaucrats and by other individuals.  
 
However, this side issue does allude to the central fact that, as Russell 
and Gregory (2007:343) argue, that “legal rational authority…is always 
conditional and not absolute”. However, the problem is precisely that the 
reification of bureaucratic relations tends to disguise its conditionality that 
limits on how far one can really treat people as “cases”.   
 
Finally, Weber is clearly concerned about the displacement of democratic 
politics as a result of bureaucratisation. The very nature of a Weberian 
bureaucracy makes it inimical to the democratic process. Weber stresses 
the fact “that ‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the ‘rule’ of bureaucracy, 
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in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion 
of bureaucratisation” (1947:231).  
 
Weber is pessimistic about the prospect of democracy in the struggle for 
power and control. He believes that  
 
the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always over-
towering. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the 
‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert’, facing the trained 
officials who stand within the management of administration (Weber 
1947:232).   
 
The appeal to “objective” expertise of law (or economics) is hard to resist, 
compared to the messy, “irrational” and inconclusive process of political 
compromise and conciliation. Indeed, the very need for political 
compromise is marginalised by the imperative of control. Control demands 
mastery of all things by calculation, including taking control of other human 
beings. Such inherent tension underlines the two folded dangers of 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis politics, according to Hummel (1994:227). On one 
hand, “bureaucracy creates the illusion that all problems, including political 
ones, can be translated into administrative and technical ones”. On the 
other, “bureaucracy produces a truncated politics that itself rests on 
bureaucratic assumptions, thereby obscuring the possibility of a full human 
politics”. What has been lost in translation however is something 
fundamental to democratic legitimacy, that is, people should have at least 
a voice and a share of power in making decisions about their own ends.  
 
For Weber, the threat of bureaucratic domination, especially for 
democracy, also comes from a particular source. For Weber, “the concept 
of ‘official secret’ is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so 
fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude” (Weber 1947:233-
234). Despite a gradually spreading culture of openness, today’s society in 
fact makes the construction of “secrecy” much easier, rather than harder, 
than ever before. It is the increasing amount, and complexity of formal 
  26 
knowledge, rather than the crude and untenable insistence on official 
confidentiality, that constitutes a barrier to knowledge. It does not mean 
that confidentiality has necessarily declined in importance: it still persists in 
the name of legal and commercial privilege, intellectual property, and even 
old-fashioned national interest. This deals a fatal blow to democratic 
politics. Without information to talk about, political discourse is bound to be 
constrained. Moreover, ignorance of citizens and their representatives 
naturally increases the prestige of experts and reinforces their grip of 
power.  
 
Weber refers to bureaucratic domination as the “stahlhartes Gehause”. As 
Peter Baehr (2001) argues, this is more accurately translated as “shell as 
hard as steel”, rather than “iron cage”. The former better reflects Weber’s 
concern that modernity may have come to produce a new kind of human 
being, who is not merely constrained in their otherwise intact power, but 
actually disempowered. Hannah Arendt voices similar concerns that 
bureaucratic organisations can socialise people to see themselves “not as 
actors but as those acted upon” (May 1996:70). Yet, if one were to believe 
that where there is power there is resistance, the more complete the 
domination might appear, the higher risk that it might lead to catastrophic 
collapse.  
 
Mill’s diagnosis of the danger of bureaucracy bears striking similarity to 
Weber’s. He is aware of the tension between bureaucratic rationality and 
value pluralism. Bureaucracy tends to become routines, but “whatever 
becomes of routines loses its vital principle” (Mill 1962: 167). Equally Mill 
understands perfectly the dehumanising tendency of bureaucracy, when 
he argues that “the more perfect that organisation is in itself…the more 
complete is the bondage of all” (1962: 167). And finally, Mill is similarly 
concerned that the rise of bureaucratic power might mean that “nothing to 
which the bureaucracy is really adverse to can be done at all” (1962: 246). 
However Mill and Weber differ significantly on the solutions. Unlike Weber, 
Mill is optimistic about the ability of “a popular government to enable 
conceptions of man of original genius to prevail over the obstructive spirit 
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of trained mediocrity”.  Perhaps what makes it easier, or more natural, for 
Mill is that his conception of bureaucracy is embedded in his construction 
of liberalism, which enables him to fold the problem of bureaucracy into a 
general political perspective. From this vantage point, the tensions 
between bureaucracy and democracy mirror the paradoxes inherent in 
liberal political philosophy itself, namely between value pluralism and 
particular “truths”, between individuals and society, and between politics of 
compromise and control by expertise. Thus paradoxically the antidote to 
bureaucratic ills lies in the vitality of the democratic polity itself.  
 
Perhaps the most ingenious aspect of Mill’s scheme of balancing 
bureaucracy and democracy is that Mill does not seek to “control” 
bureaucracy, but rather to reassert the primacy of politics over it. This 
point holds key to understanding how Mill’s approach will work.  
 
At the heart of Mill’s scheme is that the final decision making power should 
remain in the hands of the people. The people must be “masters, 
whenever they please, over all operations of government”. There is a 
need, Mill acknowledges, “to secure to the representative body the control 
over everything in the last resort” (Mill 1962: 228-229). In other words, 
political sovereignty must reside with the representative body, which 
makes it clear that bureaucracy cannot be a power in its own right. Thus 
while Mill distinguishes between functions of “government by trained 
officials” and “free government”, he does not envisage a demarcation 
between politics and administration. It follows then while the representative 
body needs to delegate its power, it must nonetheless have “the final seal 
of national assent”, which gives it the necessary leverage of actual power.  
 
But perhaps more importantly Mill envisages the representative body as a 
political constraint on bureaucracy 
 
to throw the light of publicity on its acts: to compel a full exposition 
and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; 
to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose 
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the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which 
conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from 
office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors 
(1962:239). 
 
This is not simply the cliché that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. Rather 
the emphasis on publicity is to secure “unlimited latitude of suggestion and 
criticism”, which may well confuse rather than clarify, and yet is intrinsically 
valuable because it brings the diversity of values to bear on bureaucratic 
acts. The point is not to increase “transparency” as such, but rather to 
problematise the certainty and predictability and to expose expert opinions 
to non-expert value judgements. Here Mill appeals to “the ideal of 
liberalism to defuse the claims of the knowledgeable” (Currie and 
Musgrave 1985:93). Mill requires the less knowledgeable should be “led 
with their eyes open and give the best assent they can, unforcedly, freely 
and on the basis of such information and argument as they can be given”. 
But it is precisely because people are not experts, and without a presumed 
frame of mind, that there is a range of choice which enables one to 
recognise the wise and noble amongst us (Ryan 1974). Here 
representativeness provides a countervailing influence against 
bureaucratic norms.  
 
Implicitly, in this notion is also an affirmation of the essentially human 
nature of the relations between bureaucrats, and the people and their 
representatives. The authority of bureaucrats to lead ultimately depends 
not on their claim to the impersonal authority of superior knowledge, but 
rather on them being able to obtain the interpersonal trust from the people, 
which can be removed by people themselves. Power held on trust is not 
given unconditionally. It depends critically on those who are in positions of 
power to exercise such trust responsibly. Such responsibility is thus broad 
rather than specific. It does not require, and indeed is not dependent on 
knowledge of the technical details. Instead it requires the experts to justify 
their actions to those who do not have such knowledge and to satisfy 
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whatever questions they might have. This helps to correct the inherent 
imbalance of power between experts and non-experts.  
 
Finally, Mill emphasises the most important role for the representative 
body is not to do, but to talk, and to ensure as diverse and wide a range of 
voices as possible. Mill urges his readers to value the deliberative capacity 
of the representative body and criticises those who dismiss it as mere 
talks:  
 
A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can 
have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the 
government and of all other interests and opinions, can compel them 
to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do not, is in 
itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important 
political institutions that can exist any where, and one of the foremost 
benefits of free government (1962:107). 
 
And in doing so, he highlights the centrality of politics in testing competing 
versions of “truths” through “reconciling and combining oppositions…by a 
rough process of struggle between combatants fighting under hostile 
banners” (ibid.). The emphasis on talk reflects the priority on democratic 
legitimacy. For Mill it is essential talk must precede doing, for it is 
necessary to convince the people first through dialogue in order to secure 
their trust. Here lies the power of talking, even if talking will not directly 
stop “doing”. There are intrinsic values in dialogue, as Mill argues, and by 
insisting on it one resists the bureaucratisation of politics. Moreover, Mill 
believes that dialogue might bring more fundamental changes, as “it is 
what men think determines how they act”. Changing hearts and minds is 
the unique ability of politics, one which the representative body actually 
has a leverage over bureaucracy.  
 
The brilliance of Mill’s scheme is that it brings out the essential features of 
humanity: the ability to talk, to listen, to judge, to deliberate and to trust 
and makes it the final word on bureaucratic action. The logic is simple: it is 
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futile to control the bureaucracy by inventing ever more sophisticated 
controls, which will only make it even more “bureaucratic”. Rather it is by 
actually practising humanity – that is by actively engaging in politics – that 
it can be saved from bureaucratisation.  
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 4 The Political Constitution of Westminster 
 
Mill’s idea of balancing bureaucracy within democracy sets out the guiding 
principle for a liberal democratic institutional order. Constitutions in turn 
give concrete shape and practical expression to this institutional order. 
Conversely, the justification for certain constitutional principles or norms 
can be found in the political argument as laid out above. Here constitutions 
are, like “bureaucracy”, Weberian “ideal-types”. Constitutions in reality 
never neatly fit with whatever political theorists might expect of them. But it 
nonetheless tells one how well the fit is, and why certain things, however 
they come into being, must be defended and strengthened if one is to 
uphold the ideals of liberal democracy.  
 
Unsurprisingly, there are different approaches to constitutions. A 
conventional view is that constitutions are attempts to limit government by 
law and based the legitimacy of government action on that law. Such a 
concept, which can loosely be called legal constitutionalism, is familiar to 
continental Europeans and Americans, as well as constitutional lawyers. 
However, the Westminster constitutional system, which is most relevant to 
New Zealand, belongs to a quite different tradition. It seeks to ground 
constitutions in the supremacy of politics rather than law (Bellamy 2007; 
Griffith 1979, 2000; Tomkins 2002, 2005). This as will be shown below is 
the rationale underpinning the characteristics of Westminster norms of 
parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial responsibility and civil service 
neutrality8. And it explains why the Westminster constitution is liberal in 
character and why these essential principles should not be undermined.  
 
Particular attention will be paid to its implication for democratic control of 
bureaucracy. This is not difficult. While the debates are often framed in 
legal terms, it can easily be seen as a particular example of the struggle 
for supremacy between what is essentially a legal-rational authority 
                                                 
8
 This is, of course, a simplified description of the Westminster system, to which one can 
add numerous others (Rhodes and Weller 2005). Nonetheless, these three are amongst 
the core components of the Westminster constitution, and are the most directly relevant 
for the purpose here.  
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composed of legal experts – Weber and Mill’s conception of bureaucracy – 
on one hand, and the politicians and people on the other. 
 
Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
At the heart of the Westminster system is the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. The doctrine, according to Albert Dicey, simply means the 
ability of Parliament “to make or unmake any law whatsoever”, and no 
person or body has the right to override or set aside legislation of 
Parliament (Dicey 1915:34-35). But this textbook definition, by stressing 
legal supremacy, is actually misleading, because the legal process where 
disputes are brought to definitive settlements by an ultimate judicial 
authority is very different from a political one (Gordon 1999:52). Perhaps 
the most critical difference is that the legal doctrine of sovereignty requires 
assuming “the law” as the authoritative source of truth – hence the 
possibility of definitive settlements and the need for an ultimate authority – 
while the political process is contingent on the rejection of such a notion 
and the reification that almost inevitably comes with it. Indeed, there is 
very little one can say to justify parliamentary sovereignty in this sense. 
Parliament is not particularly good at doing what lawyers are trained to do, 
and as Mill would have argued, should not have tried in the first place.  
 
Rather, the definition and justification for the doctrine is and must be a 
political one. In fact, this is evident in the historical origin of the doctrine, 
which evolved out of the bitter and sometimes bloody struggle between 
Parliament and the Crown in 17th Century Britain (Goldsworthy 1999; 
Tomkins 2001; 2005).  What is at stake is not the control of legislation as 
such, but the control of political power. And the achievement of the 17th 
Century constitutional settlement is that Parliament’s political authority 
prevails over the divine authority of the Crown.   
 
This means the debates can be reframed. The charge against 
parliamentary sovereignty often claims that it provides insufficient 
safeguards for certain values such as basic human rights. The implicit 
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assumption is that there is an “objective order of values”, whatever that 
might be, the denial of which is by definition tyranny. No doubt, an 
argument can be made that good government, or efficient administration, 
is part of this indisputable, or rather undebatable,  objective order of 
values, and therefore should be insulated from parliamentary power. This 
might seem simple to lawyers, but it will not do in a liberal pluralist polity. 
For the interpretations and enforcement of such fundamental values, and 
indeed the construction of values in the first place, are themselves acts of 
power, given the possibility of many other alternative conflicting 
interpretations.  
 
In this context “sovereignty” means the final say on the conflicts between 
rival values. And the reason Parliament must be politically sovereign is not 
because it is the most effective way to realise certain fundamental values, 
but rather it “best gives effects to the principle of popular sovereignty, 
whereby people in a self-governing community are empowered” (Ewing 
quoted in Bradley 2004:57). This in turn flows from the fact that, as Mulgan 
(1997b:99) puts it, Parliament is still 
 
the only institution of the central state whose members are chosen by 
the people. It is the only forum in which the members of the political 
executive are regularly obliged to answer for their actions.  
 
One might add that it is the only place where bureaucratic organisations 
are subject to scrutiny and compelled to obtain assent from the people for 
its powers. Moreover, no other institutions give the formal 
acknowledgement of citizens as equals, as parliamentary democracy 
does, through fair and regular elections and through open access to its 
process. Of course, such a process is far from perfect. The quality of 
elective process necessarily determines the degree of representativeness 
of Parliament and its claim to power. But it is still far better to live with an 
“elective dictatorship”, as Lord Halisham calls it, than an unelected 
dictatorship.  
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The political doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty eschews the difficulties 
with the legal doctrine. Rather than creating a Hobbesian “sovereign” 
power, it ensures that political power is ultimately subjected to political 
constraints through the parliamentary and democratic process in which all 
citizens have an equal right to participate. It makes certain that whatever 
decisions made will always be open to challenges and that the society is 
not stuck with a particular version of basic values or fundamental rights 
passed down by those already powerful. In doing so, it acknowledges that 
no value judgements are free of mistakes and caveats, and preserves the 
possibility and scope for political actions and redresses. Certainty is not a 
virtue in this process, however desirable it may seem. And the lack of it 
underlines the reason why legal administrative or economic bureaucracies 
are absolutely necessary. However, to quote Griffith (2000:165), “if we are 
to create a more just and a more free society, we must do it the hard way 
– without Moses”.  
 
How then can Parliament fulfil its constitutional role? Legislative power is 
important. So is the control of public finance. Both affirm that the ultimate 
control remain with Parliament and provide means through which it can be 
exercised. And both have a symbolic importance in Westminster 
constitutional history. But, for all the arguments that Parliament should be 
more “assertive” in its legislative or financial functions, it would be useful to 
be reminded that, to quote Mill, these are “instruments of political warfare, 
which no one desires to see used but no one likes to part with” (1962:239). 
They are more useful in crises than in a healthy polity. Thus the dilemma 
for Parliament is that it seems to have few usable and effective powers.  
 
This does not have to be the case, as Tomkins argues. Rather than 
adhering to the late Victorian invention of Parliament’s function as a 
legislator, one should instead focus on its more enduring and, in the long 
term, more promising role as a scrutiniser of government (Tomkins 2003a; 
2003b). In fact, everything that Parliament does potentially gives it the 
opportunity to probe and criticise the action of Government (McGee 
2005:4). The question, therefore, is how to make scrutiny more effective, 
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which as a deliberative forum Parliament is actually good at, rather than 
competing for direct control with the Executive. Here lies Parliament’s real 
power over the Executive, as Bernard Crick (1964: 80-81) once remarks, 
in “influence not direct power; advice not command; intrusion, not 
obstruction; scrutiny, not initiation; and publicity not secrecy”. And it is the 
role consistent with what Mill envisaged for this representative forum.  
 
Parliament’s legislative and financial control functions are actually 
important parts of this scrutiny role (Tomkins 2003a). The provide windows 
of opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise government policies and 
operation beyond the particular bill or estimate. Parliament has other 
opportunities available, particularly through the select committee systems 
which have become increasingly important in Westminster countries such 
as New Zealand and elsewhere. It is also supported by parliamentary 
officers such as the Auditor-General and others. All of these enable 
Parliament to reach into the executive and bureaucracy and scrutinise 
their actions and inactions.  
 
The key to effective scrutiny is information. Without informed 
understanding scrutiny will be meaningless. As Max Weber observed  
 
In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy, out of a sure power instinct, 
the bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a 
powerless parliament (1947:234) 
 
It is absolutely essential therefore to ensure that Parliament has unfettered 
access to information. But the use of information is not simply to shed light 
on plain truth. Parliament scrutiny is not simply about checking the facts or 
verifying the information presented to it. Rather it must be an interactive 
and interpretive process through the political and substantive meanings 
and implications of administrative actions are distilled and contested, so 
that their legitimacy can be ensured.  In such a process, the willingness to 
engage in dialogue itself is just as valuable as the availability of 
information. As is often said by the Speaker during Question Time, the 
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answer may not have been to the satisfaction of members, but the Minister 
did address the question. The fact that there is an expectation to answer at 
all is in itself a check on those who are expected to answer, and an 
insurance for those who ask searching questions on behalf of the people, 
for there is inevitably a political price to pay for poor answers in a 
deliberative forum.  
 
Ministerial Responsibility  
 
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility is a necessary complement of 
parliamentary sovereignty. As Smith (2005:104) puts it, “ministerial 
responsibility is the hinge of the constitution” with Ministers, collectively 
and individually as “the conduit between the people’s representatives and 
the Crown in whose name government is conducted”. The discussion here 
will focus on individual ministerial responsibility, as it is directly relevant to 
the issues discussed in this thesis.  
 
Ministerial responsibility has always had its critics. Recently such criticisms 
have been more intense. For its critics, the doctrine is confusing – it has 
been variously called “the enveloping haze”, “the procreation of eels” and 
“the hoariest chestnuts of the constitution” (Marshall 1986; Palmer and 
Palmer 2004; Rhodes 2005).  – and ineffective, in need of clarification or 
even replacement by something altogether more clear and more 
enforceable. Yet despite numerous obituaries, recent events in the UK 
appear to show that ministerial responsibility is much more resilient than it 
has been given credit for (Polidano 2000; Woodhouse 2004). Interestingly, 
in the UK, the reassertion of ministerial responsibility occurred after the 
managerial reforms that, according to Savoie (2003:254) “had reduced 
accountability more than any shortcomings of ministerial responsibility”.  
 
So it is quite possible, as Savoie (2003: 257) suggests, that “many 
commentators who are calling for the doctrine to be jettisoned may not 
fully understand its application”. And consequently this is often confused 
with, and by, managerial accountability” (Woodhouse
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difference is fundamental and it points to the basis of ministerial 
responsibility in parliamentary democracy, namely that “Parliament is 
entitled to know how the power of the state, which it has assigned, is being 
used” (d’Ombrain quoted in Savoie 2003:257). In other words, the essence 
of the doctrine is the political responsibility for power. Thus conceived, 
ministerial responsibility serves as a bridge between bureaucracy and 
representative government: it facilitates parliamentary scrutiny by securing 
and providing information upwards and, in turn, helps to ensure political 
legitimacy of bureaucratic actions through delegation. Moreover the logic 
of having a politician taking responsibility for bureaucratic acts is that the 
political/power dimension of bureaucratic actions themselves cannot be 
easily avoided. This holds the key to understanding the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility.  
 
A focus on power help explain why the Minister is the focus of the 
responsibility, rather than bureaucrats or managers who actually deliver 
the goods, and why it is the Minister who must be responsible for the 
conduct of their officials even if he/she does not have direct control over. 
The latter is known as “vicarious” responsibility (Mulgan 2002; Scott 1962). 
This concept often creates confusion, however, partly because the 
contrast between “vicarious” and personal/primary responsibility easily 
lends itself unfortunately to all sorts of dichotomies that were probably not 
intended originally. Such a distinction is based on a distinctive causal 
notion of responsibility. The problem with such a conception is that it 
inevitably falters in political reality when causality is often ambiguous, and 
when individual shares of collective actions are difficult to determine. 
Adherence to the causal notion of ministerial responsibility therefore tends 
to paralyse the doctrine, and renders it ineffective. Moreover, it often 
seems to leave little choice but to either invent an artificial boundary 
between Ministers and Officials can be made responsible for, directly and 
causally, that inevitably leave a large gap over the grey areas, or to blame 
the fictitious “system”. And yet, as Smith (2005:109) observes, “if public 
servants were given more direct authority and…more direct accountability, 
then this would undercut the authority and responsibility of Ministers”. This 
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in turn is likely to increase the risk of blame shifting for collective failures. 
The problem is well understood by J S Mill, in fact, as he cautions that  
 
responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible. Nor 
even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. To 
maintain it at its highest there must be one person who receives the 
whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill 
(1962: 332).  
 
Yet a more “traditional” reading of the doctrine easily dissolves such 
difficulties. For the doctrine allows Ministers to take the whole credit and 
requires them to take the full blame, simple because of who they are. This 
is the role notion of responsibility, which, explains Woodhouse (2002:77) 
following H L Hart, “arises from the minister’s ‘distinctive place or office’”. It 
implies that, Woodhouse adds, “Ministers are constitutionally responsible 
for their department not because of their detailed involvement in 
departmental affairs, but because of the positions of public trust they held” 
(ibid.). It is therefore the role of the Ministers to ensure that the power of 
the state, which keeps the “system” running, is used consistently with 
public expectation, no matter who exercises it on their behalf. In this way, 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility ensures that personal 
responsibility for collective, bureaucratic, actions will not be lost, because 
responsibility can always be traced up the hierarchical line to the Ministers 
and the Prime Minister.  
 
There are a number of well-established ways that Ministers can give 
effects to the doctrine. The minimum of responsibility is answerability for 
personal and departmental actions. In addition there is a requirement for 
rectification. And finally Ministers may be asked to resign (Joseph 2001; 
Mulgan 2002; Smith 2005; Woodhouse 1994). Critics of ministerial 
responsibility often point to its inadequacies in terms of these components, 
particularly the lack of resignation.  
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But there is a risk that focusing solely on these means might obscure the 
point that ministerial responsibility is political, and not legal. It “begins and 
ends in exercises of political judgment” (Uhr 2005a: 6). Political judgment 
goes two ways; it includes not only that of the Ministers and other 
politicians involved, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that of 
Parliament and the public on the roles of Ministers. The implication is that 
ministerial responsibility cannot guarantee either the distribution of blame 
or enforcement of sanction. As everything political, ministerial 
responsibility provides much less certainty than legal requirements.  
Understandably, this may be a source of frustration for some who believe 
that Ministers are clearly culpable and deserve punishment. And 
opposition will always ask for heads to roll. But in politics causal relations 
are rarely as clear-cut and there will inevitably be disagreements over the 
existence and degree of responsibility for collective actions, which are 
themselves political. Therefore, one danger with “clarifying” ministerial 
responsibility is that it may restrict the scope of political responsibility and 
bind it to a causal notion of responsibility. Moreover, raising the bar higher 
might actually make it difficult for the public to hold Ministers responsible 
for lesser offences. This is why that attempts to codify ministerial 
responsibility in Australia and the UK “may have done more to sabotage 
the convention than to preserve it”, as one commentator puts it in the 
Australian case (Raffin 2008; Tomkins 1996; 1998). To increase legal 
responsibility may well reduce political responsibility.  
 
A political conception of the ministerial responsibility also means a 
reappraisal of the relative importance of the different elements of 
responsibility. In this light, the “minimum” requirement of answerability is 
arguably the most important component of responsibility. Responsibility as 
answerability to Parliament is not to be confused with (managerial) 
accountability as distinct from responsibility.  Given a role notion of 
responsibility, such a distinction between accountability and responsibility 
is less appropriate (Woodhouse 2002). As Woodhouse explains, the role 
notion of responsibility entails a shift in focus to: 
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first, whether the minister has been negligent or incompetent in the 
overall supervision of his department, a conclusion that may be 
reached when there has been a succession of errors or when, after a 
major incident, there are found to be systematic failures within the 
department. Secondly, whether the minister responds adequately, in 
terms of explanation and amendatory action, when things go wrong. 
The emphasis is therefore on giving information and satisfying 
Parliament and the public that mistakes have been rectified and 
mechanisms established to prevent a reoccurrence on similar errors 
(2002:78-79). 
 
So responsibility as answerability may be “a matter of political and 
organisational house-keeping” (Gregory 2003a: 558). But it also provides 
for political accountability, and therefore political responsibility, for in 
deliberative politics, speech is action.  
 
Neither should one undervalue the significance of amendatory actions. For 
one thing, it often shows the strength of political accountability in 
compelling the Ministers to act. For another, it forces politicians to assume 
more responsibilities and even direct control of the bureaucracy to make 
things happen, taking into account of the opinions expressed by 
Parliament and the public through the debates on responsibility. This is 
significant in itself, particularly with a role notion of responsibility where 
“rectification” is often not simply a matter of righting wrongs, but 
responsiveness to the changing political judgments of Parliament and the 
public.  
 
With regard to resignation, it is generally acknowledged by constitutional 
commentators that resignation is not necessarily required as part of the 
doctrine (Mulgan 2002; Palmer and Palmer 2004; Woodhouse 2002), 
although sometimes not without a note of acquiescence. A focus on 
political responsibility illustrates why the obsession with ministerial 
resignation, or the apparent lack of it, misses the constitutional point. The 
problem is that resignation is often demanded as if an alternative to 
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requirements of answerability and rectification. The need for answerability, 
as argued above, acknowledges that, in most cases, there will be different 
opinions about the extent of political responsibility. It follows therefore 
there will often be different views as to whether mistakes are indeed so 
grave that Ministers have to resign. And it would be naïve to pretend that 
these disagreements do not exist. The doctrine, of course, never says that 
Ministers should not resign for departmental failures. It simply requires 
such decisions to be made by Parliament and ultimately the public 
themselves at the ballot box. If Ministers have so clearly failed to satisfy 
the public, then they should resign, and most likely they will be forced to, 
sooner or later. And if their defence or excuses have been accepted by 
Parliament, then they are perfectly entitled to hold on to their offices, for 
the time being. It must be up to the people themselves, and not some 
presumed moral or ethical standards, to choose their representatives, or to 
dismiss them. As the UK cases show, it does not even matter whether a 
conclusive causal case can be established: Ministers have resigned for 
much less (Woodhouse 2004). Thus a requirement of resignation will not 
add any value to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.   
 
Finally, one can proceed to examine the question of what exactly Ministers 
are responsible for. The answer, in short, is that Ministers are responsible 
for the exercises of their political power, as their roles required, and 
nothing more. This role may include their personal conducts, or their 
actions and inactions, or departmental policies and administration. It is 
impossible and indeed undesirable to specify a laundry list of what they 
should be responsible for (and what they are not). It does not, and should 
not, matter whether the consequences are actually or primarily caused by 
the Ministers. Ministers can be held responsible, or even forced to resign, 
for something which they have only a tenuous involvement, as in the case 
of resignation of Lord Carrington when the Falkland Islands were invaded 
(Woodhouse 2002:74). All that is required is that the public must be 
satisfied that the Ministers have done at least what the public expect them 
to do with the power granted to them. Of course, it may still be true that 
Ministers cannot be sensibly held responsible for everything that goes on 
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in his or her department. The point of the vagueness and ambiguity of 
ministerial responsibility, however, is that ultimately people themselves 
must be convinced of what Ministers, or bureaucrats, are or are not 
responsible for, rather than having to accept some predetermined 
separation which increases the chance of blame shifting and often 
conveniently reduces responsibilities of both. As John Uhr (2005a) argues, 
ministerial responsibility can take on “as rich and sparse a meaning as 
parliamentary antagonists want them to mean”. This is as it should be. 
 
Political Neutrality 
 
Another building block of the Westminster system is a non-partisan and 
expert civil service (Rhodes and Weller 2005). Its constitutional status 
certainly illustrates the intimate relationship between bureaucracy and 
liberal democracy. However, it does not necessarily follow from this 
constitutional importance that the role of public servants in a Westminster 
system is, as some commentators argue, to serve as the “platonic 
guardian of public interests”, independent from the political sphere of 
government (Sossin 2005; Rhodes 2005). In fact, such a notion fits 
perhaps more easily into the German model of civil service than the 
Westminster system. The difference is partly historical. The Prussian 
bureaucracy that Weber described had evolved as an administrative 
institution above underdeveloped politics and eventually became properly 
the guardian of the constitution. In Britain, by contrast, the emergence of 
modern bureaucracy was predated by the constitutional settlement, as a 
part of which the control of bureaucracy was transferred from the Crown to 
the Parliament as a result of the struggle for power (Woodhouse 1997). 
The point here is that taking a longer historical view suggests that the 
purpose of the convention is not to insulate bureaucracy from politics, 
quite the contrary, it is all about political control, by Parliament, over the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, it posits the convention of political neutrality within 
the relationship between Parliament and the public service, rather than 
solely between the government and the latter.  
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This is an important step towards a proper understanding of the 
convention of political neutrality and it helps frame debates around political 
neutrality. In this regard the “government centred” view has certain 
shortcomings. Take, for example, the New Zealand State Services 
Commission’s definition of the doctrine that: 
 
public servants should serve the government of the day 
professionally and impartially, and do nothing that will limit their ability 
to serve, with equal professionalism, future governments of a 
different political persuasion (SSC 2008),. 
 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this statement, which is fairly 
conventional. Yet, on its own, it provides no answer to the old criticism 
that,  
 
Neutrality in public office tends in the end to moral corruption. If all 
governments are to be served with equal impartiality and loyalty there 
are no grounds at all for criticizing the German official who served 
Hitler to the best of his ability. In any profession other than 
government such people would be regarded as dangerous cynics or 
weaklings (Chapman 1963:275).  
 
This does not mean one must abandon the convention of neutrality 
however. It simply points to the risk of looking at the convention in isolation 
of the historical and political contexts. For it overlooks the fact that the 
convention of political neutrality in the Westminster tradition is constrained 
by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This in turns means that 
neutrality and loyalty is grounded in the democratic process. Neutrality and 
loyalty in this context do not mean public servants, as political actors, can 
ever be apolitical, let alone amoral. Quite the contrary, they have a political 
and moral duty to respect institutions of democracy, including whatever 
government that has been democratically elected by the people, and 
because of this reason they must be non-partisan. Thus, the public service 
is not, and cannot be, neutral between the government and the opposition 
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(Mulgan 2006:4, Weller 2003:83). Rather, public servants are required to 
be “political chameleons and there are strict rules to prevent them 
becoming political animals: the logic of the convention is that a political 
chameleon can never be a political animal” (Shepherd 1986:69). And what 
distinguishes these two kinds of animals is that the latter can exercise their 
political power independently while the former cannot. The point of the 
convention therefore is not to protect the instrumentality or objectivity of 
the public service: it is to ensure that public officials are “politicised” in a 
way that is consistent with the political decisions legitimately made through 
the democratic process, rather than the private morality or ethics of their 
own, or the partisan values of those who had not been legitimised by the 
democratic process. The convention of neutrality takes away the 
independent political power of bureaucrats and gives it to politicians, who 
are in turn politically responsible to, and removable by, Parliament. In this 
sense, the justification of political neutrality lies at the very heart of liberal 
democracy.  
 
In this light, Chapman’s objection to the principle of neutrality actually 
confirms the political necessity of neutrality and shows the danger of 
elevating certain values above democratic politics. Hitler’s bureaucrats 
were clearly not “politically neutral” by Westminster standards, for they had 
no commitment to liberal democracy and this alone is enough for 
condemnation. “Constitutional guardians” could easily turn into the enemy 
of democracy. Here lies the conundrum: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
 
While there is no place in the Westminster system for the “platonic 
guardians of public interest”, the convention of neutrality does provide a 
powerful check on both political and bureaucratic powers. This is achieved 
firstly through the “bargain” implicit in the requirement of neutrality itself 
(this forms a part of the traditional Schafferian bargain common in 
Westminster countries, see Hood and Lodge 2006 and chapter 5). While 
bureaucrats, as argued above, must give up their political independence, 
politicians, in return, are required to take political responsibility. In this 
sense neutrality is also a necessary complement of ministerial 
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responsibility. In order for such a relationship to work, trust between 
bureaucrats and politicians is essential, not the least because what is at 
stake here is political power and therefore political legitimacy. Secondly, 
the corollary of responsibility in the Westminster system is loyalty. It does 
require officials to respect the authority of politicians when disagreements 
arise and not abuse the terms of trust in such circumstances, through for 
instance, strategic leaking. But loyalty does not mean blind obedience and 
passive deference. As Weller (2003:87) argues, “assisting the minister in 
his [sic] objectives by the best possible means occasionally requires 
challenging the objectives and the approach”. Arguably ministers are best 
served by “positive scepticism” of officials, guided by a ‘no surprise’ 
principle9, than a false sense of security. It is where bureaucratic expertise 
can complement, rather than undermine politics.  
 
So here is the political constitution of Westminster. It makes no grand 
promises. What it provides often seems simply a long and uphill struggle. 
But nonetheless the political constitution is worthwhile because amongst 
other things, it provides a framework for exercising democratic control over 
bureaucracy. Politics still offers the best hope to make liberal democracy 
work. That is the theory at least. The next part of the essay will examine 
the practice of the public services reform in New Zealand against this 
theoretical lens.  
                                                 
9
 Officials in the Westminster world are familiar with the requirements of ‘no surprise’. As 
the New Zealand Cabinet Manual state: “In their relationship with Ministers, officials 
should be guided by a ‘no surprises’ principle. They should inform Ministers promptly of 
matters of significance within their portfolio responsibilities, particularly where these 
matters may be controversial or may become the subject of public debate” (Cabinet Office 
2008: 3.16a).  
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5 The Bad Old Days? 
 
5.1 Politics of the Welfare State 
 
The history of New Zealand’s modern public service can be traced back to 
1912. It is not simply a coincidence also marked the end of the Liberal 
experiments, which herald the latter Welfare State. The development of 
the bureaucracy was, as argued above, an integral part of politics and in 
this case the politics of the Welfare State.  
 
It has been argued that New Zealanders have generally an ingrained 
weariness of grand political theories and are instead inclined towards 
pragmatic responses to local issues. This has been described as 
“Socialism without Doctrine” (Metin 1977). And yet to burrow a little deeper 
beneath the mish-mash of ideas that fed into the legacy of the Liberal and 
Labour experiments, one could easily discover translations, varied as they 
are, of liberal ideas of liberty and equality. Liberal’s heritage, as Sinclair 
(2000:173-4) points out, had come directly from Mill and George and from 
the harsh life lessons that taught the settlers such as Seddon genuine 
liberty can only be secured through equality.  
 
Labour picked up where Liberal had left off. Not only did it give concrete 
shape to the pursuit of these radical ideas though the progressive 
expansion of the Welfare State, more importantly, it also affirmed them as 
social and citizenship rights, thereby entrenched them deeply in New 
Zealand’s political culture (McClure 2004). As Sinclair puts it, Labour’s 
social welfare state was “shaped by the ideal of equality: it makes men 
[sic] more free” (2000:273). This is encapsulated in the aim of the Social 
Security Act, to quote Michael Joseph Savage, “to make an end to 
poverty”, to safeguard the orphans and invalids “against want and 
neglect”, and to free dependent individuals from being “an economic 
burden to relatives or friends” (Gustafson 1986 quoted in Boston 1999). 
But the Welfare State was also a contradictory construct as many 
historians carefully pointed out. The ideals were never fully realised. And 
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some of its values were limited by the bias and prejudice of its time and at 
times downright discriminatory and oppressive towards women, Maori, 
gays and other minorities. And there are plenty of setbacks and revisions. 
The liberal ideals provided powerful political energy and inspiration, but the 
ideas of Welfare State evolved only slowly. 
 
Discourse of the social, and its relationship with the individual, is central to 
the Welfare State. The concept of social security, as McClures (2004) 
points out, embodies a reciprocal relationship: on one hand, it placed on 
the state the collective responsibility for satisfying private needs of the 
individual, on the other it confirms the latter’s citizenship and the sense of 
belonging.  It was, in Zygmunt Bauman’s terms, the two-way translation 
between the private and public. The most far reaching innovations of the 
Welfare State – social security, free public health and education systems, 
old age pensions – are not just about public solutions for private problems. 
Rather their significance lay in the attempts to deconstruct what had been 
taken for granted as “private business” into public and political issues, and 
conversely “public interest” into private rights, through the democratic 
process instead of economic transaction. Thus in this light the Welfare 
State entailed negotiating between the private and public spheres and 
asserting publicly the primacy of individual autonomy and equality. This 
might make it easier to discern the humanitarian and liberal vision 
encapsulated in Savage’s creed that “social justice must be the guiding 
principle and economic organisation must be subjected to social need” 
(quoted in Sinclair 2000). Again such an approach was not always 
followed. History of New Zealand’s social policy in areas such as mental 
health and child abuse shows that there could be a dangerous swing: on 
one hand, the translation into the public could become alienating, 
paternalistic and intrusive for some, whilst others were left to their own in 
the face of collective denial (Dalley and Tennant 2004).  
 
There is a deeply rooted popular notion that the politics of the Welfare 
State was dominated by consensus, or conformity, founded as it was on a 
“classless society”. Whether one finds in this nostalgia or dullness 
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depends often on one’s ideological stand. However such a claim can 
scarcely be sustained. For most of its life the Welfare State had faced 
formidable challenges, first from hostility against state intervention at its 
inception, and then against the rise of individualism during the 60s and 
70s. Even the 1950s, although relatively calm, was never free of conflicts – 
the 1951 Waterfront Strike10 is one example of the conflicts underneath – 
driven perhaps more by a desire for normalcy than anything else with the 
help of favourable economic environment (Dalley 2005; Gustafuson 1996; 
Rudd 2001). But the politics of consensus has another meaning, which is 
sometimes unfortunately confused with imposed consensus and then 
becomes justification for the dismantling of the welfare state. According to 
Mulgan, the politics of consensus or consensus politics may refer to: 
 
not so much to the absence of political conflict in society as to a 
method by which such conflict is handled by political elites. 
Consensus politics implies that political opponents, particularly 
politicians from rival political parties, seek to reach agreement by 
accommodating each others’ differences. It is a politics of 
compromise and conciliation in which opponents share ultimate 
responsibility for decisions reached through negotiation (1997b:325).  
 
This is a more appropriate description of the politics of the Welfare State. 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration system is one example of such 
an approach to politics and it is also an excellent illustration of how 
imagined or imposed consensus can, paradoxically, become the worst 
enemy of consensus politics. Yet there is no doubt that the political 
institutions of the Welfare did not fit comfortably with consensus politics. 
The first-past-the-post electoral system coupled with unicameralism, which 
Mulgan (1992a) labelled “elective dictatorship”, constrained perhaps only 
by a strong political culture, is inimical to consensus building.  
                                                 
10
 The 1951 Waterfront Strike, sometimes referred to as the Waterfront Disputes or 
Lockout, is the largest industrial conflicts in New Zealand history. It was the result of the 
unwillingness of the employer to apply the decision of the Arbitration Court to increase 
wages by 15 percent (waterside workers were not covered by the Arbitration system).  It 
lasted 151 days and at its peak mobilised 22000 workers, which accounted for more than 
10 percent of population then.  
  49 
 
There are two points underlying the account above. First is that the 
Welfare State itself can be regarded as an application, however imperfect 
it is in retrospect, of liberal ideas: the centrality of liberty and equality, the 
importance of society, and the primacy of politics. Second, the actually 
realised Welfare State, is also full of paradoxes and contradictions. This 
sets one important theme for the next section.  
 
5.2 A Weberian Bureaucracy? 
 
The new responsibility for the state prompted a search for new ways to 
organise and deliver. Private provision for public welfare, or public-private 
partnership as it is now fashionably called, continued to play a critical role 
in the new welfare state, for instance, in the provision of state housing, 
under both Liberal and Labour. But an increasing demand clearly 
increased the pressure to “modernise” the public service.  
 
Perhaps out of habit New Zealanders looked to Britain for inspiration, more 
specifically, to the Northcote-Trevelyan reform. The result was a unified 
non-partisan merit-based career public service. With hindsight, it seems 
easy to blame the reformers then for ignoring the obvious dangers of 
bureaucratisation in this “modernising” agenda11. But to what extent does 
the Welfare State actually resemble the ideal type of Weberian 
bureaucracy? 
 
Of course, the reformers of 1912 did not set out intentionally to create a 
bureaucracy in Weber’s image. For them, the “modernisation” agenda of 
the public service of the conservative Reform government was perhaps 
more accurately described as a reaction to, rather than a consequence of, 
the proto-type Welfare State built by its Liberal predecessor. It is with this 
intention that the 1912 Hunt Commission sought to emulate the best 
                                                 
11
 Indeed the Liberal’s reluctance to adopt the Northcote-Trevelyan model was partly a 
result of their fear of bureaucratisation and its potential to undermine democracy 
(Henderson 1990). 
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contemporary “business method” of the private sector – unsurprisingly 
perhaps, since the commissioners were all prominent businessmen, for 
whom the use of business methods to constrain government had long 
been an important political cause (Henderson 1990). History was to repeat 
itself in 1984 when making the Public Service more “business-like” once 
again became popular as a panacea for bureaucratic ills.  
 
Scientific management in Government 
 
But if bureaucratisation of the Welfare State is an “unintended” 
consequence of borrowing from the private sector, it is nevertheless an 
inevitable one. A narrative of bureaucratisation can start with the rise of 
“scientific management” or Fordism. In New Zealand the idea had already 
taken its root in the private sector for some time, particularly in large meat 
works, where “bureaucratisation” – rationalisation, specialisation and 
consolidation – was welcomed with open arms, as it did increase markedly 
efficiency and profitability (Olssen 1992). Unsurprisingly the reformers 
sought to transplant its success to the public service, and not the least 
because the “apolitical” appearance of “scientific management” sounded 
far more positive and fashionable than overt political advocacy of business 
method.  
 
The influences of scientific management cannot be underestimated, partly 
because it laid down the fundamentals of a bureaucratic model. Amongst 
its chief legacies was the primacy of “efficiency” in the dual sense of 
procedural compliance and economic productivity. Ostensibly fighting 
against political patronage, the reformers themselves clearly saw 
“efficiency” – cutting “waste” in government – as the primary objective of 
the new public service (Henderson 1990; Scott 2001). Moreover it was 
understood that, in more specific and less political terms, the concept 
translated to maximising the ratio of outputs to inputs (economic 
efficiency), and as a corollary, more economic use of inputs (economy) 
(see Johns 1979). Correct application of scientific management rule – the 
notion of efficiency as procedural compliance – was the necessary means 
  51 
to achieve it. Hence the 1912 Act and later the 1962 Act were both centred 
on the objective of “efficiency and economy”. The history of the public 
service, therefore, is synonymous with “the quest for efficiency”. So the 
problem with bureaucracy is not that it is intentionally “inefficient”. Rather, 
as Gregory argues, it was because an overriding purpose with “procedural 
efficiency” was pursued at the expense of the “higher forms” of efficiency, 
particularly efficiency in its broader sense of effectiveness (Gregory 1982).  
That is to say that the bureaucracy is “efficient” in its own terms: efficient 
production of what might be simply “red tape” to others is efficient 
nonetheless.  
 
The quest for (bureaucratic) efficiency was closely associated with the 
metaphoric image of mechanistic production, or the production 
organisation in Wilson (1989)’s terminology. The central message of 
“scientific management” after all, and one which was explicitly adopted by 
the Hunt Commission, was that efficiency can only be achieved if 
organisations were to function like a “well-oiled machine” run by “scientific 
administrators” (Henderson 1990). Although this mechanistic vision as an 
ideal had gone out of fashion as early as the 60s – the McCarthy 
Commission had argued for a more “organic” alternative albeit in rather 
vague terms – it nevertheless has a strong and lasting impact in practices.  
 
Accompanying this mechanistic process was an insatiable urge towards 
greater “rationalisation” in the Weberian sense of active search for greater 
calculability and therefore potential efficiency. Contrary to the popular 
conception, the bureaucracy, in New Zealand at least, was perhaps only 
too ready to embrace the latest managerial techniques that facilitate better 
measurement and planning of efficiency. Adoption of contemporary 
accounting practices was part of the modernising agenda of the 1920s 
(McKinnon 2003). This was followed by “operational research”, developed 
during the war as a scientific method of providing a quantitative basis for 
decision making in the 1940s and 50s (Henderson 1990). The 1960s and 
70s saw a litany of acronyms – CBA, PPBS, ZBO, MBO, TQM – made 
their appearance in New Zealand’s Public Sector (Gregory 2004c). 
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Despite their diverging messages, these fashions or fads were all unified 
by their promises of better methods, and usually quantitative methods, to 
render complex social and economic systems more calculable and 
predictable.      
 
But if these processes disempowered bureaucrats as human beings, they 
also empower them as technical experts or specialists with exclusive 
access to “objective” knowledge on the running of the machine (and 
consequently disempower other political actors). The merit principle 
already prepared the ground for the officials’ claim to power by virtue of 
their expertise. And the dominance of legal and commercial professions in 
New Zealand’s traditional public service – lawyers, accountants, 
economists, and to lesser extents management consultants – indicated a 
preference for a particular kind of expertise i.e. instrumental knowledge 
about the application of rules and calculation of means. This power of 
expertise is greatly enhanced by the “cloak of secrecy” – the Official 
Secrets Act – that surrounded its exercise.  
 
Technocratic expertise is one source of power in a Weberian bureaucracy; 
exercise of discretion is another. This point is often lost in the 
misconception that focuses entirely on the rigidity of bureaucratic 
administration (hence the needs to “free the managers”) – strangely 
perhaps – in contrast with the more nuanced and perhaps mature 
perspective of earlier commentators who had to do without the benefit of 
hindsight. R S Milne for instance is notable not only for maintaining 
strongly the “inevitability” of administrative discretion but also for explicitly 
linking the existence of discretion to the exercise of power rather than 
simply the growth of the welfare state (Milne 1957). 
  
The discussion above is the conventional stock of a Weberian perspective. 
And it demonstrates that certain parts of the New Zealand Public Service 
before the 1984 reform are characteristics of a Weberian ideal type. But 
this account needs to be supplemented by the so-called welfare 
professionalism (Clarke and Newman 1997; Clarke 2003).   
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This term implies, via “professionalism”, important similarities in the way 
power is organised and exercised. The bureaucratisation thesis could be 
reframed in terms of professionalisation, for instance, the rise of 
accountancy as a profession under the Welfare State where 
professionalisation became very much a short cut to political power12. 
There are, however, important differences that put the focus instead on 
“welfare”.  
 
Firstly, the term welfare, unlike economic growth, had come to embrace a 
diverse and often contradictory collection of meanings and values under 
the Welfare State. It could not be easily reduced to a singular ratio 
between outputs and inputs, or indeed to any other simple measures. In 
some cases, such as health, the conflicts were clear between the need for 
efficiency and a commitment to professional ethics, which in rhetoric at 
least, explicitly overriding. So it is more appropriate to describe welfare 
professionalism as a pursuit of “effectiveness”, rather than efficiency. Apart 
from these wider purposes which each State activities is intended to 
achieve, the McCarthy Committee argues, efficiency has little meaning 
(McCarthy Commission 1962). Moreover, the Commission adds, 
effectiveness depends on responsiveness to changing social needs and 
acceptability to the public, which in turn merges with political desirability. 
This does not resolve the issue of gauging effectiveness as much as 
problematise it. It casts the focus back onto the politics of value conflicts 
and the political process. These disparate and conflicting values are held 
together paradoxically by the vague ideals of the Welfare State that 
                                                 
12
 The first professional association of accountants was established in 1894. Professional 
examination soon followed, conducted by universities. In 1904 the first professional 
journal was published However, it was not until 1960s that accountancy was actually 
taught in universities as a degree subject, which marked the high point of an increasing 
demand for formal training and education. The 1908 legislation recognised the authority 
of the association in regulating its own members and its monopoly over the title of 
chartered accountants, thus helped achieve the necessary ‘occupational disclosure’.   All 
these were traits of professionalisation. Commerce was ostensibly the drive. Yet this 
could not be possible without the clearly visible hand of the state. Interestingly, Peter 
Barr, a member of the Hunt Commission, and an accountant himself, was instrumental in 
the process of professionalization. Power flows the other way too. Treasury, through the 
rise of accountants, and later economics, transformed itself from relative unimportance to 
possibly the most powerful government department (McKinnon 2003). 
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produced them. For whatever the differences are, the power of 
professionals as officials, or bureaucrats, ultimately owes to the existence 
of the Welfare State and its legitimising value.  
 
This is particularly true for those so-called “helping” professions – 
teachers, nurses, social workers – who had a strong affiliation historically 
with the New Zealand Welfare State. It is telling that the founding 
principles of New Zealand’s public education system appealed not only to 
professional values of teachers, or to the power of knowledge, but more 
explicitly to egalitarianism13. Such a spirit is deeply ingrained, so much so 
that the New Zealand bureaucracy became itself an epitome of the 
egalitarian spirit (Smith 1974:15, 65; Mascarenhas 1984:18).  Of course, 
one must always be cautious not to “romanticise” the values of 
professionalism. It was not immune to the problem of goal displacement. It 
is an ever-present temptation to reduce the politics of the welfare 
professionalism to something simpler and more coherent, such as the 
Hippocratic Oath. And this can be just as troubling as the single-minded 
pursuit of efficiency. But the existence of the Welfare State, at once 
diversifying and unifying, set down an inherent limit of how far the goals 
can be reduced. It is not surprising then that the managerial reforms were 
perceived to be a challenge to the Welfare State, bureaucracy and 
professionalism at once (see Easton 1999).   
 
Secondly, the relation between professionals and citizens could be at 
times just as “dehumanising” as the relations between bureaucrats and 
citizens. Lake Alice Hospital provided New Zealand’s own and probably 
extreme experience with the danger of the dehumanising power of 
professionals. The Welfare State’s anxiety with social problems could 
easily obscure its humanitarian roots, as the provision of welfare became 
increasingly divided into separate realms of “problem solving” and 
                                                 
13
 In a statement prepared by Clarence Beeby, then Assistant director of Education, Peter 
Fraser, the Labour Prime Minister declared in 1939: “The Government's objective, broadly 
expressed, is that all persons, whatever their ability, rich or poor, whether they live in town or 
country, have a right as citizens to a free education of the kind for which they are best fitted and to 
the fullest extent of their powers. So far is this from being a mere pious platitude that the full 
acceptance of the principle will involve the reorientation of the education system." 
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entrusted to professionals with specialist knowledge. The clients 
themselves often became the problem in the eyes of the professionals. In 
the instance of social work, it was found in a 1982 study that skills such as 
problem-solving, client and resource status assessment, case and 
workload management which were manipulative – or one might say 
dehumanising – of clients were given much higher priority than solutions 
that involved social change (Simpson 1984:186-187). The expectation was 
for clients to fit into “the society”, rather than for the society to adjust to 
human beings. But this does not change the fact that in reality the work of 
professionals, particularly the helping professionals are immensely 
personal. Labrum (2004) for instance emphasises the importance of 
discretionary welfare under the Welfare State, and the particular 
personalised relationship it engenders. It reinforced, Labrum argues, a 
“very localised, intimate relation of the ‘state’”. Professionals, in a sense, 
were the human faces of the machine-like state.  
 
Moreover, the State itself provides an important counter-balance to the 
dehumanising tendency of professionalism, for it affirms the rights of 
citizens. Ironically perhaps the “bureaucratic” rules and standards were 
crucial to ensure some basic respect for the patients’ dignity were 
maintained, even though the reality may often fall short of bureaucratic 
inspirations, particularly given fiscal constraints (Brunton 2004).  The New 
Zealand Public Service was, as Mitchell (1969:181) puts it, “a friendly 
neighbourhood bureaucracy” which served as “the collective embodiment 
of the people”. The culture of equality is by definition anathema to the 
hierarchical structure of welfare professionalism. Smith (1974:103-110) 
had found that the culture in departments were much less impersonal and 
more relaxed, with a high degree of trust between superiors and 
subordinates in contrast to the Weberian bureaucratic model.  A singular 
emphasis on dehumanisation or the reification in narrating welfare 
professionalism is therefore clearly inadequate.  
 
Thirdly, like bureaucrats, professionals draw their power from the 
possession of specialist knowledge. And they share with the bureaucrats 
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the “aversion to politics” resulting from “a built-in animosity between the 
professional and bureaucrats”.  (Mosher 1982:118). Welfare 
professionalism in New Zealand was not exception to this discourse of 
professional power. The established professions, doctors and lawyers, 
easily laid claim to new territories in the Welfare Bureaucracy as the 
expertise was revered and taken for granted by legislators as a principle 
for designing the bureaucracy. Occasional complaints – one commentator 
lamented that the Department of Health was “doctor ridden” – simply 
confirms the extent of such power and control. New professions – the 
emerging and helping professions – had a harder time to lay their own 
claims to power and ended with varying degree of success. These 
technocratic ideas often become inseparable from the politics of the 
Welfare State.  
 
However, it would be simplistic and wrong to reduce one into another, for 
example, in the joining of Keynesianism with the Welfare State. The 
Labour Party did use a few vague Keynesian slogans before its election – 
because Keynes appeared “almost Fabian” – but there was no evidence of 
any plan to put it into practice (Easton 1981; Sinclair 2000:265). It was the 
young economists at the Treasury who were enthusiastic to mould their 
advice according to the new orthodoxy to improve economic management. 
Labour by contrast wanted only to make economic organisations work for 
their wider social goals, in which their humanitarian vision was really 
grounded.  And they, in a sense, simply expanded on what Liberal did and 
what the Vogel ministry did earlier. It is the “pragmatic” tradition of New 
Zealand politics, rather than the orthodox application of economic 
management, that stood out here. This difference, in a sense, reflects the 
divide between technocratic and political mentality. And it appeared that 
senior officials have understood this well. Whether the advice was 
informed by neoclassical or Keynesian thinking, McKinnon (2003:162-163) 
comments, “it was always usable”. It was not until the 1950s Keynesianism 
has been recognised as the orthodoxy, when the Labour Party has already 
lost its “socialist” reform zeal perhaps not purely by coincidence 
(McKinnon 2003). The point here is that the Welfare State is not a 
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monolithic monument of professional or bureaucratic power. Rather it was 
the site of conflict and contradiction.  
 
Put these two models together, a different picture emerges than the 
standard Weberian image. Indeed, there was a strong tendency of 
bureaucratisation, reinforced by professionalisation, but the degree of 
bureaucratisation was limited by the values, norms and politics of the 
Welfare State.  
 
Command and Control  
 
The term “machinery of government” is often used to describe the inter-
organisation relationships of the traditional service. Such a metaphor 
inevitably provokes a pejorative mechanistic and bureaucratic image, 
which was probably not entirely inaccurate. Like a Weberian bureaucracy, 
the public service was run, or was supposed to run anyway, under a 
hierarchical structure tightly controlled from the top down through a long 
chain of command, which connects the departmental officials with control 
departments such as Treasury and SSC and ultimately with politicians 
within a single unified pyramid-like structure. In this way the machine 
bureaucracies could be integrated into a larger piece of machinery and 
made to operate efficiently to certain inner logic as those on the top see it.  
 
But again this simplicity can be deceiving. The actual institutional design, 
although undoubtedly hierarchical, was anything but simple and rational. 
By 1958 It was composed of “forty one departments of the state and 
almost one thousand local authorities, government sponsored companies 
and public or semi-public corporations” in a country with a few million 
people: the picture is no less complex today (Polaschek 1958:3; Gill 2008). 
This points to the so-called “sectoral” approach under which these public 
organisations were created in the first place (Boston et al 1991, 1996; 
Savoie 2003). The sectoral approach groups organisations based on their 
political raison d’etre. It was simple: define an area of responsibility, label it 
say social security, and allocate all responsibilities for that purpose. The 
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hierarchical order, by contrast, is a “functional” approach in a sense that it 
lends itself easily to schemes of rationalisation through regrouping and 
amalgamation aimed to increase bureaucratic efficiency14(Polashek 1958; 
McCarthy Commission 1962). The institutional design, therefore, inevitably 
embodies the contradictions between these two approaches.  
 
On its own, the hierarchical order tended to project an instrumental and 
bureaucratic view of coordination, directed towards a presumed higher 
value or perhaps an objective order of values. And the instrumental 
emphasis inevitably gravitates towards efficiency and economy. By 
contrast, in practice, “most machinery of government changes were the 
result of new policy initiatives or changing social needs or political 
manoeuvring; they were not the product of efficiency drives or the 
application of grand bureaucratic design” (Boston et al 1996:77). These 
policy initiatives and social needs in turn defined the sectoral bases for 
individual organisations and inevitably brought with them distinctive 
political values and objectives. The combination of these two approaches, 
if only by accident rather than design, was essential. As Boston et al 
(1996:71) argues, “institutional design poses important normative, political 
and symbolic issues; it is thus centrally about values, and their relative 
importance”. And the sectoral approach provided a richer normative, 
political and symbolic content while the hierarchical order supplied an 
overriding common purpose. These two parts formed a basis for 
coordination of substantive conflicts among sectoral objectives. 
 
What was needed was a formal coordinating mechanism. And this was 
provided by the hierarchical chain of command through which the 
agencies were connected to other units within the organisation and 
upwards, via the control agencies e.g. Treasury and SSC, to the Cabinet 
and its committees (McCarthy Commission 1962). While this was highly 
                                                 
14
 Some might argue that the functional approach is also purpose-driven since they must 
contribute to the same purpose of the Government as a whole (see Polashek 1958).  This 
however ignores the fact that not all goals can be reconciled easily and meaningfully with 
a higher end, particularly if they are filtered through the democratic politics. This actually 
confirms the instrumental nature, in the Weberian sense, of a functional approach,  
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effective, it might also be cumbersome and costly, since “coordination” 
could only be achieved through vertically imposed impersonal authority.  
This was what Gregory (2003c:52) called a “strong mechanistic system 
which produces net benefits for members and the wider community”. But 
coordination also takes place through other more “organic” and relational 
means, for example, through the informal “old boys networks” among 
officials, which was reputedly a feature of the old New Zealand system 
(Gregory 2003c). While it is difficult to assess the exact extent of these 
and other informal networks, especially given the cloak of bureaucratic 
secrecy over them, but it seems reasonable to assume that these had 
considerable influence, amongst others, over policymaking (Goldfinch 
2002). By contrast, the institutionalised consultative forums, which not only 
include bureaucratic players but also external interest groups, provided a 
more open and transparent means of coordination.  Many of these 
however did not survive long after 1984.  
 
Finally, one comes to the issue of power and control. The existence, and 
inevitability, of informal networks alongside formal networks where political 
legitimacy resided in a sense complicated the problem with bureaucratic 
power. It is more likely to invoke concerns that too much “intimacy”, or 
“particularised trust” in Rothstein and Uslander (2005)’s terms, might 
depreciate long term “generalised” trust15. This poses a risk, especially 
given the real or perceived oft-elitist undertone of these networks, for 
ordinary New Zealanders (Goldfinch 2002; Harris 1995). While the 
bureaucratic hierarchy may appear strongly mechanistic, it serves crucially 
to push the issue up to those in the real position of power who must 
exercise their value judgement to adjudicate value conflicts.  It shows “co-
ordination” as what it really is i.e. the alignment of powers and thus an act 
of power itself and highlights the concerns in its exercise for impartiality, 
probity and legitimacy – the substantive values embodies in bureaucratic 
                                                 
15
 Particularised trust refers to situations where people only trust those who already 
belong to similar social, economic or political groups as them, for instance, those who 
share the same religious beliefs or are of the same ethnicity/race. Generalised trust by 
contrast means that people are able to trust others who do not belong to their 
communities. The latter is clearly essential in a pluralistic society where there are many 
communities (Rothstein and Uslander 2005). 
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administration itself. This political perspective seems implicit in the 
McCarthy Commission’s approach, which eschewed the administrative 
layers of coordination and opted to align the hierarchical chain with the 
Cabinet system.  
 
Economic Constitution and Welfare Politics 
 
Finally one must briefly consider the macro issue and this concerns the 
demise of the Economic Constitution – the tripod of gold standard, 
balanced budget and free trade –  which was marked by the 
“nationalisation” of the Reserve Bank in 1933 (McKinnon 2003). In one 
sense, this is the real beginning of the Westminster system in New 
Zealand, unshackled from the implicit “constitutional” constraints of 
laissez-faire capitalism. 
 
For some commentators, the rejection of an independent central bank 
reflected a shift towards the Keynesian theory (Dalziel 1993). But while the 
control of the central bank is a central plank in Keynesianism, the 
economic interpretation tends to underemphasize the wider theories about 
the state and economy than different ways of managing the economy. In 
fact, as Hawke (1973) argues, the first Labour Government’s reform did 
not in fact change how the Bank operated in practice. The impacts of the 
reform was not so much economic as political.  
 
In the first place it is not only about difference of means but also about 
difference of ends. This choice in 1936 on whether or not to nationalise the 
Reserve Bank was not a simple one between full employment and price 
stability – that was to come later in the 1950s and 1960s – but between 
social welfare and economic welfare. Even the term “economic welfare” in 
the 1933 Act was “a significant step in the State’s paternalism towards its 
citizens”, as Bassett (1998, p.176-7) points out. The objective in 1930 has 
been to maintain the stability in the value of money, which was more true 
to the economic constitution and the Treasury line. If Bassett’s claim was 
exaggerating, the addition of  “social welfare”, despite receiving no debate 
  61 
in the nationalisation debate thanks to the post-Depression political 
consensus, was clearly a step further in the tug between paternalism and 
laissez faire capitalism.  
 
Such fundamental differences can be illustrated from other angles. The 
Reserve Bank created in 1933 was meant to be, in the words of its 
governor, “a useful part of financial machine”, “to coordinate, consolidate 
and control the banking system”, for the gold standard that was in its place 
had crumbled (McKinnon 2003:153). This was necessary to cure a “sick” 
economy and to restore “good sound conservative finance” (op.cit.:132). 
“The economy” in a sense was the beginning and the end, almost a thing 
in itself. To the Coalition, the crisis could be phrased in entirely 
impersonal, even inhuman, terms, as an “economic problem”. No 
excessive tinkering was necessary: the malfunctioning was to be resolved 
in economic terms, according to its own laws, assisted by economic 
“doctors” while the harsh lived experiences of people seemed irrelevant. 
Indeed to conquer the adverse conditions, more sacrifice and hardship 
were necessary.  
 
Labour had a different outlook. It was equally obsessed with the monetary 
system and the economy. But to Labour the problem was precisely the 
impacts of the Depression on people, made worse by the Coalition’s 
attempt to save the economy through a balanced budget. Michael Joseph 
Savage, for example, had stressed the importance to “control the 
monetary system” – not for the sake of the economy – but “by doing so to 
guarantee prices to the producers in the first place and incomes to those 
whom they employ in the second”.  It was the living standards of the 
people, rather than the “health” of “the economy”, and therefore the 
distribution of pains and gains amongst people, that were its primary 
concerns. 
 
Finally, the change can be discerned in terms of the relationship between 
politics and expertise.  To insulate monetary policy from politics was an 
important design principle behind the 1933 Act. It was the central Treasury 
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faith, as one contemporary recalls, that the elaborate set up were 
necessary safeguards to assure the Bank of its independence against 
“dangerous, wild men” that the future might bring (McKinnon 2003). It did 
not succeed. The future did bring “possible wild men” that the architects of 
the 1933 Act had feared with the election of a Labour Government. But the 
political economy changed. The 1936 Act (and the 1939 amendment) 
made clear the Government’s desire to assert political control over the 
Bank and monetary policy. It was consistent with Labour’s philosophy that 
establishes the primacy of politics over expertise, and democratic 
legitimacy over elite authority. This approach was clearly at odds with the 
logic of an independent Reserve Bank. And it was illustrated by a brief 
exchange between the Reserve Bank Governor and the Labour Prime 
Minister in 1938 over the issue of exchange control recorded by Hawke 
(1973). The Governor had argued strongly against exchange control, for it 
would inevitably require complex and no doubt inefficient, regulations and 
would do nothing to balance the budget. To this the Prime Minister replied 
that “our difficulty is that, up to now, no alternative, excepting one which 
would not be tolerated by the people, has been suggested”. 
 
There is a lot of truth in the Governor’s assessment, of course. But for 
Savage, it was what the people desire that ultimately counted. Economic 
efficiency was not unimportant but it was secondary when the choice had 
to be made. This was the end of the old economic constitution, for the 
laissez-faire economic imperatives that underpinned the constitution had 
lost the control over political imagination and practices to welfare politics.  
 
 The New Zealand Public Service prior to the reform did possess certain 
characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy, in both its quest for ‘scientific’ 
principles of management and its hierarchical structure. But what is 
equally, if not more important, is the values, norms and politics of the 
Welfare State that puts a limit on the “rational” authority of bureaucracy. 
This counter balance, although important, is indirect. And it relies perhaps 
too much on mutual trust and confidence. The more direct checks and 
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balances lie, supposedly, with the political constitution. How then did it 
perform? 
 
  
5.3 More Westminster than Westminster? 
 
Although recent studies have shown that the pattern of transplant was not 
as straightforward as it was once thought to be (Wanna 2005), few would 
dispute that New Zealand’s constitutional tradition could be traced to the 
Westminster Parliament. And, prior to MMP, the unitary, unicameral 
parliamentary democracy dominated by a strong executive elected by a 
majoritarian (first-past-the-post) system certainly magnified certain 
characteristics of a Westminster system to its extreme (McLeay 1995; 
Levine 1979; Mulgan 1997b). For this reason, New Zealand was once 
regarded as “more Westminster than Westminster” (Lijphart 1984; 1999).  
But such assertions are directed not so much towards Westminster as 
such, as they are at majoritarianism. In order to understand how the 
Westminster system worked, or failed to work, emphasis on purity or 
perfection are less useful than paradoxes and contradictions.  
 
 
Hollow Crown of Sovereignty 
 
The first paradox is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. If one were 
to look only at a Diceyan definition of parliamentary sovereignty, as Scott 
(1962) did, then New Zealand certainly appeared doctrinaire. There were 
few legal constitutional constraints on parliamentary power. The period in 
question might easily lend to the impression of a golden age of 
parliamentary sovereignty, where the doctrine was simply taken for 
granted. And there were very few explicit challenges to Parliament’s 
power. The Treaty of Waitangi had not yet become a political issue. The 
courts did not seriously challenge Parliament’s ultimate authority. And the 
use of referenda did very little to abridge Parliament’s power. However, as 
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Mitchell (1969) points out, there had always been vocal complaints in New 
Zealand about the weakness of Parliament.  
 
Such complaints must be examined critically, particularly as they often 
come with talk of the decline of Parliament’ by comparing the practices of 
the day with an earlier “Golden Age”. This, he argues, was “a picture so 
moving and colourful” that is also “completely inaccurate”. Indeed, what 
was often overlooked then – and it is still neglected now – was that some 
changes in the twentieth century could equally be argued as the “rise” of 
Parliament and the corresponding decline of private powers. The lack of 
separation of powers meant that the “expansion” of the state and politics 
necessarily enlarged the role of Parliament. Keith Jackson raised an 
important point when he remarked in passing that “it is scarcely more than 
40 years ago, for example, when matters of the economy were left largely 
to the Bank, being hardly fit concerns for governments” (Jackson 1978:16).  
The fact remains that New Zealand Parliament of the twentieth century 
had a role – however ineffective and symbolic a role in the face of an all 
powerful executive and bureaucracy – in many areas of economic 
management and social welfare where it had not previously.  
 
Nonetheless the critics were right to point out that the highly disciplined 
party organizations – in a way, party bureaucracies – did pose a problem 
for Parliament. However, as argued before, the problem was not so much 
the prominence of parties, nor the strength of executive power, since 
neither necessarily conflicts with the idea of parliamentary democracy, but 
majoritarianism, which eroded the legitimacy of Parliament as a 
representative political institution. New Zealand’s own electoral system, 
which had produced a stable two-party system and a bias against sizeable 
minority parties, brought out its own illogicality in stark terms when the 
Labour opposition lost both the 1978 and 1981 elections despite winning 
more seats. Thus it is not surprising that New Zealand had suffered 
particularly badly from the “unbridled power” of executive dominance, as 
Palmer (1987) complains. And this places a severe constraint on 
Parliament’s ability to control the executive and the bureaucracy.  
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The traditional perception of Parliament has been summed up by Jackson 
(1987:37): 
 
the House, as we have suggested, has important deficiencies as a 
representative chamber; equally it can be misleading to call it a 
legislature when it actually ‘makes’ few laws itself’; financial control of 
the executive is a myth; and the most important political activities 
take place off the floor in the majority party’s caucus where, all too 
often, what the caucus says goes. 
 
Palmer (1987) described the New Zealand legal system in the 1980s as 
having the “fastest law in the West”, which highlighted the growing quantity 
and complexity of law, driven by the executive expediency – and in turn 
enhanced the power and status of bureaucracy as the legal-rational 
authority –  at the expense of parliamentary legislative control.  Yet, the 
multiplication of law, as Palmer himself points out, “in part a response to 
political demands” driven by the belief that “the government must be seen 
to be reacting” (op.cit.:78). And it showed that Parliament still remained 
central to this political process. However irritating this may have been for 
lawyers, politics is itself an antidote against bureaucratization. Indeed, it is 
more problematic when the exercise of power is not filtered through 
Parliament at all, for example, in the extensive use of delegated 
regulations in New Zealand. It was once said that under the Economic 
Stablisation Act that “you can do anything provided that you can hang your 
hat on economic stablisation” (Muldoon quoted in Jackson 1978:21). In 
these cases, parliamentary control of the bureaucracy was virtually non-
existent. Here it is not politics, but rather the lack of it, that was the 
problem.  
 
The inadequacies of parliamentary control over finance appear equally 
obvious. With the benefits of hindsight it is easier to see the primitiveness 
of the control mechanisms. These deficiencies by no means escaped the 
notice of commentators and were in fact subjects of several attempts at 
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reform, including the 1962 McCarthy Commission (Boston et al 1994; 
Polasheck 1958; McCarthy Commission 1962; McRae 1994). Yet financial 
control remained focused on the annual cash cost of inputs such as 
personnel, travel, maintenance and materials without much information on 
the results and the longer term. In 1978 the Auditor-General concluded 
that parliamentary financial control was “inadequate”, pointing to the 
problem that “the estimates do not contain sufficient information on 
objectives and functions of departmental programmes, achievement of 
goals, or the full costs involved” (Auditor-General 1978).    
 
Parliamentary control was also constrained by its process, which was said 
to be a copy of “the House of Common’s highly complex, ornate and 
mostly meaningless form” which had little relation to the exigencies of 
modern financial management (Jackson 1987:148).  
 
To some extent, these problems are ameliorated by the work of the 
Auditor-General and the Public Expenditure Committee (the Public 
Accounts Committee before 1962) which maintained a more focused 
watching brief over the Estimates (Skene 1990). Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that parliamentary control over finance is 
“rudimentary at best” (Jackson 1987:148-160). However, one might risk 
putting too much emphasis on financial management rather than 
parliamentary control. Indeed, what might be regarded as the weakness of 
one function may well be the strength of the other. This could be seen in 
the role of the Public Accounts Committee. On the one hand, its 
effectiveness in financial control was unquestionably limited, not the least 
because it “failed” to focus on administrative or financial details, rather 
than broad policy (Jackson 1987:153). On the other, as Polaschek (1958) 
observes, its primary value actually lies in the information it gathered 
which could be used during the atmosphere it created that “helps to keep 
administration in line with public opinion”. This is acknowledged by 
Jackson himself as well as other commentators (Jackson 1987; McRobie 
1978; Palmer 1979). In other words, the financial process provided 
another channel for parliamentary scrutiny of and influence over the 
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bureaucracy, which is particularly valuable in the face of executive 
dominance16.  
 
Yet the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny as a whole must be 
questioned. Central to the issue was the traditional culture of secrecy. 
Under the Official Secrets Act 1951, public servants were required to sign 
a declaration and gave an undertaking that they would not disclose official 
secrets. And the duty to be free and frank, alongside the supposed need 
for anonymity, reinforced the tendency to withhold information. Ministers 
too were bound by the convention of cabinet confidentiality, which added 
to the cloud of secrecy. It is also true that the adversarial nature of a 
Westminster system put a premium on information, which acted as a 
further disincentive to openness. (It could equally be argued, however, that 
it is a positive incentive for opposition members to seek information.) It is 
important to note that the origin of official secrecy lies not in Parliament but 
in the prerogative of the Crown that predates it (Eagles et al 1992). Yet 
whatever its origin is, the culture of secrecy and the (Weberian) 
bureaucratic power were mutually reinforcing17. And in New Zealand there 
had been official attempts that chipped away at the culture of secrecy prior 
to the Official Information Act18 (Keith 2005). Nonetheless the assumptions 
of official secrecy – that information is secret unless made publicly 
available – gave the bureaucracy an automatic claim to power and put 
politicians at an instant disadvantage.  
 
                                                 
16
 It must be pointed out that the Public Accounts Committee and Public Expenditure 
Committee were themselves dominated by the Executive.  
17
 For Weber, of course, the concept of official secrets is “the specific invention of the 
bureaucracy”. This could be regarded as a reflection of different political histories. 
Whereas in Germany the bureaucracy became almost synonymous with the state since 
Fredrick the Great and intimately connected to the Monarch, the question of secrecy was 
raised earlier in Parliament’s attempt to control the Monarch, which predates the rise of 
modern bureaucracy. Nonetheless, this does not change the fundamental relation 
between secrecy and power. 
18
 Keith (2005) writes that “notwithstanding the strictures of the Official Secrets Act, or 
really by way of recommending a relaxation of them, the Royal Commission on the State 
Services declared that “Government administration is the public’s business, and the 
people are entitled to know more than they do of what is being done and why”. That 
declaration led to the newly established State Services Commission directing in 1964 that 
the rule should now be that information should be withheld only if there is good reason for 
doing so.’ The administrative directive was not successful however.  
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The passage of the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) through this lens is 
to be regarded as a confirmation of the spirit of the Westminster system 
rather than an attack on it. It is true that the legislation required “an 
overturning of the traditional way of doing things”, but it does not 
necessarily conflict with the other parts of the Westminster system, such 
as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility or the requirements of free and 
frank advice, and therefore “move by backdoor towards the American 
system of government”, as John Martin feared (1988:45). Indeed the 
problem of the Official Secrets Act is precisely that it reinforced 
bureaucratic autonomy by insulating its claim to power against Parliament. 
The passage of the Official Information Act therefore simply confirmed to 
the correct constitutional principle, that such powers should be exercised 
only with Parliament’s consent and that Parliament should have unfettered 
right to information if it so wishes. Parliament, of course, can still choose to 
protect the confidentiality of official advice, as it did in the OIA, but the 
point is that secrecy is no longer solely a prerogative of the Executive. It is 
not surprising then that the OIA had been used extensively by opposition 
politicians and the media. Information is a powerful political weapon. And 
this inherently political nature might also explain why a recent evaluation 
has found mixed views on the effectiveness of the legislative framework19 
(White 2007). Because it is political, as Gregory (1984:15) predicted in the 
early years of the OIA, the OIA was “neither panacea nor placebo”. 
 
The Ombudsman is another innovation under the traditional model, which 
altered the balance between Parliament and the bureaucracy. Although its 
adaptation in New Zealand had required adjustment (Gilling 1998), it did 
not pose significant constitutional difficulty. After all, the creation of the 
office in Sweden sprang from the Swedish Parliament’s struggle with the 
Crown. A similar struggle had laid the foundation of the Westminster 
system. The working of the Ombudsman reflects its status as a 
parliamentary officer and indirectly the way Parliament exercises its 
                                                 
19
 White’s research had found that much of the dissatisfaction with the OIA stemmed from 
the perception that the operation of OIA has been too ‘political’, instead of merely shining 
a light on official actions (White 2007).  
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authority in a Westminster framework. Information again was the key and 
the Ombudsman was given almost unfettered access to official papers, 
despite the stricture of the Official Secrets Act. It has the power of 
persuasion and advocacy on behalf of citizens but no direct control over 
the bureaucracy. Yet, in spite of this lack of control, the Ombudsman today 
is recognised as almost universally a success, even in comparison with 
the Courts (Palmer and Palmer 2004; Keith 2005).  
 
The Official Information Act and Ombudsman had strengthened 
Parliament and compensated for the effects of majoritarianism. However 
these two innovations alone could not, and did not, address the problems 
at its root. Despite its promise and potentials, parliamentary sovereignty 
remained very much an illusion. 
 
 
Accountable but not Responsible? 
 
Under the traditional model, the convention of ministerial responsibility was 
the central means to ensure accountability, and responsibility, for 
bureaucratic actions. The traditional notion of ministerial responsibility 
means, according Scott (1962:124): 
 
A minister has not only primary responsibility for his own actions but 
also vicarious responsibility for the actions of his [sic] 
subordinates…Where the actions of departmental officers have been 
done on the minister’s bidding, the minister’s responsibility is 
vicarious only. In practice a minister always admits that he is 
responsible for the actions of his subordinates in the sense of being 
accountable for them. 
 
A brief look at the operation of ministerial responsibility under the 
traditional model might easily give an impression that ministerial 
responsibility, though a central constitutional doctrine, was more honoured 
in the breach than the observance. In 1980 Keith Ovenden argued that the 
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correct interpretation of the doctrine had already been “lost” and “largely in 
response to this loss the convention has been allowed to die” (Ovenden 
1980:95).  
 
To make a case for the death of ministerial responsibility – assuming that 
there was a time when the doctrine was “alive and kicking” – one cannot 
escape referring to Bob Semple’s famous, and often misunderstood, 
dictum that “I am responsible but not to blame”. The Semple case has 
been widely cited in New Zealand literature. It is appropriate therefore to 
discuss the doctrine against this practical example.  
 
The first thing to note about the traditional doctrine is that while who to 
blame is usually a difficult question, who is responsible is not, because the 
ultimately responsible persons can always be traced through the chain of 
command to the Ministers and ultimately to the Prime Minister and the 
government. Admittedly, the classical interpretation of the doctrine, such 
as Scott’s version above, which distinguishes between the personal and 
the vicarious, could easily lend itself to a “causal” rather than “role” notion 
of responsibility along Woodhouse’s typology. However, unlike the 
policy/administration divide, such a distinction was not made with any 
presumed precision. What counts as reasonable and what could have 
been done differently are after all speculative questions for which Scott 
provided no answers. The doctrine therefore, could be understood as a 
“backward mapping” strategy (Boven and t’Hart 1996; 62-3): it requires 
Ministers to fulfil their role and take responsibility first and from there the 
exact extent of the responsibility is worked out through the political 
process.  
 
This understanding of what Ministers are responsible for is illustrated by 
Bob Semple when he states very clearly that 
 
Of course, we are responsible; of course I am responsible for the 
administration of my department; I am responsible for the 
administration of my department; I am responsible for the conduct of 
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the servants too; but I am not to blame for things they do that are 
wicked and contemptible (NZPD 18 October 1944). 
 
Here Semple did not seek to blame the permanent head, nor “the system”, 
by distinguishing between the responsibilities of the minister and the 
department. His defence instead rest on the matter of trust between the 
Ministers and individuals whom he alleged had betrayed his trust. To him 
and the opposition, it was clear that Ministers have a role to play in the 
administration of the department, and consequently a duty to inform 
Parliament and public of the potential problems that he should have known 
and could have rectified earlier, whether or not the actions or inactions of 
politicians actually caused such problems. The question is whether he had 
failed in such a role, not whether such a role exists. Thus, had the 
traditional notion of ministerial responsibility really meant a causal notion 
that separates between administration and policy, it would be very difficult 
to explain why Semple would have chosen such an awkward way, if he 
intended to shift blame to officials, instead of appealing to the separation 
from the beginning. The fact that this route was not taken demonstrates 
the strength of doctrine as a powerful political symbol, which could not be 
easily set aside. 
 
Secondly, the Semple case also illustrates how the doctrine was supposed 
to work. Most commentaries focused on the debate which took place in 
October. The issue had actually already surfaced in March. At that time, 
the Leader of the Opposition, refuting accusations against Semple from his 
own colleagues, commented that  
 
I and the honourable member of Stratford here had lengthy 
discussions with the Minister of Works [Semple] on this question. I 
asked that files be made available and the Minister has said that I 
can have any file at any time. I spent a considerable time with him 
and I have read the report and I would be failing in my duty if I did not 
say that I do not think the Minister is personally responsible (NZPD 
25 March 1944) 
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This shows, in a sense, the constitutional minimum: Parliament, especially 
the Opposition, with the assistance of the Minister, was able to reach into 
bureaucracy, investigate the errors and arrive at its own conclusions. This 
requirement was met without much fanfare. While the fact exonerated 
Semple – a Commission of Inquiry had confirmed that – the debate did not 
stop there, which made the degree of openness on the part of the Minister 
even more remarkable. Rather it marked the beginning of a more difficult 
and less certain political process through which the political questions 
around responsibility in its broader sense could be examined in more 
depth, even if a simple clear-cut answer can never be reached. If one were 
to focus on facts alone, the Semple case would probably not have 
received as much notoriety and concepts such as “systemic failures” might 
have to be invented to explain the failures in the construction of the 
tunnels.  
 
The use and misuse of the Semple case usually impinge upon the 
proportion of blame. Even if one were to view Semple’s claim as a cynical 
attempt at blame shifting, and even if one were to discount completely the 
cost of accountability and remedial requirements which he did fulfil, 
Semple did not exactly go “scot-free”. In the first place, Semple’s 
statement did not conclude the political debate of where blame lies. Indeed 
the fact that Semple did not resort to any argument on the point of 
principle, such as the politics/administration dichotomy, but rather a 
“weaker” case of trust, exposed his defence to political judgment. As a 
result Semple had to withstand the sustained scrutiny from the Opposition 
and the negative publicity that ensued, not to mention that for some he still 
carries the can for supposedly undermining the constitutional doctrine. On 
top of that by coming to Semple’s defence the cabinet and the Prime 
Minister, in effect, took the responsibility (McLeay 1995). These political 
costs are by no means negligible.  
 
The problem is that blame is often confused with responsibility. Such 
confusion tends to lead one to overlook the political cost and focus on 
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symbolic punishment, such as resignation. In the Semple case, the 
Minister did not resign. For one thing, who should bear the blame was 
hardly straightforward in the Semple case. For another, forcing resignation 
was never impossible, since Semple had accepted the responsibility for 
administration, so long as the opposition could argue convincingly that the 
minister had failed in his administrative duties, and had not simply been 
“betrayed”. And the willingness of Ministers to take full responsibility for 
departmental actions actually paved the way to such demands for 
resignation. It would have been much harder to argue for resignation, if the 
Ministers were allowed to flatly reject responsibility simply because the 
causal evidence was weak. Moreover, it could be argued a swift 
resignation of the minister might well be counterproductive even for the 
Opposition since it would enable the Government to escape its share of 
criticism, as it did in the 1934 case, which saw the resignation of Sir 
Apirana Ngata for departmental maladministration and alleged corruption 
(Scott 1962:121).  
 
Finally, the traditional model is often linked to accountability in its 
procedural and mechanic sense i.e. accountability for following rules. It 
would be difficult however to identify such a link in the Semple case. While 
whether correct procedures had been followed was inevitably part of it, the 
focus was with what could be best called, with an unavoidable ambiguity, 
departmental administration. Moreover, for Semple, his defence rests 
heavily on the issue of trust, which lent to the accountability debate a 
personal and relational dimension. This would have been quite 
unnecessary with a mechanical and procedural conception of 
responsibility.  
 
More broadly, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility simply does not 
seek to prescribe the “what” of accountability, and certainly does not 
require a fixation on inputs. Rather, as Scott (1962:132) points out,  
 
The category of the duties of Ministers is not closed. Ministers are 
defensively responsible whenever the opposition criticises them, and 
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the government party is responsible in its own interests for answering 
any criticisms.  
 
This would probably appear very odd for commentators today who are 
obsessed with tying accountability to specific concepts such as inputs, 
outputs and outcomes, or individual and collective causes, which are 
necessarily partial and incomplete snapshots of bureaucratic actions.  
Neither does the formulation of ministerial responsibility depend on the 
existence of causal linkages. Rather, it seeks to capture something more 
fundamental, that is, the exercise of power that underpins everything that 
the bureaucracy does and which ultimately emanates from the Ministers 
themselves.  
 
The exact form of ministerial responsibility “can take on as rich or as spare 
a meaning as parliamentary antagonists want them to mean” (Uhr 
2005a:12). This flexibility is important because it reaffirms the 
constitutional relations between Parliament and the executive. As Scott 
(1962:121) puts it, “the concept of responsible government entails the 
existence of an unfettered discretion in Parliament, not only as to the 
actions for which a minister or Ministers may be held responsible, but also 
as to whether responsibility is to be attributed to a single minister or to the 
ministry collectively”. The decision as to what could be properly asked of 
ministers is one for Parliament itself to make, rather than relying on any 
external criteria.  
 
The supposedly worst-case scenario of ministerial responsibility in the 
Semple case thus was not as bad as it might appear at first sight. The 
Semple case was not an isolated example of course. In 1955, the justice 
minister of a National Government also faced the same dilemma in a 
prisoner escape scandal (Mcleay 1995:195; Robson 1987). The minister 
also accepted full responsibility in the first instance20. Politicians were 
                                                 
20
 The Minister, John Marshall’s press statement at the time presents a classical 
interpretation of ministerial responsibility. He stated that ‘I have no wish to evade 
responsibility or a single aspect of this inexcusable happening, for which, as Minister now 
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generally prepared to take responsibility for their own actions and their 
departments’ actions and, even though resignation is not required, face 
the political consequences for doing so.  
 
However, the problem is that the working of ministerial responsibility 
presumes a vigorous democratic political scrutiny, which was as argued 
above, critically undermined by the culture of secrecy and majoritarianism. 
In a way the chief strength of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility – its 
link with  politics – is also its major weakness. This makes it easier to 
depart from constitutional norms. This happened in 1984 when the 
Ministers of the National Government openly blamed their departments for 
the failures of the Maniototo irrigation scheme (Roberts 1987:48-49). The 
correct interpretation of the doctrine would require them firstly to take the 
responsibility for the administration of the departments themselves, 
presumably also to defend their departments, and to identify individual 
officials who they believe were to blame. These differences are subtle but 
nonetheless important. As Roberts points out, this case alone does not 
change the constitutional rule. The constitutional shift however was not 
very far away, as the Cave Creek tragedy discussed below will show.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
in charge of the administration of prisons I bear responsibility. I have sought to discharge 
this responsibility by giving a full account of the case and by indicating as clearly as 
possible the steps which have been taken to avoid such cases.’ Marshall did not resign, 
nevertheless.  
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A different kind of servants 
 
 
To understand the role of public servants in the old public service, it would 
be useful to remember that there was a time in the history of New 
Zealand’s public service when officials were servants and such a notion of 
officials as servants never entirely vanished (McKinnon 2003:51). Indeed, 
this notion of ministerial-official as a private employment relationship was 
to be revived in the 1980s. The reform in 1912, by abolishing patronage, 
changed all that, however. The bargain between Ministers and officials 
was no longer a private transaction. Officials were still called servants, but 
they are now public servants. And this “public” orientation puts a wholly 
different complexion upon the relationship between Ministers and officials.  
 
This relationship is often described as a “Schafferian” bargain (Hood and 
Lodge 2006). In New Zealand Lipson (1948:479) expresses a similar idea 
that: 
 
By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career and a pension, 
parties have foresworn the use of patronage and have guaranteed to 
the state’s employees their tenure of their jobs. In return the parties 
expect, and the public servants owe, equal loyalty to any 
government, which the people have placed in place.  
 
Political neutrality was clearly central to this bargain. But what exactly did 
neutrality mean in the traditional bargain? One view was that it implied the 
discredited separation between politics and administration (Mallard 2003). 
This is certainly a simple explanation but not a very convincing one. For 
one thing the idea of a functional divide, which had its origin in America, 
was more compatible with a separation-of-power constitution – at any rate 
it has long been rejected by American commentators themselves (Lynn 
2001) – than Westminster norms. It would not fit easily with the idea of 
parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial responsibility, both of which 
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imply the prerogative of politicians to reach into bureaucracy itself, if they 
wish, rather than steering from the outside. It is doubtful whether such an 
idea had ever taken root in New Zealand, beyond perhaps a few confused 
references (the report of a 1934 Commission of Inquiry on Native Affairs 
was one example). Although some officials had been fond of laying down 
such principles, Leicester Webb observed as early as 1940, a separation 
‘between policy and administration, between the functions of the minister 
and his [sic] high officials’ would be “unreal” (1940:88). In any case, as 
Smith (1974:111) argues, it had already become commonplace to dismiss 
the dichotomy as a myth.  
 
The reality was certainly very different, and this could be easily seen in the 
early commentaries on public administration. Whether it is because of the 
small size of New Zealand or other reasons, the principle of anonymity 
was never quite as strong or practical as in countries such as UK. This 
helped to highlight the prominent roles that public servants such as 
Tregear21 or Beeby played in policies of the emerging Welfare State. Their 
relationships with politicians were more close to a partnership devoted to 
similar goals than that between a superior and the subordinate. More 
often, the traditional role of senior public servants was a fusion between 
politics and administration: “as advisers to elected Ministers and as senior 
executives of the department or bureau” (Martin 1988:26). The provision of 
policy advice was inevitable, which often had a direct impact, and such 
advice was inevitably, as one seasoned public servant noted in 1957, 
“political in the best sense of the word” (Marshall 1957:128). The 
policy/administration line was not only blurred at the top, it was also 
challenged from the bottom by a general awareness of the inevitability of 
administrative discretion and the discretionary powers exercised by 
officials (Milne 1957; Polaschek 1958). Public servants themselves were 
acutely aware of not only the political environment in which they worked, 
                                                 
21
 Edward Tregear (1846-1931), Secretary of Labour from 1891 to 1910, was responsible 
for the progressive industrial legislation passed under the Liberal Government. Clarence 
Beeby (1902-1998) was the Director of Education from 1940 to 1959 who was 
instrumental in founding New Zealand’s modern education system (Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography at http://www.dnzb.govt.nz).  
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but also the dual roles of implementing as well as formulating the policy, 
as Smith (1974:113) found in his survey. Smith quotes one administrator 
that “Anyone who thinks that the government is not influenced by politics is 
naïve in the first degree”. All these point to an awareness of “the political 
nature of administration” that transcends the artificial politics/administration 
divide despite such nature being “particularly well hidden” (Wilenski 
1980:23). “Politicisation” was already there. The logic of the bargain was 
not separation between politics and administration, nor to trade the two off, 
but rather the subjugation of administrative power to political power.  
 
But this does not mean that New Zealand’s public servants were not 
neutral. Rather, it simply suggests that they did not mistake neutrality for 
being “apolitical”. Smith (1974:111-112) for instance emphasizes the 
distinction between politicisation and partisanship. He also found that, 
while New Zealand bureaucrats were aware of the political aspect of 
administration, “there is a clear indication that the administrators are non-
partisan in their relationship”.  There was no question that political 
neutrality was central.  
 
To define neutrality is a slightly more difficult task. Broadly and vaguely it 
meant the timeless terms that public servants should serve whoever the 
people put in government “with the same loyalty and professional services 
as its predecessors” (Probine 1963:22). Absence of political patronage 
was the bottomline and was generally respected. And it is interesting to 
point out that this had never been intended to mean that Ministers’ views 
on candidates should be entirely ignored (Scott 1962: 138-9). Beyond this 
however the view of neutrality differed. James (2002) believes that the 
traditional doctrine required public servants “not to carry out instructions to 
promote the minister’s party or engage in party political activity”. Scott 
(1962: 140), by contrast, preferred an emphasis on the “serial loyalty” – a 
view which is shared by John Martin (1988). He argued that the Ministers’ 
intention should be left to the electorate to judge and public servants were 
to serve the Government loyally even when they suspect the policy had 
been adopted only for electoral reasons. Such disagreements are 
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unavoidable. What “partisan” politics is, ultimately, must be a matter for 
political judgement, rather than the personal judgement of public servants 
themselves. In this sense the disagreements simply reflect the political 
nature of neutrality. But Scott had gone too far in that he overlooked his 
interpretation, which he had admitted as being “extreme”, relies on the 
presumption of an almost ideal democratic process, which simply was not 
the case in New Zealand’s “elective dictatorship”.  
 
Despite difficulties of precise definition and prescriptions, public servants 
nevertheless managed under the traditional model with a pragmatic 
attitude. This gave the principle of neutrality another interpretation, which 
conceived neutrality as an essential ingredient of sustained trust between 
Ministers and officials, rather than an injunction against “politics” (Probine 
1963:24). A high degree of trust, Probine argues, is in the interest of 
individual public servants as well as the interest of Government, the 
Opposition parties and the country as a whole.  
 
Trust was gained, rather than assumed. It was, as Roberts (1987:83) puts 
it, “battle honour won in a stern campaign…preserved only by correct 
behaviour”. Indeed a number of commentators have found in New Zealand 
a culture of mutual suspicion between public servants and politicians – 
both left and right – which often came to the spotlight when there was a 
change of government (Polaschek 1958: 224, 286; Martin 1988:15). 
Nonetheless there is very little evidence that the initial reservation actually 
led to persistent problem or crisis. According to Martin (1988), in two 
significant moments – election of the 1936 Labour Government and the 
1949 National Government – transitions were made without much friction. 
Neither was there any hard evidence, one must add, that adherence to 
neutrality has actually eliminated the tension. Nonetheless, what one could 
draw from these experiences is a compelling argument that the principle of 
neutrality had stood strong against the odds.  
 
The principle of neutrality was reinforced by a strong sense of loyalty. 
Deference to politics was still the accepted norm. Open conflicts between 
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officials and politicians were rare. The majority of public servants, Smith 
(1974) found, rejected more authority for them in policy making and 
instead preferred to see the politicians running the show. This is not to 
suggest that tensions did not exist. The McCarthy Comission (1962) for 
instance was compelled to state “the obvious”, while commenting on 
Treasury’s power, that “it is Cabinet or the Minister, not Treasury, that 
makes the decisions. Treasury is merely an advisor”. Nonetheless, as 
Polasheck (1958:210) concluded, while political control was never a 
perfect safeguard, “politicians touch the key points and are remarkably 
successful in bending the Service to the wishes of the people”. 
 
Deference to politics does not mean subservience. Rather the convention 
of free and frank advice was equally valued as part of the loyalty bargain. 
Scott (1962:142) demands that  
 
where a permanent head thinks the minister is wrong about the 
merits of a policy, or wrong in allowing himself to be influenced by 
considerations of political principle or of political interest, he owes to 
his minister to say so. He owes the duty of offering disinterested and 
fearless advice, and should argue as strongly as he feels is justified. 
But he should not necessarily argue the matter repeatedly.  
 
Smith (1974) similarly found that officials valued the ability to “stand up to 
politicians”. While this may have been a strong norm, it is difficult to 
assess how it is applied in practice, because of the confidential nature of 
official advice. Perhaps the most clear example was decision of the 1948 
National Government to abandon its policies of abolishing price control 
based on official advice, despite the fact that those policies had been part 
of its election platform (Scott 1962:143). Yet one could also discover the 
darker side of the art of “speaking truth to power”, for instance, in the 
advice tendered by Treasury to the Labour Government on the 1958 
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“Black Budget”, which had been politically disastrous for the Government 
(McKinnon 2003).22   
 
But confidentiality was not simply a symptom of the culture of secrecy. 
Rather it was a necessary part of the bargain. It required Ministers to take 
political responsibilities for their decisions and refrain from attacking the 
officials in return for the latter’s public commitment to the final decision. 
 
In return for their public silence the Ministers are to take responsibility for 
their decisions and refrain from attacking their officials. This as argued 
previously did not always happen. Apart from the Maniototo scheme 
mentioned above, an earlier instance occurred in the early 1950s when the 
Minister of Maori Affairs in 1954 openly criticised his department for failing 
to carry out the government’s policies (Scott 1962:132).23 It is not 
necessary to recount the detail of the case. But nonetheless it is 
worthwhile to emphasize the interconnected nature of constitutional 
conventions, if ministerial responsibility has failed, then the traditional 
bargain is likely to remain weak too.  
 
Similarly from the politicians’ point of view, officials sometimes broke the 
bargain too, for example, by leaking or “whistling blowing”, notably 
regarding debates on issues such as indigenous forestry policy in the 
1970s because of differences in political views. It led the State Services 
Commission to reiterate the duty of loyalty (Boston et al 1996; Martin 
1988). As James (2002) points out, quite correctly, there were probably no 
fewer leaks in the days of the old public service than in the 1980s or 90s. 
But there are qualitative differences, as a result of a different context. The 
writing of contemporary commentators clearly reflects a prevailing 
                                                 
22
 As one economist recalled, Treasury’s strategy was to deliver a “fiscally responsible” 
budget, but “framed” around the policies that the Labour Government had promised. As a 
result it left the Government little choice but to “put up indirect taxes – [but] on things that 
were politically disastrous for Labour” (Holmes quoted in McKinnon 2003:220).  
23
 Scott points out that the Minister  “had made no complaints either generally or 
specifically on which disciplinary or remedial actions could be based”, and even if he “had 
conveyed his complaints through the proper channels, he was at fault of not ensuring that 
remedial action was taken” (1962:132).  
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aversion against breaking the bargain except in extreme cases. While it 
could be assumed that such opinion was shaped by its time, the argument 
itself is not necessarily outdated. For the justification of 
leaking/whistleblowing inevitably falls back on the issue of “public interest” 
versus obligation as a public employee. The heart of the argument, as 
Scott  puts it, is that  
 
it is a matter of opinion where the public interest lies…the case for 
giving political power to Ministers in a parliamentary democracy is not 
that they can be always guaranteed to know with a mechanical 
perfection where the public interest lies, but that they are responsible’ 
so our constitutional system is not subverted by the errors of 
judgement that Ministers, being human, are bound to make, but is 
subverted by the obstruction of ministerial wishes by politically 
irresponsible public servants (1962:141). 
 
Polaschek’s argument (1958: 223) was not entirely dissimilar. He was 
concerned that this practice might allow public servants to acquire their 
own source of influence from pressure groups, which “strikes at the very 
basis of the democratic control of the public service”. As Polasheck points 
out, officials cannot be “divorced from the power and authority of his [sic] 
official position”. In other words, the issue for Scott and Polasheck is not 
simply about loyalty to politicians but rather the need to maintain 
democratic control over bureaucratic power through such a bargain. 
However again the force of such arguments depends critically on the 
quality of democratic control. With hindsight, they might have been too 
restrictive, given the dysfunctional democratic process and the lack of 
alternative means of internal disclosure. Yet these may actually provide 
some useful insights into today’s problems, as well be discussed later.  
 
The traditional bargain between Ministers and officials, therefore, produces 
similar dilemmas as the other two elements of the constitutional system. 
On one hand, there was a strong culture of political neutrality and loyalty 
within the public service. On the other hand, the bargain itself was again 
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stretched to the limits directly and indirectly by the dysfunctions of the 
oppressively secretive majoritarian political system. 
 
Constitutional control of the public service, while effective in theory, was 
limited in reality. And this adds to the problem of the public service itself, 
torn between the hazardous forces of classical Weberian bureaucracy and 
welfare professionalism. Reforms were necessary. But did the reformers of 
the 1980s make all the right steps? 
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6 A Brave New World  
 
6.1 The Rise of the New Right  
 
As Wendy Larner (2000) points out, there are “different versions of 
neoliberalism”. Nonetheless, at the risk of simplification, the radical 
changes to New Zealand’s political landscape during the 1980s and 90s 
brought about by the New Right still are recognisably neo-liberal, in spite 
their differences and apparent contradictions. 
 
Indeed, what is peculiar about the New Right is its ability to hold together 
different, and potentially contradictory, values while suppressing precisely 
these contradictions. Classically the New Right was seen as an expression 
of libertarian values such as negative liberties, sanctity of contracts and 
property rights. This does not mean that the New Right presumes the 
validity of the market, or privileges economic profit above everything else. 
Rather, it is better understood as an ethics or ethos that constructs and 
construes values in rational market terms (Brown 2003; 2006). Thus it is 
not surprising that equally central to New Zealand’s New Right agenda 
was an emphasis on “moral rectification”, with its own variant of 
Thatcherite “Victorian” values: “core family”, private charity, thrift, and 
decency, the evil of dependency, the importance of self-help, the 
appropriateness of incentives, and the moral imperatives of 
entrepreneurship. Not only are consumers free to choose, it was made 
certain that they could not do otherwise. They “should attend to their own 
needs” and are “expected to meet the cost of their social services 
themselves” (Richardson 1990:20). The individual freed from Fortress New 
Zealand was in fact heavily disciplined by her or his own freedom. In a 
sense, the abortive Code of Social Responsibility introduced by the 
National Government in 1998, which attempts to prescribe the 
responsibilities rather than rights of citizens, represents the high point of 
the New Right project. That is a project “of extending and bolstering 
market logics, socialising individualised subjects and disciplining the 
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noncompliant”, if only to bear out its contradictions (Peck and Tickell 
2002:42). 
 
The complexity of New Right values certainly demonstrates Larner’s point. 
What holds these values together, however tenuously, is above all their 
rather fevered – and one may argue deeply irrational – desire for value 
certainty in an age of uncertainty. Perhaps nowhere is this mentality more 
pronounced than the idealisation of the colonial past in such influential 
works as that of David Green. For New Zealanders in the 1990s, as 
Thomson (1990:165) puts it, colonial society was not only “what lies 
behind but also ahead”. It was not so much that the values themselves 
fitted together, but that they both fitted into this notional past in one way or 
another. The notional past, with its powerful suggestion of stability and 
harmony, seemed to provide a way out of present contradictions and away 
from politics. The economic fundamentalism of the New Right was not so 
much economic as fundamentalist. 
 
Accompanying the changes in values was a reconceptualisation of the 
idea of social relations, which under the welfare state manifested itself in 
the concept of citizenship with a right to welfare. Under the New Right, 
such a concept gave way to the images of “consumers” and “competitors” 
(Janiewski and Morris 2005). The implications of such a shift for politics 
seemed clearly borne out in practice. To quote Helen Clark, then Minister 
of Health in 1989, “I have tried very hard to think of words other than 
consumers, but I can’t … in the end I come to the conclusion that we can 
probably only all be described generically as consumers of the health 
system” (James 1992:139). These words from an unlikely ally of the New 
Right ideology demonstrate its penetration into politics. 
 
This partly explains the preoccupation of the reformers in the 1980s and 
1990s with economic policy while social policies “suffered from 
prevarication if not simple neglect” (Holland and Boston 1990; Rice 
1992:485). There was an apparent disjunction, but not a real one: after all 
both are policies made for and affecting people in society. “Economic” 
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reforms, such as the flattening of tax scales, struck right at the heart of the 
social compromise embodied by the welfare state. It would be more 
accurate to talk of the dominance of economic priorities over social ones 
and the reframing of social issues in terms of “what we can afford”, 
measured by the rate of spending against GDP, rather than what matters 
most to the public (Boston et al 1999b). 
 
Framing the debate in these terms, the economy, it was argued, was 
under severe stress, particularly because of mismanagement during 
previous years (Treasury 1984; Aberbach and Christensen 2001). A 
similar rhetoric of crisis was used by the National Government to justify its 
own “structural adjustment” in the 1990s. Arguments such as these are 
open to debate (Goldfinch 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2004a). At the same time 
the talk of crisis often tended to foreclose careful discussion and opened 
the way to the introduction of “econocracy” in New Zealand, the essence 
of which is an appeal to theoretical or technocratic knowledge (Gregory 
1998b). Indeed, Aberbach and Christensen argue that the reform could be 
theorised using a “garbage can” perspective: the exact nature of the 
problem does not matter much, rather, what matters are the ready-made 
solutions. 
 
Of course the technocratic tendency is also apparent under the neo-
Keynesian paradigm of “economic management,” as Gregory (1998b) 
points out, and therefore has a similar tendency to a “garbage can” 
mentality. The problem, however, was that while the neo-Keynesian 
paradigm at least retains a notion of managing the economy to improve 
welfare and thus is open to the political questioning of “welfare”, the neo-
classical model views the economy as a central part of its alternative and 
autonomous “regime of truth” to politics. The neo-Keynesian means-ends 
formula was inverted: now the most important task became to manage 
social policies to provide “a consistent framework for the growth and 
development of a strong economy” (Treasury 1987:374). Pains inflicted 
upon some sections of society, usually the disadvantaged, were therefore 
justified for the sake of gains to “the economy”. 
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The third factor in this technocratic transformation is the changing 
approach to politics (“Rogerpolitics” Mulgan (1992b) or “Blitzkrieg” (Easton 
1997)) which “involved an attack not only on the democratic conventions of 
the Westminster system but also on deeply held values within New 
Zealand’s political culture”. Of course, changing ideological commitments 
must necessarily be reflected in new institutional arrangements and 
values. This is precisely what makes the choice of structure important: it is 
not simply a matter of means, but rather essentially a question of political 
ends. 
 
The principles of this new approach to politics seem to have a particular 
authoritarian bent. Yet the obsession with speed or efficiency is not 
inconsistent with the New Right spirit of entrepreneurialism. Taking 
“quantum leaps” – rather than limited, “strategic,” consultative, one-step-
at-a-time, reforms – outflanking opponents by rapid implementation, as 
laid down by Douglas (1993:217-218), is not only tactical, but also 
embodies the morality and rationality of a competitive market, where 
consumers are lured and supposedly satisfied by finalised commodities, 
and competitors are to be eliminated at all cost. This is not just a variant of 
politics. It is a replacement of the primacy of politics with the primacy of the 
market. 
 
Moreover, along with the market view of politics is a deep distrust of others 
in the political community, reinforced by Public Choice theory, shared by 
reform-minded Treasury officials and politicians. Opponents to reform – 
including those within the bureaucracy – were pre-emptively dismissed as 
the voices of vested interest or “privilege” and accused of “capture”, 
although proponents were deemed to be curiously exempt from such 
blanket allegations (Goldfinch 1997). A cynic might suggest a self-serving 
logic at work. But perhaps the deeper problem lies in the impossibility of 
public servants being “just technicians applying value-free scientific 
analysis to society and welfare for all” (Goldfinch 1997:72). 
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In addition, the reform was driven by “a close (and often relatively closed) 
trust and reciprocity policy community” (Goldfinch 2004:89; also Goldfinch 
1997; Gregory 1998b; Janiewski and Morris 2005). Such an elitist 
tendency seems almost to have reversed the processes of the preceding 
era, by replacing generalised trust distilled from the pluralistic democratic 
process with localised trust based on certain values and relationships. 
Power was concentrated in the hands not only of political and bureaucratic 
actors but also private organisations such as the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable and the Centre for Independent Studies24. Contestability and 
flexibility outside the political realm seems to produce an even narrower 
coterie of decision-makers in the economic world. 
 
To put the above analysis in another way, the politics of the New Right 
were not politics at all, bur rather a form of ‘anti-politics”. Such “anti-
politics” was based on values not open to debate and projected a reified 
universe where human autonomy and equality can be sacrificed for other 
“things”. And it reduced politics to no more than expedient means to 
technocratic ends. In these terms, it could be argued that the New Right 
had “bureaucratised” politics in a Weberian sense. 
 
 
6.2 The New Public Management Model 
 
The New Public Management reform was integral to this counter-
revolution. In New Zealand the reform was driven by a set of coherent and 
highly dogmatic, as well as technocratic, economic theories – particularly 
Public Choice, Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics – which 
are intimately connected to neoliberalism and neo-classical economics. 
The perceived economic crisis and the changing politics allowed the 
reformers to seize a rare window of opportunity to “crash through” with 
these theories in a purer form in New Zealand than elsewhere (Aberbach 
                                                 
24
 The Centre for Independent Studies is a libertarian think tank based in Australia, but 
had crucial influences over the New Zealand economic reforms during the 1980s and 90s. 
It has a New Zealand office opened in 2005. 
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and Christensen 2001; Gregory 1998b; Goldfinch 2000). The resulting 
New Zealand model is widely regarded as an exemplary application of 
NPM (Boston et al 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Chapman and 
Duncan 2007). Whereas neoliberalism chooses the Welfare State as its 
enemy, the target of NPM is the “bureaucratic” public service of the old 
Welfare State. To what extent then did NPM succeed in de-
bureaucratising the state? 
 
 
Managers or Mandarins? 
 
A central tenet of the NPM reform is what can be called “managerialism” 
(Pollitt 1993; 2003). The process of managerialism can be summed up 
with the slogans: “free managers to manage” and “make managers 
manage”. The first slogan means “shifting decisions on the use of 
resources (staff, money, space, supplies, and so on) from central 
controllers and headquarters staff to line managers”. The second refers to 
“specifying in advance the performance expected of them, comparing 
results against targets and auditing both financial and substantive 
performance” (World Bank 2000:36). 
 
In New Zealand, the implementation of managerialism, through the State 
Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989, entailed radical 
changes to the traditional model of public service. “Chief Executives” 
employed on five year renewable fixed-term contracts replaced 
“permanent heads” as the top officials of the departments. They were 
given authority over staff employment and pay, as well as greater freedom 
to manage financial resources, or “inputs” in the NPM vernacular, so that 
they could, among other things, “recruit others who are willing and able to 
take charge” and “shed workers who shirk responsibility or are 
unproductive” (Schick 1996:41). They were encouraged to be “robust, 
entrepreneurial, risk taking” (ibid.). In return they were bound by 
performance agreements with their ministers, which specified the “results” 
or “outputs” – the goods and services produced by departments (including 
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policy advice) – that they were required to deliver25. This was supported by 
the ex ante specification and ex post reporting of departmental 
performance in delivering outputs, through a “modernised” budgetary 
system based on accrual accounting and aligned with generally accepted 
accounting practice (or GAAP). This system provided for “purchase 
agreements” with ministers as purchasers and CEs as providers or 
producers, which reinforced the responsibility for delivery of outputs 
(Boston et al 1996; Goldfinch 1998a; Norman 2003; Schick 1996, 2001; 
Scott 1996, 2001). 
 
These changes served New Zealand public servants with a stern 
message: they could no longer be “bureaucrats” or even professionals. To 
enjoy the freedom promised by a new regime they must become 
managers. Just like the individual citizen in a neoliberal society, the public 
manager was to be controlled through her or his freedom. The point of 
NPM, in the words of its advocates, was “to give away control of small 
numbers in exchange of control of large numbers” (Scott 1996:89). 
 
The justification for, and the central value of, a better managed – or better 
controlled  – public service is that it would improve efficiency and 
effectiveness (Scott 2001). Norman (2003) likens the pursuit of efficiency 
and effectiveness to “the quest for Holy Grail” (more Monty-Pythonesque 
than biblical perhaps? –  author). As many commentators have pointed 
out, in practice, the emphasis falls on the former – in the economic or 
operational sense of more outputs for less inputs – rather than the latter 
(Boston et al 1996; Schick 2001). It is generally acknowledged that 
managerialism had brought some efficiency gains – for example the length 
of time required to obtain passports was significantly shortened – even by 
the critics of the regime (Gregory 2001; Kelsey 1995; Petrie and Webber 
2001; Scott 2001). Overall efficiency gains were much more uncertain, 
                                                 
25
 A SRA/KRA system was implemented in 1993 by the National Government. The KRA 
or key results areas replaced ‘outputs’ as the focus of performance agreements. The 
move reflected concerns about the lack of attention to ‘strategic’ results or outcomes. This 
issue will be discussed below.    
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particularly given the costs of the reforms themselves such as spending on 
consultants and extravagant severance payments for senior officials 
(Goldfinch 1998a; Gregory 2001).  
 
Issuing passports and processing benefit payments are not the same as 
guaranteeing the rights of citizens, however. A narrow focus on 
instrumental efficiency may increase the probability of “hitting the target 
but missing the point”, given the multiplicity of objectives that characterise 
a public service (Boston et al 1996; Gregory 2001; 2007a). In this light, 
NPM can be seen as a case of bureaucratic “goal displacement” where 
quest for efficient means became an end in itself (Gregory 2007a).  
 
But this simply begs the question as to why NPM managed to transform 
the public service at all. The fact is that NPM was introduced at a time in 
New Zealand when the various and contradictory objectives of the Welfare 
State that stood in the way of business-like efficient management were 
under siege. In the neoliberal world there is simply no such thing as “public 
interest” that can or needs to be undermined. It is not just the public 
service, but also the “publicness” of it, that has come under attack (Haque 
2001). 
 
The issue here is not simply about the boundary between the public and 
the private. Such an argument has proven to be an easy target for NPM 
theorists (see Scott 2001:37). As Boston et al (1996:39) observes, “it was 
never assumed by those guiding the reforms that private sector 
management practices should be applied automatically, uncritically, or 
comprehensively to the public sector”. Rather NPM is better understood as 
a fundamental re-definition of the “public” itself than simply as an 
encroachment of the public by the private. It did not escape those attentive 
private managers that in some cases managerial freedoms for public 
managers compared favourably with those of large companies, provided 
policies, rules and guidelines are followed (Norman 2003: 83). 
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This subtle but profound transformation from within can be seen in “the 
emergence of a managerial elite enjoying highly privileged rates of 
remuneration (including in some cases massive severance payments), 
which have been increasing much more quickly than those of the rank and 
file”, that signalled the end of egalitarianism that the New Zealand Public 
Service had traditionally embodied26 (Gregory 2000; 2002a; 2002b). In 
other words, it is the transformed political context that made possible a 
stronger commitment to the bureaucratic quest for efficiency than the 
previous system could allow. 
 
Efficiency can be obtained by means of apparently quite different ways. 
The NPM reformers have often contrasted the flexibility of management 
with the “culture of compliance” of administration bound by procedural 
rules and input controls (Schick in Scott 2001:xv). Such a comparison is 
superficial and misleading, and even disingenuous. Indeed one can argue 
the contrary: the logic of managerial efficiency implies “a thermostat-like 
system of effective managerial control” which is “strongly linked to a 
recurring feature of more rational public management” (Norman 2003; 
Hood and Lodge 2006:175). 
 
The thermostat control system is in turn predicated on a production (as 
opposed to “procedural”, “craft” or “coping”) model of public service 
(Wilson 1989; Gregory 1995a, 1995c, 1999b, 2007a). The lynchpin of this 
production model is the distinction between outputs and outcomes. 
Outputs, defined as the goods and services that departments “produce”, 
are by definition tangible, measurable and therefore “manageable” things 
to which rational rules of calculation could apply. By contrast outcomes, 
                                                 
26
 The pay rate for the Secretary to the Treasury for instance had quadrupled during 1982 
and 2000 to ten times more than the average wage of ordinary New Zealanders, which, 
for Greogry (2002), is not a function of either chief executive performance or improved 
national economic performance’. Pay for performance is perhaps difficult to justify. But 
such ‘inequality’ would be perfectly justifiable and indeed necessary from a neoliberal 
perspective, as rewards for entrepreneurial behaviours, a substantive moral imperative in 
itself. 
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the impact of government activities on community and society, lack the 
objectivity and controllability of outputs. The production model is 
concerned primarily if not exclusively with the outputs, rather than 
outcomes. It may be that many of the tasks of the public service do not fit 
with the image of production so that many outcomes could easily “fall 
between the cracks”, as a number of evaluations have pointed out (Schick 
1996:73). But the problem with NPM is that it turns Wilson’s insight upside 
down: while Wilson intended to highlight the incommensurability of the 
production model and the reality of public service, the NPM theorists 
simply take this to mean that the reality must be made compatible with the 
imperative of production. It creates a strong incentive for public managers 
to ignore the inherent limitation of the production model and to treat all 
public organisations as if they were, first and foremost, production 
organisations. The pursuit of clarity and order creates a demand for ever-
increasing measurability and calculability of outputs as a basis for 
performance measurement and means of control – the “output fixation” as 
it was called – that conversely reinforces the mechanistic metaphor of 
production as if it were the real thing. 
 
Unsurprisingly NPM generated its own distinctive “culture of compliance”. 
As the SSC (1999:27) observes, “the use of small output classes, tight 
specification and activity measures forced managers to move into a 
narrow compliance and conformance mode that can discourage innovation 
and responsiveness”. Any illusion of freedom quickly evaporates in the 
face of a tightly controlled, orderly and rational construction of political 
reality as manageable tasks. 
 
It also means that the public service has become increasingly distant from 
the “friendly neighbourhood bureaucracy” and the intimate personal 
relations between officials/welfare professionals and citizens it traditionally 
embodied in New Zealand. NPM transformed officials themselves into 
human resources, citizens into one-dimensional consumers, and reified 
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their relations into part of a mechanical process of production of things 
(Gregory 2007a). The reified production model keeps the people at arms’ 
length from “interfering” with what is supposedly their own creation. 
 
Critics are usually quick to point out that a production model does not fit 
easily with the peculiar tasks of the public service, especially in cases such 
as provision of policy advice. As Schick (2001:15) argues, policy advice is 
not simply “goods and services”, but “judgment expertise and 
professionalism of the chief executive and other senior managers”. To 
treat them as goods or services poses the risk of goal displacement, for 
what can be readily measured is not always what matters most. 
 
But again “what matters” is where the issue becomes problematic. This is 
best illustrated if one looks at “the commodification of public service 
activities which were required to fit neatly into quantifiable pigeonholes” 
(Kelsey 1993:61, Italics added) for it reveals another meaning of “outputs”, 
namely, as commodities that can be bought and sold on an open market. 
Scott (2001:172) has made this quite clear himself. Outputs not only 
“clarify the production functions” but also “facilitate arrangements for 
internal markets, contracting out and benchmarking”. Rather than simply 
treating the public service as if it constitutes a production organisation, the 
point is to actually transform it into a series of private businesses which 
are by definition production organisations. 
 
All of these lead ultimately to the issue of bureaucratic power and control. 
It is a simple fact, yet one often conveniently ignored by reformers, that 
despite the NPM rhetoric against the “command and control” hierarchy of 
the old public service, management is by definition about control and 
necessarily implies a hierarchical relationship between the managers and 
the managed. As Gregory (2000) puts it: 
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Saying that it is better managed is rhetorically more appealing than 
saying it is better controlled, and rhetorically more appealing than 
saying it is more bureaucratic.  
 
The rise of managers necessarily requires “the diminution of other models 
of power” (Clarke et al 1994:25). But this does not necessarily mean the 
weakening of bureaucratic power as such. The advent of managerialism 
was accompanied by a not-so-subtle purge of senior public servants who 
did not conform to the new ideology and the instalment of reformers, such 
as Roderick Deane, at key positions of the public service (Mascarenhas 
2003:130). The changes also resulted in the SSC losing its centralised 
power over personnel. In other important aspects there were fewer 
changes. Treasury, for example, still wielded impressive power, which was 
probably enhanced, rather than diminished, by reforms which were partly 
“Treasury driven” (Boston et al 1996; Easton 1997; Kelsey 1995; Goldfinch 
1997, 2000).  
 
Beyond the centre, professionals felt the pressure too, especially those in 
the “helping professions” which were strongly associated with the 
professional bureaucracy and the welfare state, such as teachers, doctors, 
nurses, psychologists and social workers. Perhaps the most dramatic 
example of challenges to the welfare-professional regime of power was 
the practice of appointing non-health practitioners to executive positions in 
the health services, although this met with considerable resistance. An 
attempt to proscribe the decision-making power of professionals and 
simultaneously extend those of managers by the National Government 
ultimately faltered in the face of strong opposition (Ashton 1999; Easton 
1997, 1999; Belgrave 2004). 
 
This partly reflected the changing demand for expertise. In the old public 
service, the claims of professionals to power were grounded, as argued 
earlier, in their knowledge of how the multiple objectives of the welfare 
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state could be achieved. Managers by contrast are “the people who know 
about organisational efficiency and performance” (Clarke et al. 1994:25). 
Such knowledge becomes indispensable as the systems of performance 
management and accompanying financial control/audit grow more 
complex, rational and sophisticated, given the imperative of efficiency that 
overrides other possible objectives of the state in the NPM discourse. And 
this simultaneously expands the relative autonomy of managers, so long 
as they behave like managers, or rational self-interested individuals, as 
assumed by managerialism. 
 
But contrary to what some critics may appear to suggest, the problem is 
not simply a conflict between different types of expertise, or between 
“specialist” and “generic” managers in Easton’s terms. If that is the case, 
then all that is needed in such cases is simply the right mix of different 
kinds of managerial expertise, given clear objectives, as Scott (2001) 
argues in reply.  
 
Rather, what really makes the managerial knowledge-power nexus 
distinctive from the professional one – and also makes it more 
“bureaucratic” in Weberian terms – is its underpinning by a reinvention of 
the politics/administration dichotomy, couched in terms such as outcomes 
and outputs, or purchasers/providers. Unlike the latter, managerial 
knowledge is explicitly divorced from the substantive social purposes so 
that it can be applied across sectoral boundaries. What counts as good 
management is to be defined by management itself without the necessity 
to refer constantly back to the legitimacy of substantive goals. By contrast 
the professionals of the welfare state, as argued above, inevitably put 
themselves in a more “exposed” position. As the managerial realm 
becomes more and more closed, the autonomy of managerial power 
increases proportionally and its internal logic harder to detect. As Gregory 
(2007a:241) observes, managerialism generates 
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a surfeit of quantitative technical knowledge, much of it created 
primarily for the purpose of managerial control as an end in itself 
[that] grows almost exponentially, unleavened by any comparable 
development of political wisdom and judgment. 
 
This is a perfect recipe for “goal displacement” because it asks one to 
pretend that the tasks of management can be conceived as though they 
involve no need for substantive judgements about trade-offs between 
conflicting ends. Standards of good management or efficiency are 
substituted for good judgement and democratic legitimacy. 
 
Such pretence to power can be sustained only as long as the costs are 
deemed politically acceptable (Gregory 2001: 241-242). But the problem is 
precisely that within a neoliberal order these costs are acceptable. It is the 
hegemony of neoliberal values, which itself staves off political contests for 
legitimacy, that sustains the myth of managerial neutrality. 
 
Perhaps the most worrying consequence of the rise of managerial power 
is its implications for the balance of power between citizens and 
bureaucracy. NPM represents a default on the delicate bargain between 
professional control and citizenship rights in the Welfare State. As Pollitt 
(1993) notes, citizenship is an awkward concept for NPM. Rather 
managerialism, like neoliberalism, promises empowerment in the form of 
“consumer responsiveness” (Gregory 2000; Petrie 1998; Petrie and 
Webber 2001). Yet, as Kelsey (1993:333) puts it:  
 
When already powerless individuals put their bargaining power 
against corporations whose raison d’etre is maximising profit 
(whether they are state or private owned), claims of consumer 
sovereignty become equally fatuous.  
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The NPM discourse suffers from the fallacy of “false customerisation”, as 
Gregory (2003c) calls it, that disguises the inherent imbalance of power 
between bureaucracy and citizens, and between citizens themselves. As 
highlighted by the parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of IRD in 1999, 
consumer sovereignty provides little protection for citizens’ rights when 
they are confronted with powerful bureaucracy (Gregory 2001; 2002a). It is 
more likely to invite cynicism, rather than build confidence in the public 
sector, particularly when the “culture of fear and punishment” imposed on 
tax payers had been accompanied by cool indifference over tax loopholes 
for the corporate elite.  
 
To put it in another way, managerialism is a strongly technocratic form of 
power. This is unsurprising given the technocratic nature of its theoretical 
underpinnings in the “economics of politics”. The rise of managerial power 
is made possible by the revived separation between politics and 
administration – and in this sense it is more “bureaucratised” – but it is 
also firmly grounded in the neoliberal political philosophy. 
 
Contracts and Competition 
 
Another stream of NPM is the structural reform carried out during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The reforms were extensive and regarded by 
some international commentators as “a kind of extreme case” (Christensen 
and Laegreid 2001, 2004). The radical nature of structural changes is 
partly a reflection of its theoretical foundation in economic theories, 
especially Public Choice theory.  
 
For reformers, the problem with the old public service with its unified and 
hierarchical structure is not only that organisations lack clear and 
consistent objectives, but also, because of such ambiguity and uncertainty, 
it encourages “provider capture” by self-interested bureaucratic 
organisations (Boston et al 1996; Treasury 1987). Both contribute to the 
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rigidity and inefficiency of the bureaucracy as a whole. The solution was to 
replace the hierarchical model of command and control with a market 
model of competition and contract. To achieve this, fundamental changes 
were made to the sectoral design of the public service. These changes 
included, as a first step, a series of separations to break up the shapeless 
conglomerates along the lines of different functions e.g. commercial and 
non-commercial, between funding, purchasing and provision of services, 
and between policy and operation functions27 (Boston et al 1996; Boston 
and Eichbam 2005; Scott 2001). These separations would, according to 
the reformers, allow organisations to be more focused – thus reinforcing 
managerial reforms – and reduce the risk of “capture”28. Furthermore it 
would enable and encourage competition between specialised agencies 
and in turn facilitate “reallocation of functions for focus, synergy and 
information” (Scott 2001:86).  
 
The structural reforms of the 1980s had something in common with what 
had gone before. They both reflected a strongly instrumental or 
mechanical view of the task of institutional design, as if “governmental 
systems are analogous to a Lego construction that can be disassembled 
and rebuilt in new configurations with little or no concern for living reality or 
organisational symbolism and culture” (Gregory and Hicks 1999:5; 
Gregory 1999, 2001). And this could be seen in the particular language 
and metaphors used to justify the changes. For instance, Scott (2001:91) 
sees them as an exercise in “reworking” the old “machinery of government 
toolkit” and “not so much a novelty in itself”.  
 
                                                 
27
 One example of structural changes could be found in the 1993 reform of the health 
sector. The Department of Health was separated into a policy ministry, regional health 
authorities funded by the department, and ‘Crown Health Enterprises’ i.e. public hospitals 
selling services to the health authority on a competitive basis with private providers. 
Significant changes were subsequently made to the 1993 system within a relatively short 
period of time (Howden-Chapman and Ashton 2000; Ashton 2002) Other examples 
include the disaggregation of the Departments of Scientific and Industrial Research and 
Transport (Goldfinch 1998a; Norman 2003). 
28
 “Capture” in this context means that certain interests, mostly from within the 
organisation, dominate the decision making process and therefore conceal the potential 
adverse consequences of existing policies. One example is the so-called “provider 
capture” referring specifically to the operational interests within the departments which 
subvert the policy process (Boston et al 1996:73).  
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But as Boston et al (1996:71) argue, the issue of institutional design 
ultimately was about “values and their relative importance”. The 
explanation of the organisational trajectory was not to be found in the 
sudden discovery of new design principles, but in the shift of values 
underpinning them. Just as the ad hoc growth of the sectoral model 
reflected the ambiguous, conflicting and layered values and meanings of 
“welfare”, the rational or rationalistic appearance of the functional model 
was a reflection of the priority of transparency, competitiveness and 
ultimately efficiency. Even by these standards, the evidence seems to 
suggest that the tendency to use the blunt weapon of structural reforms to 
solve substantive problems generates more costs. It had gradually 
become accepted that the preoccupation with clarity enhancement had 
resulted in excessive fragmentation and therefore the lack of coordination 
and collaboration (Boston et al 1996; Boston and Eichbaum 2005; Scott 
2001).  
 
So structural reforms had not only not necessarily made the public service 
more economic, it could be argued that the new design had actually been 
made more “bureaucratic” than before. The problem is that the objectives 
of the structural reforms were by and large instrumental, at least as the 
reformers understood them. It ignores the fact that institutional design 
inevitably reflects the trade-offs between competing substantive values 
that it must make. And if such trade-offs are a “mess” of contradictory, 
uncertain and overlapping political judgements, then their institutionalised 
form must necessarily reflect such “messiness”. Here then is a danger of 
“goal displacement” as the desire for more rational functional forms 
distract from the substantive pursuit of organisational purposes.  
 
But such cases of “goal displacement” must be understood in their 
ideological context. Separation of commercial and non-commercial 
functions, for instance, often drives those commercial organisations to 
focus overwhelmingly on profit signals even when they are supposed to 
take other considerations into account (Christensen and Laegreid 2001). 
But this is fully consistent with a privatisation agenda of which such 
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separation is simply an intermediate step. Also there are more complex 
linkages at work. Take, for instance, the complaint of “excessive 
fragmentation”, which all too often collapses into a meaningless truism, 
especially in official documents, that “fragmentation can make alignment 
difficult”. Scott was absolutely right to reject such vague criticism (Scott 
2001: 86-90). The crucial point is that what counts as coordination or the 
lack of it, or what is to be considered good institutional design, is grounded 
in the neo-liberal ideology and sustained by the theoretical faith in the 
“invisible hand” of the market. For reformers such as Scott, a “fragmented” 
state is necessary to achieve “coordination through contractual and 
managerial relationships between the autonomous organisations” (Scott 
2001:87). The choice was not between coordination and fragmentation as 
such, but different forms of coordination (Considine and Lewis 2003; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2004). And this choice of forms ultimately can only be 
made by political judgements.  
 
The structural changes also accentuate the commodification of public 
services by using the metaphors of contract and competition. The rhetoric 
of competition promises choice. But in reality market competition all too 
readily reduced choices to what could be carried by the tangible “goods 
and services”, or outputs, from alternative providers and ranked in varied 
prices for comparison – in other words, commodification – often with scant 
regard for quality, as has been noted by observers of New Zealand’s 
health sector reforms (Howden-Chapman and Ashton 2000). This is 
exacerbated by the implicit drive towards greater “competitive neutrality” 
between the public and the private sector as the public sector is forced to 
compete with the private sector on the latter’s own terms in the efficient 
and profitable provision of commodities, rather than say the ability to 
uphold the liberal ideal of impartiality between citizens. Some 
commentators see in this an inherent bias against public providers 
(Newberry and Pallot 2003). Rather than offering more choices, points out 
Clarke (2004:35), price competition often serves to: 
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drive out or subordinate ‘ambiguous’ issues of values, orientations 
and other political choice-making criteria in favour of the rational, 
transparent and readily calculable ‘bottom line’. That which cannot be 
financially represented (economically valorised) is ruled inappropriate 
or irrelevant. 
 
The market may very well provide a wide range of high quality goods. And 
in this way it is superficially similar to a vibrant political realm. The concept 
of the “marketplace of ideas”, which often lies behind the advocacy for 
greater contestability for policy advice, is one example. But as Lukes 
(2004) warns, the metaphoric “market of ideas” does not follow from the 
literal market, which simply does not recognise the intrinsic values of 
freedom of ideas for the sake of citizenship and social justice. In New 
Zealand it has been noted that while the split between policy and 
operation, and the outsourcing of policy advice, might have produced more 
flexibility and contestability, attention is focused too often on the cost of 
policy advice sometimes to the detriment of its quality, especially in terms 
of impartiality, as readily admitted by senior officials (Boston et al 
1996:140).    
 
Similarly, the language of the contract reconstructs the relationships 
between organisations and people around the metaphors of production 
and exchange, as providers or producers versus funders, purchasers, and 
owners. This in turn reinforces the competitive relationship between 
“providers”. It limits the possibility of relationships to the exchanges of 
commodity at arms’ length that can be quantified, measured and 
“contracted for” in the formal legalistic language of commercial law. 
 
Contractualism is not simply a question of “wearing different hats”, which 
may be necessary from time to time. Rather it at least implicitly transforms 
citizens into consumers and truncates their democratic right to control 
institutions they created, substituting for that right the freedom to purchase 
goods and services on a marketplace from the others (Shaw 1999; 
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Gregory 2001). The result is that the relationship of trust between citizens 
and their political and bureaucratic trustees is replaced by the fragmented 
web of distrust among competing self-interests.  
 
Unsurprisingly this has generated demand for even more precise 
measurement of outputs as a basis for both competition and contracts. 
The enthusiasm for measurement is clearly reflected in “the several years 
of effort in statistical analysis and modelling” that went into “developing 
standard product and service definitions with associated benchmarked 
prices, which were used in the annual contracts between the HFA and 
CHEs” (Scott 2001:182). Scott’s comment is all the more interesting given 
the widespread perception of the failures of the system of contracting for 
health services, not least because of high transaction costs in specifying 
the contract (Boston et al 1996; Ashton 1999; Gauld 2001). For some, the 
pursuit of greater calculability can sometimes be counter-productive as it 
encourages providers to “skimp on those aspects [of services] least visible 
to purchasers” (Fougere 1995:115).    
 
For some, this model is unsatisfactory because it ignores the truth that 
“inherently governmental functions”, such as the provision of policy advice, 
impose certain limits on the use of contract and competition as means of 
delivery. But focusing on “functions” might be misleading because, as 
Boston (1995) points out, even the most basic functions of the state can, in 
theory, be contracted out.  
 
The real problem is that organisational relations and conflicts between 
public entities cannot be subjected to the discipline of competition and 
contract because ordering these relations and resolving these conflicts 
require making political judgements about the trade-offs among values. 
Conversely those aspects of organisational relations which can be 
efficiently and transparently managed by the market are not necessarily 
what is most important. There is a case of “goal displacement” that can be 
made. But one should be aware that such goal displacement is not merely 
incidental but implicit in the neo-liberal ideological underpinning. The idea 
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is not so much that public organisations could do better under the 
competitive pressure, but rather that competitive pressure should dictate 
the organisational form.  
 
Finally, despite NPM’s general aversion to politics, the theory of “capture” 
which provides a crucial justification for structural reforms puts the 
spotlight back on the issues of power and legitmacy.  
 
Unlike the hierarchical bureaucracy of the past, which derives its 
legitimacy from the political process, the market model of institutional 
design seeks to construct legitimacy on the basis of technocratic economic 
theories independent of the formal political process. Competition and 
contract, according to such theories, provide an automated system of 
checks and balances. Autonomous, functionally divided organisations 
competing for power, in theory, would provide better leverages for political 
principals, as consumers, to assert control through contracts.  
 
This clearly echoes the “separation-of-power” theory. And it is useful to 
recall Neustadt (1990:32)’s definition of the American styled separation-of-
power as one of “separated institutions sharing power”. It seems that the 
reformers have stopped exactly where they should have started. The 
obsession with alleged “capture” of the old public service has driven the 
reformers to a complex and costly system of separations but the “solution” 
says very little – at least not explicitly – about power. The technocratic 
theories that it relies upon do not provide normative standards against 
which one can verify the legitimacy of control through contracts by 
“consumers” of various kinds, or the competing claims to power 
themselves. Neither do they supply any justification for the values that 
shape the standards and structures of competition and contracts.  
 
Structural reform thus ran the risks of exacerbating the problems they 
were supposed to resolve. As Boston et al (1996:94) put it: 
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Of course, various forms of ‘capture’ can occur in a bureaucratic context: 
ideological capture, client capture, provider capture, regulatory capture, 
and capture by professionals and technical experts. The case for 
separating policy advice from operation attempts to address only one of 
these – provider capture.   
 
A fixation with “issues of provider capture or with seeing functional 
separation as automatic remedy” ignores the potentially greater danger of 
other forms of capture that arise “[not] because of inclusive organisational 
arrangements and the supposed problem of internal vested interests but 
because of the power of external vested interests” (ibid.). 
 
It is not surprising that the reforms have not entirely eliminated the 
supposed symptoms of capture from inside the bureaucracy. The 
separation of policy and operations, and separation of funding, purchasing 
and provision, did pose a serious challenge to the monopoly over policy 
advice, for example, in the transport sector. But the functional divide 
generated clearer boundaries of organisational “turf” and thus implicitly 
strengthened the monopoly of agencies over their own turf (Norman 
2003:166). Moreover, the emphasis on functional differences not only 
obscures the overlapping organisational turfs, it also ignores the possibility 
of capture by already powerful agencies of smaller functionally separated 
agencies in the grey zone. Treasury, for instance, has benefited not only 
from the functional separations which virtually exclude other departments 
from provision of economic policy advice – which arguably extends to 
everything done by Government – but also from the removal of some 
institutional rivals such as the Ministry of Works and the New Zealand 
Planning Council, ostensibly to improve contestability (Boston et al 1996; 
Goldfinch 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2004). This is enhanced by movement of 
senior ex-Treasury officials to other public agencies as well as influential 
private organisations such as the NZBR, which contributed to a high level 
of consistency of views across the public and private sector. The 
dominance of Treasury might be taken to suggest that structural reforms 
had exchanged the appearance of capture for the substance of capture.  
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Conceivably, however, the most worrying risk comes from the outside. The 
entrenched bias of the market model against the public sector could well 
be argued as a form of “capture” by the private sector. Health sector 
reform in the early 1990s provides one example (Howden-Chapman and 
Ashton 2000). Public hospitals starved of cash found themselves in a 
predictable dilemma, as Leys (2001) observes, when they were faced with 
a well-established private sector with access to capital while the public 
purposes these public hospitals served were simply not recognised in 
market terms. Such public purposes included obligations to share 
information, to provide training and to provide costly and intensive care 
back-ups for private providers (Howden-Chapman and Ashton 2000). The 
so-called “consultant capture” was another example (Kelsey 1995; 
Campbell 1999; Goldfinch 2000). The reformers were peculiarly indifferent 
to the potential risks of contracting out to private consultants often with a 
strong and consistent neoliberal view whose very self-interest, according 
to Public Choice theory, would mean that they were unlikely to recommend 
a return to public provision, whether or not the latter would actually provide 
better public service. The use of consultants to advise on structural 
reforms was susceptible to such risky outcomes (Kelsey 1995).  
 
None of this necessarily proves corruption or conspiracy. The 
disadvantage of the automated configuration of power and control under 
the market model is rather that because of its tendency to become an end 
in itself it could, at best, externalise the conflicts previously hidden and at 
worst, as Helen Mercer (1995:177) puts it, sustain “the economic and 
political position of those who can control the competition”. Moreover, it 
lacks the ability of the hierarchical model to escalate them up to political 
debates and thus ensure the democratic legitimacy of the exercise of 
power shared between organisations.  
 
Consequently the techniques of competition and control proved just as 
prone to the unintended or reverse effects as the managerial instruments 
of reform. Structural reform had set out to tackle the perceived problem of 
  107 
bureaucratic capture, but it ended up creating new problems on top of the 
old. 
 
 
Reviving the Economic Constitution 
 
Managerialism and structural reforms are probably the most discussed 
parts of the NPM reforms. But the revival of the “economic constitution” – 
the Reserve Bank Act 1989 and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 – is 
undoubtedly the most successful and enduring. The former 
institutionalises the independence of the Reserve Bank and limits its 
objectives to control of inflation. The latter imposes a formal framework for 
fiscal policy with an emphasis on transparency, especially in terms of 
departure from the “Principles of Responsible Fiscal Management” 
specified in the Act. These two pieces of legislation bear unmistakable 
resemblance to the two pillars of the old economic constitution: sound 
money and balanced budget (McKinnon 2003). The intention of the reform, 
as Ruth Richardson once put it, was explicitly to place certain policies 
“beyond the reach of an unfavourable shift in the political winds” 
(Richardson 1995 quoted in Newberry 2002:8-9). Rather, monetary and 
fiscal policy should be managed on the basis of “sound” economic theories 
insulated from political interference (Eichbaum 1999). Clearly then the 
criteria of “soundness” are not only economic or scientific but ideological.    
 
Constitutions are inevitably about fundamental value judgements. But the 
new economic constitution was presented, deliberately, with strong 
emphasis on its instrumentality. The instrumental orientation was 
embedded in the design of the Acts; for instance, in the distinction 
between goal and instrumental autonomy of the Reserve Bank (Gregory 
1996; Singleton et al 2006). Similarly, the architects of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act intentionally avoided substantive definition of good fiscal 
policy and opted for decision-making principles. And it is reflected in the 
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principal goals of low inflation and fiscal management, which as Boston, St 
John and Stephens (1996) point out, 
 
are, of course, not simply ends in themselves. Rather they are 
primarily means: their ultimate purpose is to enhance the welfare of 
New Zealand citizens through improvements in the country’s 
economic performance. 
 
The economic constitution therefore serves to entrench the ends-means 
dichotomy which runs through the NPM reforms in other forms: between 
politics/management, policy/operation and so on. And because of its 
“constitutional” status, it makes explicit the priority of instrumental 
consideration that is often implicitly assumed in these dichotomies: that the 
instrumental goals must be treated as overriding ends in themselves. 
Hence it is not only necessary to remove references to full employment, 
production and trade, but also references to the substantive purposes of 
economic and social welfare. Again it raises the question of “goal 
displacement” and its political implications.  
 
But instrumental decisions inevitably entail moral and political choices 
between conflicting substantive ends themselves (Gregory 1996). This is 
more so when the monetarist faith is not universally accepted amongst 
economists themselves in New Zealand and elsewhere, both then and 
now (Dalziel 1993; Gould 2006). And even if one were to accept the 
proposition that monetary policies are incapable of delivering goals other 
than inflation avoidance in the long run, there remain important political 
trade-offs to make. For instance, the implicit assumption that short-term 
sacrifice is necessary for long-term economic prosperity entails 
consideration of issues such as trade-offs between economic prosperity 
and other values such as fairness, dignity, temporary or permanent ends; 
the proper balance between short-term pains and long-term gains; 
unequal distribution of short-term pains which tend to fall harshly on the 
more vulnerable poorer section of the society, whereas the benefits accrue 
mostly to the better off. Neither does the “natural” limit of monetary and 
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fiscal policies absolve policy makers from the responsibility to make sure 
that other policies do deliver the overall goals of economic and social 
welfare and that monetary policies do not impose unreasonable and 
unnecessary constraints on these alternative means.  
 
A second issue with the economic constitution is the reified, “supposedly 
apolitical”, notion of economy that lies at its centre. The economy, which 
“might otherwise be seen as a complex web of economic and social and 
political relations”, becomes a “thing-in-itself” from which the authority of 
the economic constitution is derived (Gregory 1996:19-20). “The most 
insidious example” of such a tendency to reify “the economy”, according to 
Gregory, “is probably the powerful euphemism ‘financial markets’, which in 
real political terms actually means people/organisations with money to 
invest, or – arguably – ‘rich people’” (op.cit.:20). But in monetarist 
economic terms, financial markets are treated as if they are autonomous 
entities capable of automatic, “rational” and self-correcting reactions if left 
on their own. And therefore politics is by definition not only futile but 
counterproductive. The consequence, as Kelsey (2003:159-160) observes, 
is that policy making centred around the reified “financial markets” 
becomes itself “reified as an objective science”, while the discourses of 
“rational expectation”, “sound monetary policy”, “fiscal discipline” and 
“economical fundamentals” imply both neutrality and virtue. This intricate 
construct is at once separated from politics, and paradoxically “intrinsically 
in the public interest”, against which, Kelsey comments, “alternatives were 
a conceptual impossibility”.  
 
What is lost in translation here is the opportunity for legitimate political 
debates between the people themselves to define what the public interest 
is and how to achieve it, which they would have been entitled to in a 
political realm. Moreover, it severs the relations between the public and 
their political institutions (or the people who run those institutions such as 
the Reserve Bank governor or the finance ministers), and inevitably 
weakens the ability of the former to exercise control over the latter. The 
need to talk to citizens and gain their consent is replaced by the metaphor 
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of “talking” to the financial markets and responding to their anxiety or 
disappointment. The Reserve Bank Governor, for instance, admitted that 
there were manifest failures to explain to the citizenry the rationale behind 
the remarkable reforms of the 1980s and 1990s to convince citizens of the 
merits of those reforms, although he himself nonetheless is convinced that 
they were meritorious (Brash 1996). To explain to the citizenry as a whole, 
when citizens of course are divided into classes and other groups by 
conflicting interests, is of course much harder than simply asserting an 
economic orthodoxy which happens to coincide in an agreeable way with 
the interests of one particular section of the citizenry.  
 
And this brings one to the third issue: that of power and legitimacy. Such 
issues are seldom, if ever talked about, in the technocratic discourses that 
underpin the revival of economic constitutionalism. They are buried deep 
beneath the discourse of a politics/economics dichotomy. The need to 
legislate for Reserve Bank independence and fiscal responsibility 
nevertheless betrays a basic fact that there is no force of nature policing 
the boundary between politics and economics. The “insulation” of 
economics and politics from one another necessarily requires exercise of 
political power to check the perceived illegitimate use of power. Indeed, 
despite the official rhetoric of consensus, the making of the economic 
constitution clearly reflected the dominant patterns of power (Goldfinch 
2000). 
 
As Dr Brash’s comment above demonstrates, consistent with the 
discourse of NPM, the legitimacy of power under the economic constitution 
is based on the “correctness” of economic theories rather than the 
persuasiveness of political justifications.  One might thus describe it as 
“technocratic”, that is, a form of governmental power based on technical 
expertise prioritised over political arguments. This is essentially a reversal 
of what happened under the first Labour Government which sought to 
assert the primacy of politics over technical expertise.  
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Technocratic power is power nonetheless. And it has important 
implications for the configuration of power in society generally. Mulgan 
(1997b:317) for example regards the “insulation” of monetary and fiscal 
policies as a deliberate effort by governments themselves to “limit their 
own power to respond to economic interests opposed to those 
represented by investors in financial markets”. The technocrats are 
inevitably involved in the game of political power. As Watson (2002, 
2003:290-291) observes, central bank independence provides “not only an 
institutional guarantor of orthodox monetary policies, but also a political 
guarantor that the interests of a particular sector of society will be 
inscribed at the heart of the policy making process”.  
 
The problem then is that the covert technocratic politics may not have a 
high degree of political legitimacy outside its own realm. Indeed, the 
economic constitution necessarily implies a choice between economic 
expertise and democratic accountability. As Gregory (1996:11-12) puts it, 
commenting on the Reserve Bank Act: 
 
We can have an Act which really does emphasize the democratic 
accountability for the Reserve Bank, or we can have one which is set 
up to ensure inflation avoidance; but we cannot have both.  
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act poses a similarly difficult trade-off between 
“the rights of elected representatives, even if motivated by short term 
consideration … and the need to ensure continuity and stability in the 
wider public interest” (Boston et al 1996:288).  
 
In this light, the reformers’ argument for constitutional checks on 
“preoccupation with the short run, either by opportunistic politicians or by 
the society at large” (Bryant 1996 quoted in Gregory 1996:22) becomes 
highly problematic. This would not change even if one indeed were to 
accept the correctness of neoclassical economics. This is not only 
“paternalistic”. It is also highly bureaucratic in a sense that it entrenches in 
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the constitutional rules the triumph of technocratic reason over political 
values.  
 
While the NPM reform purported to “banish bureaucracy”, it achieved 
precisely the opposite: by committing the reform to the pursuit of 
instrumental efficiency, and by dismantling the welfare professionalism 
that had previously served to “problematise” such a pursuit, it simply 
accelerated the process of “bureaucratisation” in a Weberian sense and, in 
doing so, amplified the political irrationalities of a supposedly “rational” 
bureaucracy. As Gregory (2003c) argues, NPM has largely replaced one 
form of bureaucratic control with another. And moreover it has unleashed 
the bureaucracy from its internal political constraints. But what happened 
to the constitutional system? 
 
 
6.3 From Westminster to Where? 
 
Before examining the constitutional implications of the 1980s and 90s 
reform, a few words must be said about the changes in the electoral 
system. For some commentators the introduction of MMP represents a 
departure from the Westminster norms of strong majoritarian government. 
But it is equally possible to argue that the introduction of MMP helped to 
bring New Zealand’s system closer to an era before the domination of the 
two-party system – an era with fairer representation values and a higher 
degree of democratic legitimacy – where these basic norms first evolved 
(Palmer and Palmer 2004: 17). Hence it is not surprising that some 
commentators have concluded that MMP does not appear to change the 
role and function of the public sector (Boston et al 1999; James 1997).  
 
It is interesting to note that the introduction of MMP has been regarded as 
a reaction against the 1980s/90s reforms, and the “Blitzkrieg” politics 
under which the reforms were implemented (Boston et al 1996; Denemark 
2001). One might therefore ask, if MMP has strengthened the Westminster 
system, did the NPM reforms weaken it? 
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Sovereignty under Siege 
 
The NPM reforms in New Zealand did not set out to challenge the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty, or at least not explicitly. Treasury’s 1987 
briefing Government Management, for instance, begins with a 
conventional account of parliamentary sovereignty but proceeds quickly to 
a strikingly different convention with a heavy tint of Agency Theory, 
asserting that: 
 
the Government is the agent not of Parliament but of the electorate, 
responsible to the electorate which alone determines its fate. When 
voters go to the polls they are conscious of choosing a constituency 
representative, but the most important question before them is which 
party shall be the next government (Treasury 1987:53). 
 
Officials concluded therefore that all that was required was the 
“effectiveness of translation of the preferences of voters into outcomes, 
and efficiency in the conduct of government administration” (1987:54). 
There is however little explanation of how else one could determine and 
refine the meaning of “electoral preferences” outside a representative 
parliamentary democracy. This is perhaps not surprising given that as 
Jonathan Boston observes, “ the advocates of the reforms have generally 
wanted to reduce the importance of, if not de-legitimise, preferences that 
are expressed through the political arena” (Boston 1992 quoted in Kelsey 
1995:297). And moreover, this means that the NPM model is orientated by 
design, as Jacob et al (2007:16) argues, towards the needs of the 
executive rather than Parliament. The inconsistency of the reformers’ 
formal endorsement and practical rejection of the doctrine at the same 
time lends itself to the accusation of “constitutional illiteracy” by some 
commentators (Hood 1990:15).  
 
The threat to parliamentary sovereignty is evident. For a start, the 
economic constitution further reduces the scope for Parliament to exercise 
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its legislative supremacy, limited as it has always been. Although the Acts 
posed no de jure constraints, the intent was clearly to achieve de facto 
entrenchments of principles of monetary and fiscal policies, which 
effectively bound future governments (Kelsey 1995: 233-234). Challenges 
to parliament’s supremacy were not all as obvious as this. The 
replacement of the traditional “command and control model” with 
competition and contract also had serious implications for parliament’s 
legislative power. As Taggart (2004:618) argues, the substitution of 
traditional regulation with a “fictitious legal person’s power to contract” is 
implicitly a transformation, in his words, “from ‘Parliamentary Powers’ to 
privatisation”29. This further weakens Parliament’s control over regulation.  
 
Parliamentary control over finance raises a slightly more complex issue, 
not the least because strengthening such control is one of the chief 
objectives of the NPM reforms. Yet while there have undoubtedly been 
notable improvements, the actual overall performance of the new financial 
system has been questioned by a number of commentators (Ellwood and 
Newberry 2007; Newberry and Pallot 2004; Newberry 2003; Boston et al 
1996). The reformers appear to have taken for granted that the benefits of 
the new public finance regime – more transparency and tighter control of 
public expenditure – would automatically translate into better 
parliamentary control of supply (Scott 2001; Treasury 1996). However, as 
McLean (2005) argues, the perspectives of the “financial markets”, the 
ministers and parliament are not necessarily the same: what might be an 
increase of “transparency” for one might be a drastic reduction for another.  
 
Indeed the celebrated techniques of private sector accounting do not lend 
themselves easily to parliamentary scrutiny, and often seem more likely to 
generate “information overload” than better scrutiny (Norman 2003). The 
size and specification of “output classes” for example has always been a 
                                                 
29
 Some may argue that the law of contracts places greater control on government via the 
common law courts. However although the courts have been active in certain areas of 
common law rights, such as certain human rights and Maori customary rights, their record 
for controlling the more mundane but no less significant aspects of executive and 
bureaucratic powers is disappointingly poor (McLean 2006). 
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problem for parliamentary scrutiny (Boston et al 1996; Scott 2001; Schick 
2001). It is predictably difficult to fit parliament’s eclectic concerns into 
neatly defined categories. Even the introduction of accrual accounting, 
which has generally been viewed as a success, does not necessarily 
serve parliamentary scrutiny well because of the inherent difficulty in 
translating “notional book entries” into departmental activities that require 
parliamentary approval (Aiken 1994; Boston et al 1996; Newberry 2002; 
Newberry and Pallot 2006). It is not difficult to see why this did not pose a 
problem for reformers, who at any rate would probably prefer market 
provision, but did pose a problem for politicians.  
 
Nor does the new financial system necessarily enlarge the scope of 
parliamentary financial control. Certain activities of the government, such 
as its operation on the financial derivatives market, remain the preserve of 
the executive. Moreover, while input controls were removed from 
parliament on the basis that such controls are redundant in an output 
based system, the controls were in fact transferred to Treasury, rather 
than simply abolished. This aroused some concerns about the balance of 
power between the executive and parliament, as well as the rationale for 
removing input control in the first place (Newberry and Pallot 2006).  
 
These are not merely, as Scott (2001:56) seems to believe, “technical 
issues”. These issues matter firstly because they enhance or erode 
parliament’s control over finance, and secondly because they affect the 
ability of Parliament to exercise control over the actions of the Executive. 
The paradox is that the new regime might give Parliament better financial 
control but it might also remove its leverage of power. The former is a 
matter for technical debate but the latter means that political principles are 
at stake. As Laing (2006) puts it, “the elevation of constitutionally irrelevant 
concepts” that focus on “accounting” rather than accountability, has “the 
potential to undermine decades of negotiation and settlement between the 
executive and the Senate”.  
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An even starker warning could be found in the Clerk of the Senate of 
Australia’s comment that a similar financial system, introduced in Australia 
since 1997, has enhanced executive power in “reversing the results of the 
English Civil War, the Revolution of 1688 and the reforms of William Pitt 
the Younger” (Evans 2007). Comments like this are meant to shock. 
However, at the very least, claims that the NPM public finance system 
enhanced parliamentary control must be viewed skeptically.  
 
This leaves the third and most important role of Parliament – scrutiny of 
the Executive. Reformers can easily point to testimonies by senior officials 
that suggest significant improvements as a result of the reform (Scott 
2001:63-67). But critics could just as easily find evidence that shows 
otherwise. Gregory and Painter (2003:67), for example: 
 
Members of parliament often feel that their scrutiny of agencies is 
inevitably perfunctory, and that the “real issues” lay obfuscated 
beneath the professional façade presented by officials.   
 
They also quote one New Zealand select committee chairperson who 
described departmental chief executives as “master of the bland fudge”. 
Another claimed that the committee was deliberately lied to by 
departmental officials. A senior MP also recalled that one of the agency 
heads appeared more concerned about missing an afternoon appointment 
than appearing before the committee for a financial review (ibid.).  
 
Politicians’ misgivings were reciprocated by reservations from officials, 
especially about opposition members. One official reportedly claimed that 
“there was insufficient control on opposition members who waste the time 
of the executives” (Norman and Stace 1997 quoted in Scott 2001:108). 
Another described the select committee environment as “harsh and 
illogical” (Norman 2003:156). 
 
The relationship between parliamentarians and officials is of course 
always going to be an uneasy one, as it is between democracy and 
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bureaucracy. Under the old system, they had been held together by 
constitutional norms and mutual respect, if not trust. The NPM reforms, 
however, had put additional pressure on this.  
 
There were warning signals that parliamentarians and officials had 
become much less trusting and more combative. In 1998, the Chairman of 
the Fire Service Commission – a management expert with private sector 
background – was reported as telling a select committee that “he had 
better things to do than answering their full frank and pointless questions” 
(Sunday News, 18 May 1998). Old-fashioned bureaucrats might have 
shown more respect for constitutional subtleties in such circumstances.  
 
Of course, dramatic controversies such as these are rare. Yet low visibility 
does not necessarily mean less damage. The use of commercial 
confidentiality, for instance, is a common strategy that has serious 
implications. And this issue is clearly related to the NPM reforms and to 
contractualism in particular.   
 
In a sense, NPM has reversed the trajectory towards greater openness in 
the pre-1984 era that resulted in the Official Information Act. Certain 
information such as the pay and conditions of senior officials, which 
previously had been publicly available – and arguably should still be – was 
now removed from public and parliamentary scrutiny on the ground of 
commercial confidentiality30. This may seem immaterial for reformers. But 
the ability of such information to generate public controversies, for 
instance in the cases of “golden handshakes” in the 1990s, often suggests 
otherwise. An investigation by the Auditor-General into severance 
payments concluded that while “confidentiality has its place … it can also 
be at the cost of transparency” and went on to note that for many “secrecy 
                                                 
30
 A notable example occurred in the aftermath of the Fire Service Commission fiasco 
when the new Chairwoman, citing confidential clauses, refused to give to a select 
committee the details of severance payments for outgoing senior staff. Another concerns 
the Chief Executive for Work and Income who refused to divulge to a select committee 
details of an out-of-court settlement. These cases prompted Sir Geoffrey Palmer to 
suggest that parliament could threaten to use its power to imprison if officials refused to 
comply (Dominion Post, 12 April 2000). 
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is evidence of public officials having something to hide” (Auditor-General 
2002:14).  
 
This issue has generated much debate in other Westminster countries, 
particularly Australia (Barrett 2001; Cameron 2004; de Maria 2001; Evans 
2002; Freiberg 1999; Roberts 2000, 2001). As one Australian 
commentator points out, the issue of commercial confidentiality and 
openness is not just about commercial information but rather is about “two 
distinctive visions of governance” (de Maria 2001:93). Moreover, 
commercial confidentiality has provided “the traditional inclination of 
government to secrecy with … a powerful additional weapon in the age of 
contracting out”, especially in cases of bureaucratic failure (Zifcak 
2001:89). 
 
A different but not entirely dissimilar issue in this regard is the separation 
between commercial and non-commercial entities, which resulted in, for 
quite some time, severe limits to parliament’s power of scrutiny for the 
former. Air New Zealand, for instance, was only brought under 
parliamentary scrutiny in 2002 after the collapse of Ansett and subsequent 
bailout with public funds. Even then, scrutiny is limited for the fear that this 
might put Air New Zealand “at a commercial disadvantage to its 
competitors” (Cullen 2003). Indeed there has long been a perceptible 
unwillingness for SOEs and privatised companies to cooperate with 
parliamentary scrutiny (Boston 1992:578; Gregory and Painter 2003).  
 
Putting these together a different picture than what the reformers had 
promised emerges. The NPM styled public finance system, as constructed 
under the Public Finance Act 1989, has undoubtedly important benefits. 
But, at the same time, such improvement was bought at the high cost of 
fundamentally undermining the constitutional sovereignty of parliament. 
Indeed, the embedded barriers to effective scrutiny would appear to have 
reinvented the “culture of secrecy” rather than diminishing it.  
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Unaccountable and Irresponsible 
 
Turning to the issue of accountability and responsibility reveals the same 
conflicted views of reformers concerning constitutional conventions. 
Palmer and Palmer (2004:91) contend that the NPM reforms have not 
altered the doctrine but only made accountability and responsibility more 
transparent. This position, interestingly, does not appear to be strongly 
endorsed by the reformers themselves. Government Management argued 
that the doctrine was obviously outdated: it was “designed a century ago 
for a small public sector with limited functions, where ministers took all 
decisions of any importance”. Worse still: 
 
[the] current system creates confusion as to managerial responsibility 
which in turn seems to reduce accountability … Responsibility for 
administration goes constitutionally to the Minister; legally to Minister 
and SSC together; practically it tends to disappear (Treasury 
1987:59).  
 
Thus while in theory ministerial responsibility is still the beginning and the 
end, in practice the reforms are not so much about strengthening the 
doctrine as it is about searching for ways to implement a new 
accountability without running into obvious constitutional difficulties. 
Responding to Palmer and Palmer’s comment quoted above, Scott 
argues: 
 
While the doctrine of ministerial responsibility may not have been 
eroded in respect of ultimate accountability, the situation today is 
different in a practical sense. Chief executives are now much more 
accountable for the delivery by their department of specified services, 
and they can face severance or non-renewal of contract on 
performance grounds alone (2001:126).  
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Here in a nutshell is the managerial formula of accountability. For Scott, 
clearly, the emphasis in the discussion of “clarification” falls on the 
changes, rather than the continuities. But just how different is managerial 
accountability from ministerial responsibility?  
 
The first difference is that whereas ministerial responsibility begins with 
constitutional roles of ministers and officials, managerial accountability 
starts from the question of “what”. Managerial accountability relies 
absolutely on the distinction between inputs, outputs and outcomes, which 
is absent from the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, for it a key task is 
to clarify the managers’ accountability and to assess their performance 
(Schick 1996, 2001; Scott 2001). Outputs, as Schick (1996:1) puts it, are 
“the lynchpin of the New Zealand accountability regime”. 
 
The choice of output is based on perceived objectivity – and thus 
measurability – and controllability. The rationale is simple: “for 
accountability to operate effectively, the individuals held accountable must 
have control over their results” (Boston et al 1996:264). This puts the 
managerial notion of accountability firmly on “the logical-positivist 
foundations” of “the hard rationalist school” (Gregory 2003a:564). 
Outcomes, by contrast, lack both. Scott (2001:175-176) argues that 
accountability for outcomes is likely to fail because outcomes can only be 
partially controlled by individual chief executives; the causal relationships 
between outputs and outcomes are frequently not well understood; 
timeframes for outcomes are usually too long; and many outcomes are 
simply too difficult to measure. From a managerial perspective, apparently, 
“if you can’t measure it you can’t manage it” and by implication, you cannot 
be held accountable for it either.  
 
Such obsession with measurable and controllable results – here 
accountability is understood as synonymous with control – has been 
criticised by several commentators (Gregory 1995; 1998; 2003a; Scott 
1996, 2001; Stone 1995). Schick (1996:74), for example, puts the case 
subtly that outputs were chosen because “they provided a reliable basis 
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for managerial accountability, not because they are the most important 
indicator for government performance”.  
 
The paradox is that the clarity and simplicity of managerial accountability 
for outputs limit its use in reality, for it is inherently difficult to establish a 
causal relationship between the “production” of outputs and the ultimate 
outcomes that matter in an inherently complex, uncertain and politically 
charged environment, not to mention that not all bureaucratic actions can 
be reduced to reified notions of production in the first place (Mulgan 2004). 
“Just about the only certainty” in the Cave Creek case, Gregory 
(1998a:524) contends, was “that the platform was an output that produced 
a precise outcome: 14 dead and four injured”. Scott (2001: 136-142) 
argues that managerial accountability should have made it easier to 
dissect the overall accountability for the tragedy into small parcels of 
failure along the managerial chains of command. Indeed, it is clear enough 
where responsibility for the production and the purchase of the outputs lie. 
But this simply begs the question: if evidence is as sufficient as Scott 
believes it is, why then were no individuals prosecuted for criminal 
negligence given the senseless loss of lives at Cave Creek? All the official 
and academic efforts that had gone into clarifying accountability and 
responsibility, including Scott’s own, would have been superfluous. Scott 
undermines his own case in fact, perhaps unwittingly, by suggesting that 
the “Crown” should be prosecuted for the tragedy at Cave Creek. Why 
indeed should one ever resort to the ambiguous and often confusing 
concept of the “Crown” if responsibility can be devolved to individual 
managers and employees who “produced” specific outputs that led to the 
tragic outcome? 
 
But the limit of managerial accountability is not just its impracticality. 
Managerial accountability is intrinsically limited because by definition it 
fails to capture what is arguably the most important facet of bureaucratic 
acts, that is, the inherent public and political nature of such acts: the 
unavoidable judgment of values, the inevitable exercise of discretionary 
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and non-discretionary powers, and the positions of trust held by officials 
and politicians for such powers.  
 
In the case of Cave Creek, it would be futile to look for a precise causal 
relation between factors such as an organisational culture of “doing more 
with less”, or the lack of funding, with the collapse of the viewing platform 
at Cave Creek. There is none. All one could conclude from evidence is 
that these factors played a part in the final outcome. But this does not 
absolve anybody from political responsibility in terms of whether their acts 
and judgments, as well as the outcomes, in themselves were consistent – 
and seen to be so – with public expectations for officials. Such 
responsibility is even more important when specification of outputs or the 
causal relations linking outputs and outcomes, are lacking, as often is the 
case with the “craft” – and more so with “coping” – rather than the 
“production” tasks of the public service.  
 
The public of course do not always see accountability as a function of 
good management, and neither do they always find managerial 
accountability in this narrow sense satisfactory. As Mulgan observes: 
 
Interested parties, whether ministers, members of parliamentary 
committees, media or members of the public rarely, if ever, resort to 
output statements or outputs measures as a basis for holding 
government to account (2004:9).   
 
What this illustrates is a gap between managerial accountability and public 
expectation, and between managerial assumptions and political reality. 
The reified notion of a production process is unlikely to be convincing for 
the public who actually bear the impacts of bureaucratic power. Cases 
such as Cave Creek provide vivid illustration of the virtual irrelevance, and 
impotence, of the outputs/outcomes dichotomy in satisfying public demand 
for political responsibility (Gregory 1998a).   
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Secondly, managerial accountability also differs from ministerial 
responsibility in terms of its process (the “how” of accountability). 
Consistent with its rationalistic orientation, the process of managerial 
accountability takes the form of “counting”, rather than “probing” (Gregory 
2003a:565). More formally, the focus is on matching ex-post measurement 
of performance against ex-ante specification of targets – in other words, 
verification of achievements against predetermined goals and indicators – 
rather than open-ended discussion and debate as in the case of ministerial 
responsibility.  
 
The problem is that the emphasis on “verification” ignores the fact that ex-
post measurement of “performance”, just as the ex-ante specification of 
objectives, is inherently a “subjective and value-laden activity” which is 
why performance measurement is “popular in theory but difficult in 
practice” (Thomas 2007). And just as objectives are inevitably multiple, 
vague and potentially conflicting, the measures of success or failure also 
are open to different and possibly contradictory interpretations. 
Accordingly “performance is what the people most directly involved have in 
mind when they use them” (op.cit..:417). The “performance” of the 
Department of Conservation in the case of Cave Creek is unsurprisingly 
intensely focused on the specific failure to ensure public safety, rather than 
any predetermined financial or performance targets. This would require an 
interactive process to construct the standards of good performance in 
specific contexts, according to Thomas, rather than assuming “there is an 
objective reality ‘out there’, just waiting to be discovered” (ibid.).  
 
Yet the discourse of accountability as verification tends to foreclose 
discussion of their meaning and relevance to a particular perspective of 
“performance”. This in turn reinforces the focus on outputs, rather than 
outcomes, because the outcomes are prone to descending into “a debate 
about evidence, causality and degree of control” (Scott 2001:175). Critical 
reflection, or “double loop” learning, is explicitly discouraged.  
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Managerial accountability is thus heavily “rationalised” in the typology 
devised by Weber, as Stone (1995:514) argues. It is “increasingly 
regularized or systemized and governed by ‘instrumental’ or process 
values” and therefore increasingly “professionalised”. Unsurprisingly, such 
a process puts a heavy premium on the formal techniques of financial 
accounting and auditing, which is evident in the so-called “audit explosion” 
in the public sector (Power 1994; 2003). This can be seen in the growing 
volume and sophistication of budgeting and reporting documents such as 
corporate plans, estimates, purchase and performance agreements, 
annual reports, SOIs and others in New Zealand’s public sector as a result 
of NPM reform (Boston et al 1996). Yet, as this happens, the unintended 
or perverse effects of enhanced accountability also become evident. This 
is reflected in the perception that “a lot of reporting and accountability in 
the budget cycle has become a game” (Norman 2002:623). Accountability 
becomes, in Michael Power’s words, “rituals of verification”. And rather 
than spurring performance it simply generates a checklist mentality 
(Schick 1996). As Gregory (2003a) comments, an over-commitment to 
performance measurement can actually subvert accountability. 
 
Critics are familiar with such paradoxes of “performance” (van Thiel and 
Leeuw 2002). They can be understood in Weberian terms as a case of 
bureaucratic “goal displacement”: performance measurement becomes 
more about “measurement”, as an end in itself, than performance. As it 
happens, accountability becomes increasingly internalised as a part of 
managerial control – and therefore more opaque and closed – instead of 
connecting externally to politicians and the people who ought to have the 
final say on the assessment of bureaucratic performance beyond its 
narrow managerial definition (Matti 2007). The outcome appears to be 
increased bureaucratisation, rather than enhanced democratic and political 
accountability.  
 
Such risks are clearly present in the case of Cave Creek. An SSC 
performance review prior to the tragedy found that William Mansfield, the 
Chief Executive, was doing a good job, particularly in improving the 
  125 
department’s system of financial management. Another review after the 
tragedy found no ground for seeking his dismissal. It is not difficult to draw 
a parallel between this situation and that of the Chief Executive of the UK 
prison service, Derek Lewis, in 1996. Lewis contested his dismissal on the 
grounds that, among other things, he had met all his performance targets 
(Polidano 1999; Woodhouse 2005). Had the Chief Executive of DoC 
shared Derek Lewis’s tenacity, he might have argued for a bonus instead. 
Fortunately this was not the case in the Cave Creek tragedy. Yet this was 
by no means a foregone conclusion.  
 
Another consequence of the concept of accountability as verification is that 
it further obfuscates the relationship between responsibility and 
accountability. In Cave Creek, it has been argued that the Chief Executive 
and the Ministers involved were “accountable but not responsible” 
(Gregory 1998a). Accountability, Gregory argues, has been fulfilled by 
ministers’ explanation to parliament and two inquires into the tragedy. But 
it is not clear that their moral and ethical responsibility after the event has 
been met in the face of public demand for explanation and retribution for 
what should or could have happened. 
 
It is true that traditional ministerial responsibility can be reduced by 
prevarication to mere answerability, but it can also be stretched to inflict 
serious political damage through effective probing by the politician. The 
point of giving an account is to confirm that ministers are politically 
responsible. By contrast, the new form of accountability is deliberately 
distanced from political responsibility through the employment of a 
policy/operation divide. And in doing so it enacts a distinction between 
objective responsibility and subjective responsibility (Mosher 1968; 
Gregory 2003a) which arguably did not exist under traditional ministerial 
responsibility. The “objectivity” of managerial accountability allows clearer 
boundaries to be drawn on matters that managers can be held 
accountable for. This forces the accountability component of ministerial 
responsibility to stand on its own. If Ministers are no longer responsible for 
the acts of their subordinate, then accountability can be nothing more than 
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recounting the “facts” or telling the “truth”, with no political or moral or 
ethical implications on the Ministers’ part. Conversely, the political 
dimension of administrative acts is obscured when ministers, as 
politicians, no longer have to offer a political explanation of departmental 
administration. In other words, there is an important qualitative difference 
between the requirement to give a “full” account under traditional 
ministerial responsibility, which means engaging with open-ended political 
debates and discussion – including what constitutes facts, truth or 
evidence when conclusive causal linkage is lacking – and the insulated 
verification of “facts” that managerial accountability demands. Such a 
difference seems to have escaped some observers, such as Baberis, who 
believe that managerial accountability simply exacerbates the old 
problems already there (Baberis 1998). Nonetheless it adds fuel to the 
criticism of traditional responsibility that it allows politicians and 
bureaucrats to be “fully accountable but irresponsible” (Gregory 1998a; 
2003a).  
 
The problem lies not so much with ministerial responsibility, but in the 
subtle encroachment on the doctrine by managerial accountability. It could 
be argued that, far from being “fully” accountable and paradoxically 
irresponsible, managerial accountability implies a limited account and a 
limited responsibility. Ministers hence can be managerially accountable but 
politically unaccountable, and therefore politically not responsible.  
 
In the Cave Creek case, the question of managerial accountability has 
been satisfied in terms of identifying the causal linkage between various 
parties’ action or inactions and the final tragedy. But it could be argued 
that the parties involved, politicians in particular, did not accept 
responsibility to the extent that the convention would have required and 
therefore failed to give a full account for issues such as integrity, or moral 
and ethical choices. The alternative to “I am responsible but not to blame” 
appears to be “I am not operationally responsible, nor politically 
accountable, hence cannot possibly be blamed”.  
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This raises a further question about blame and punishment. In theory, 
managerial accountability, combined with a performance measurement 
system, provides an automated process for apportioning blame and 
enforcing punishment, if the causal links between actions and outcomes 
can be conclusively established. But instant satisfaction is bought by 
drastically reducing the quality and scope of responsibility. Ministers, being 
politicians, will often attempt to dissociate themselves from blame, and 
similarly public servants would try to hang on to their job. The point of 
ministerial responsibility is to ensure they get away with less by exposing 
them to public scrutiny and political pressure. Managerial accountability, 
on the other hand, means that the public and parliamentarians often face a 
much more difficult, if not impossible, mission of proving the causal link 
between bureaucratic actions and ultimate failures in cases such as Cave 
Creek31.  
 
The separation and specification of roles, including the roles of officials 
and politicians, and the focus on verification, is partly designed to make it 
clearer who is responsible. It makes ministers responsible and 
accountable for the achievement of outcomes, while the sphere of chief 
executives is deemed to be the production of departmental outputs 
towards achieving these outcomes (Treasury 1996; Scott 2001). The 
notion of control underpins the allocation of accountability and 
responsibility, though probably more so in the case of chief executives 
than politicians. In fact, the managerial theory cannot explain why 
politicians should be held responsible or even accountable for “outcomes”, 
such as economic growth or public welfare, which are almost always 
beyond their personal control.  
 
                                                 
31
 A more recent case concerns Mrs Folole Muliaga, who was terminally ill and dependent 
on an oxygen machine. She died less than three hours after the electricity supply was 
disconnected to her house by a contractor of the state-owned Mercury Energy, due to an 
outstanding balance. Police investigation concluded there was no evidence to justify any 
charge against the company, contractor or staff involved. The problem, as in Cave Creek, 
is that the lack of causal evidence not only absolves the legal culpability of parties 
involved, it also glosses over the moral and political responsibilities of the staff, the 
company and ultimately the Government which owns it.  
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The difficulty with this control-based notion of accountability is that it has 
very little to say about the “problem of many hands”, as in such cases as 
Cave Creek (Mulgan 2004). Bureaucratic actions very often are collective 
by definition. They are collective not only because bureaucratic actions 
inevitably overlap, both within the bureaucracy itself and with the political 
executive, but also because the political dimension of bureaucratic actions 
makes it impossible to separate individual decisions from the broader 
political choices and the exercise of political power. As Gregory (2001) 
argues: 
 
The attempts to specify role relations according to categories like 
outcomes and outputs are politically naïve and offer a poor guide to 
understanding the ambiguities and uncertainties of government 
relations. 
 
Managerial accountability represents a paradox. On one hand, no one is 
clearly responsible for the bureaucracy as a whole. This lack of clear 
responsibility reinforces the perception of bureaucratic organisation, in 
Hannah Arendt’s terms, as “the rule of nobody” (Gregory 1998a; 2003a). 
This in turn underlies the invention of “systemic failures” as an explanation 
of the tragedy at Cave Creek, since Judge Noble could find neither any 
individuals nor any particular group of individuals who were responsible. 
The Chief Executive and the Minster did not resign directly in response to 
the tragedy. Blurred responsibility serves to promote a reified notion of 
“large organisations as abstract entities with a life of their own” and further 
conceals the “ultimate humanness of profoundly impersonal governmental 
systems” (Gregory 1998a). 
 
Some commentators have argued that what is needed is simply a heavier 
dose of managerial accountability (Scott 2001; Hunt 2005). But these 
commentaries occlude, as much as they seek to explicate, responsibility 
and accountability. Indeed, while critics dislike the term “systemic failure”, 
there seems to be a parallel and intrinsically contradictory tendency to “fill 
in the gap” by resorting to such mystifying personifications as “DOC” or 
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“the Crown” or even “risk management system” as if they too have a life of 
their own– a system by another name would be just as impersonal – when 
the apparent individualistic explanations are exhausted, while refusing to 
bring their own reasoning to the logical conclusion. If the Chief Executive 
is to blame, then who is culpable for tolerating the Chief Executive’s “poor” 
management and even poorer political judgement for so long, even after 
the event, other than the Minister (assuming the SSC had fulfilled their 
oversight function)? If the DOC or the Crown or systems of any other kind 
are to blame, then who should be responsible for them? If nobody is to 
blame, then who is responsible for perpetuating the myth of “the rule of 
nobody”? 
 
One explanation of its inability to grapple with personal responsibility for 
collective actions is that managerial accountability, as Mulgan (2004:16) 
argues, confuses “the question of who was actually in charge and who 
should therefore take collective responsibility”. In other words, the 
responsibility for maintaining the power-relationship between politicians 
and public servants, and ultimately the relationship of trust with the people, 
are attenuated. In this light, the traditional convention provides much more 
clarity and certainty than managerial accountability, since the responsibility 
for such collective failures falls prima facie on the politicians.   
 
In the case of Cave Creek, traditional ministerial responsibility would argue 
for the head of the Minister. One could expect the Minister to argue that he 
is “responsible but not to blame”. Whether such an explanation or excuse 
is acceptable or not would be subject to political debate and judgement. 
Managerial accountability, by contrast, automatically shields the Minister 
from responsibility and blame by invoking the separation between policy 
and operation32. And if one were to accept the logic of such separation, 
how is it fair to blame the Chief Executive – or even to insist on his 
statutory responsibility to ensure public safety for using DoC facilities in 
                                                 
32
 Indeed, as Graeme Hunt puts it, ‘Mansfield need only have reiterated his statutory duty 
under the State Sector Act for the general conduct of the department’ to shield his 
Minister from a widespread, and for Hunt misguided, call for him to resign (National 
Business Review 23 August 1996: 48).  
  130 
the first place – given that “he did not have a hand in the fateful platform-
building at Cave Creek” and could not be expected to at any rate (Hunt 
2005)? This seems more akin to cynicism than “objective” allocation of 
responsibility. 
 
Thus, in theory, managerial accountability operates alongside the 
convention of ministerial responsibility. In practice, the former displaces 
the latter.  
 
 
Breaking the Bargain 
 
Not only did NPM replace the informal relational contract between 
politicians and officials, it also fundamentally altered the relationship 
between them. In New Zealand and elsewhere, the traditional Schafferian 
bargain had been intentionally broken down to make way for a new 
managerial bargain (Savoie 2003; James 2002; Hood and Lodge 2006).    
 
Signs of change are not difficult to identify, partly thanks to the high profile 
of public servants such as Christine Rankin (James 2002; Gregory 2005a). 
Arguably New Zealand public servants have never quite been faceless 
bureaucrats. Yet compared to the old bureaucrats, the new public 
managers have been remembered more often for their insistence on 
managerial prerogatives and their contractual rights, than their popularity 
with the public. Seen in this light, the demise of anonymity is important not 
so much in itself but rather for what it reveals about the changing nature of 
power relations between politicians and officials.  
 
The new bargain seems to shift the balance of power towards bureaucrats 
or managers rather than politicians. As Gregory (2001:250) argues, 
“whether or not dressed up in the languages of freedom to manage, 
empowering operators and managers implies a consequential 
disempowerment of the political executive”. The NPM reforms have given 
managers an independent source of power in managerial or economic 
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expertise, rather than in democratic mandate. Whereas the latter makes it 
clear that politicians, because they are elected, should retain the ultimate 
control over the bargain, the former places officials in direct competition 
with their political principals. Indeed the loss of anonymity could be 
regarded as a tacit acceptance of the independence of officials from the 
Minister. Research confirms that officials during the NPM reforms were 
less tolerant of politics and more guarded against “interference” by 
politicians (Gregory 1995b:172-173; 2004b). 
 
Politicians naturally do not welcome such competition for their authority. 
The expansion of managerial discretion was met by Ministers hungering 
for more control over bureaucracy, especially after major failures such as 
Cave Creek (Gregory and Norman 2003; Maor 1999; Norman 2003). In 
theory, the reforms would enhance the control of politicians as “principals”. 
However, as Scott (2001:109) acknowledges, this role requires “different 
skills, different from those used in political management” and “ministers 
with such skills are very rare”. To take advantage of the efficient control 
system provided by the NPM reforms, ministers must first learn to behave 
as the reformers expect and accept the managerial terms of the game, if 
not becoming managers themselves. The assertion of managerial control 
thus does not necessarily compensate for the loss of political power and 
the political instinct of ministers often drive them towards more direct 
control. 
 
Of course, this has not prevented politicians from insisting on the old forms 
of control, which manifests itself in, for example, “the obsession with 
inputs” over issues such as the money spent on consultants, severance 
pay or information technology (Norman 2003:86-93). But these ad hoc 
attempts to rein in managerial freedom tend to entail little more than 
tinkering at the margin, rather than any fundamental rethinking about the 
managerial philosophy of freedom and control. Some commentators argue 
that this leads to “learned vulnerability” that saps the innovative energy of 
managers (Gregory 1995a; Norman 2003). An alternative argument might 
be that unconstrained managerial freedom is to blame for undermining the 
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trust between politicians and officials in the first place. Moreover, the 
operation of the managerial bargain is based on the separation between 
politics and management. This opens up new opportunities for “cheating” 
between ministers and bureaucrats over what is inherently a grey zone 
rather than two separate worlds, as a number of commentators have 
observed (Hood 2001; Hood and Lodge 2006; Savoie 2003). This makes it 
more difficult to trace the ebbs and flows of political power between 
bureaucrats and politicians when both can disguise the exercise of power 
simply by breaching the boundary or pushing it outwards. 
 
But, perhaps more importantly, the managerial bargain implies a change in 
the nature and purpose of the “bargain”. Whereas the traditional bargain 
sought to subjugate bureaucracy to politics, the managerial bargain 
legitimises the competition for power between politicians and officials, and 
therefore acknowledges that the latter have an independent claim to power 
based on managerial or economic expertise rather than democratic 
credentials. The traditional bargain aims at affirming democratic control of 
power, while the managerial bargain tries to ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management by insulating them from political intervention. 
The traditional bargain is hierarchical: it trades power and independence 
for trust and protection. The managerial bargain resembles a market with 
separated parties exchanging powers.  
 
It is no longer clear who is or should be in charge, but it would seem that 
the bureaucrats would naturally have an edge over politicians in the 
pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness. One commentator remarks that 
“during the reform years, the conventional relationship between elected 
government and bureaucratic advisors in a Westminster system was to a 
great extent reversed” (Nagel 1998:243). The bureaucracy, rather than the 
politicians, became the initiator of policies. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that some have feared values such as political neutrality and loyalty might 
give away under contractual demands and competitive pressure.  
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Consider, for instance, political neutrality. The new system of fixed term 
contractual relations that put an end to the symbolically important 
“permanence” of employment inevitably arouses worries about political 
patronage (Boston et al 1991; 1996). Such fears were found to be 
exaggerated (Boston et al 1996; Scott 2001). One should not overlook that 
the contractual devices attempted to provide some safeguards: for 
instance, the five-year term, which is specifically designed to counter the 
political “business cycle” (Scott 2001). At any rate, even under the old 
system permanence was not meant to be an unconditional guarantee of 
job security. For some, the new arrangements simply acknowledge 
officially what was long the implicit requirement: that public servants have 
to be responsive to their ministers, though often this implies a redefinition 
of responsiveness in “customer-oriented”, rather than political terms.  
 
However, the reforms may have “politicised” the public service more subtly 
than by means of politically risky patronage (Gregory 2004a). New 
Zealand reforms raised questions about “policy-related” and “managerial” 
politicisation. According to Mulgan (1998), policy related politicisation 
refers to “appointing people with well known commitment to particular 
policy directions that may render them unacceptable to a future alternative 
government” while managerial politicisation is where the Government 
replaces the incumbent with new appointees in order to exert its control 
over the departments. It is not difficult to identify either form of politicisation 
during the reform years. A notable individual example is the appointment 
of a well-known advocate of the NPM reforms to the position of State 
Service Commissioner in the 1980s to replace the incumbent who had 
criticised the reforms (Gregory 2004a). Another concerns the Treasury, 
found to have adopted inconsistent methodology when asked by the 
National Government in 1993 to cost the Labour Opposition’s policy 
(Mascarenhas 2003:131). Concerns about these new forms of 
politicisation underlined the Labour government’s reservations about the 
capacity and willingness of public servants to implement its policies when 
it came to power in 1999.  
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It could be argued that the dichotomy between politics and management 
has facilitated both forms of “politicisation” by confusing political neutrality 
with political antipathy. As a result, it has put too much emphasis on the 
negative sense of political neutrality (the protection of the merit principle 
from external threats) and overlooked its positive meaning (the ability of 
public servants to serve any democratically elected government). This also 
implies that the cause of politicisation is not to be found in conspiracy 
theories but rather in the structural entrenchment of neoliberal values and 
policy preferences through apparently “apolitical” means, such as the NPM 
reforms themselves. In other words, pressures of politicisation come from 
the changes within the public service. The merit principle remains intact 
from external threats, but the concept of merit itself has been extensively 
reconfigured according to a new set of administrative and political 
imperatives. This is manifest for instance in the preferences for those 
candidates with economic or managerial expertise and Treasury 
backgrounds for top positions in New Zealand public service since the 
reforms (Boston 2001).  
 
The difference between new and old forms of politicisation, like the 
boundary between politics and management, is not fixed. Gregory (2004a) 
argues that policy related politicisation in New Zealand tends to reflect 
partisan preferences. Boston (2001) finds that public managers in the mid 
1990s were more likely to vote for the National party and were significantly 
to the right of most other “opinion leaders” and the community as a whole. 
The conservative tendency of bureaucrats is not entirely surprising. 
Nonetheless it is telling that two officials and advocates of the NPM 
reforms later became high-profile politicians on the right, after moving on 
from their high offices33.  
 
It casts serious doubt on the likelihood that the reforms have actually 
reduced the risk of partisan bias, or whether they have simply assumed 
away the problem, and more importantly whether the 
                                                 
33
 Dr Brash, the Reserve Bank Governor, became the National Party leader from 2003 to 
2006. Graeme Scott, Secretary to the Treasury, was on the Act Party list.  
  135 
politics/administration separation has in fact made bureaucratic politics 
less transparent and open, and thus more susceptible to partisan biases 
when left on their own. Indeed it may be politics itself, rather than 
management, which needs to be defended against the perils of new forms 
of politicisation, especially given the increased autonomy and power of 
officials under the managerial reforms.  
 
A related issue here is the advent of political advisors (Eichbaum and 
Shaw 2003; 2005a; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008b). The rise of political 
advisors could perhaps be conceptualised as a response to the demand 
for additional capacity and capability required to preserve “popular control 
and constitutionally independent, non-partisan and expert public or civil 
service” and not solely as a response to the NPM reforms in New Zealand. 
But such a demand is surely not because of the old regime of “public 
administration” emphasising only “the routine administration of procedures 
and rules” or that policymaking under the old welfare state was any 
simpler than making monetary policy along neoclassical lines. It is not 
difficult however to envisage an alternative explanation that echoes the 
analysis above – that the politics/management distinction, which attempts 
to “depoliticise” the public service, has generated an increase in partisan 
politics. Adding a third, or fourth, element into the bilateral relations 
between ministers and officials would not necessarily help to address the 
fundamental tension between bureaucrats and politicians. It might simply 
shift the issues to elsewhere and invent new forms of “politicisation” 
(Eichbaum and Shaw suggest a new administrative politicisation on top of 
Mulgan’s typology). While ministerial advisors might help to take some 
political heat off officials, by attempting to insulate officials from such 
problems and giving them an easy way out, it risks displacing the notion of 
“political neutrality” with a toxic combination of partisan politics and 
(supposedly) apolitical management.   
 
The other side of the coin, loyalty, is similarly under stress. At any rate, the 
NPM reformers are suspicious of the degree of loyalty of bureaucrats to 
politicians found in the old public service. Loyalty of such a type runs 
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counter to their faith in the public choice discourse of organisational self-
interests. Thus the NPM reforms, and contractualism in particular, imply a 
very different kind of loyalty, one based on the sanctity of contract – and 
“privatised” loyalty between agents and principals – rather than the 
democratic legitimacy of political authority. Yet, as Hay (2004) argues, an 
assumption of self-interest has a propensity to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. It can easily dissipate the trust between officials and politicians, 
which is crucial to sustain the loyalty bargain between them. At best, the 
managerial bargain reduces loyalty to what can be specified in the 
contract; at worst, it provides a powerful incentive for each party to exploit 
the opportunities of cheating and blame shifting provided by the new 
bargain. This latter outcome in turn will reduce trust even further.  
 
Leaking is one indicator of the degree of loyalty of public managers 
towards their political masters. Although there is no evidence that leaking 
has become more prevalent than previously in New Zealand, it may have 
changed in character (James 2002:29-30) and become more “malevolent”. 
Public servants who are active political party members may now be more 
willing to leak information when they believe there is something “wrong” 
when their concept of wrong is a belief that it is contrary to “their party’s 
principles or policies”. Such “surreptitious” leaking is underlined, as James 
argues, by a distorted view of the public interest that “transcends the 
loyalty to a minister” and may go directly to specific users or services or to 
employers (ibid.). Leaking is not solely a result of managers flexing their 
muscle. It might be a last resort for disenchanted officials who find that 
“the formal advice process has become anything but free, frank and 
fearless” under the NPM reforms (Morrison 1998).  
 
The provision of “free and frank” advice is itself an important component of 
loyalty. The convention has not been forgotten by the reformers. Scott 
(2001:80) for instance has stressed the importance of the convention and 
insists that the convention should be included in the Chief Executives’ 
performance agreements. But it is difficult to see how exactly one could 
specify such performance. After all, the convention is about the 
  137 
constitutional norms of interaction between officials and politicians. It is not 
simply the “quality” dimension of an output, which could be easily 
measured and “produced”. There is little evidence suggesting that 
contractual instruments have made public servants any more fearless and 
forthcoming with advice.   
 
Quite the contrary, concerns have been expressed about the possibility 
that the convention of free and frank advice might actually be undermined 
by the new bargain (Boston et al 1996; Gregory 2005a). It might be true 
that the distance between politicians and officials would reduce direct 
political pressures. Yet, the paradox is that, especially given the culture of 
openness engendered by the OIA, that: 
 
In a politically charged environment where risks and blame games 
become more apparent, where chief executives are less anonymous 
players in the political arena, it is much safer for them to align 
themselves with the stances and interests of their ministers, the 
better to ensure public support from ministers when things go wrong 
(Gregory 2005a:22).  
 
The desire for contestability has the potential to exacerbate such risk 
aversions, as a wish to retain a lucrative contract might compel advisors to 
fashion their advice according to the preferences of potential buyers 
(Boston et al 1996:138). 
 
This again illustrates the differences between the traditional bargain and 
the managerial one. Whereas the former allows politicians to exert their 
control over the bureaucracy – and thus gives them the freedom to reject 
advice – it ensures that advice will be listened to, if not acted on, and that 
politicians will get away with less as a result. The managerial bargain 
shows that attempts to reduce the degree of legitimate political control 
might open many other doors through which political influence can 
advance itself, and can be exercised with fewer conditions attached.  
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There is also a risk that the convention of free and frank advice, like 
whistle-blowing, might become a politically-loaded term with distorted 
meaning. The “speaking truth to power” formula, coupled with the 
policy/management divide, can easily end up in a deadlock between 
managerial “truth” and political power. There is, and has always been “a 
fine line between giving free and frank advice and obstructing the 
government’s policies” (Clark 2000 quoted in Scott 2001:355). And 
politicians often understand, thanks to instincts acquired and honed in their 
climb to office, this dialectic between truth and power better than 
managers or bureaucrats. This is not to argue against the convention of 
free and frank advice, but simply to point out that the managerial bargain 
misunderstands the nature of the convention.  
 
Thus, at first glance, the managerial bargain promised political neutrality 
and loyalty as well as political control of bureaucratic power. The truth 
seems to be that the replacement of the traditional bargain by the new 
managerial bargain may have done more to sabotage these 
constitutionally important values than to preserve them.  
 
The NPM reforms in New Zealand were intended to “reinvent 
Government”, to make it more “business-like”: more efficient, more 
effective and more economic. However, paradoxically, but not surprisingly, 
it has reinvented a Weberian bureaucracy in managerialist garb. What it 
has managed to banish is the political and constitutional constraints, 
already eroded by the neoliberal hegemony, on bureaucratic power. 
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7 Are We There Yet? 
 
7.1 March left, or right 
 
The election of a Labour-led Government in 1999 signalled, according to 
the Labour Prime Minister, an end to fifteen years of neoliberalism. 
However the official death of neoliberalism does not come with a 
resurrection of the ideas of the old Welfare State. In New Zealand, as in 
the UK and Germany, those ideas have been set-aside for the so-called 
Third Way or the “new social democracy” (Clark 2002; Maharey 2001, 
2003; Chatterjee et al 1999).   
 
A precise definition of the Third Way is probably more elusive than the first 
or second: it can be “everything found between those poles of economic 
and social organisation” (Chatterjee et al 1999:35). And New Zealand’s 
third way is probably bolder than its British or American versions. 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand model demonstrates something which is 
central to the Third Way idea, that is, the belief that the fundamental 
values of these two previous models – social justice, economic growth, 
and more recently environmental sustainability – could be and probably 
somehow seamlessly combined, without the conflicts and the necessity to 
choose.   
 
But a political vision without conflicts resonates better with an anti-political 
philosophy than the ideals of the left, which inevitably challenge rather 
than embrace inequality. Even if the Labour party has glossed over the 
conspicuousness of economic growth with new communitarian slogans 
such as innovation, inclusion, social cohesion, knowledge society, 
sustainability and many others, economic growth emphatically remains the 
explicit priority, if only because maintaining the confidence of business is a 
necessary evil for the new social democrats. For instance, in her speech to 
Parliament, the Prime Minister argues: 
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Indeed for most of us the development of a stronger economy is a 
means to an end. That end is higher living standards and the ability 
to provide a better quality of life for all our people. An inclusive and 
cohesive society is an essential building block for a growing and 
innovative economy (Clark 2002). 
 
Arguments such as this, however incoherent, help to highlight the 
continuity in the changes. The quote above leaves an impression that, for 
Third Way champions, social justice itself is just a means to an end, 
secondary to the needs of the economy, which in turn serves some higher 
purpose. This is why it is necessary to reformulate the old left ideals into 
friendlier communitarian concepts such as social capital or human capital 
so that they can fit more easily into a framework of the knowledge 
economy. “Higher living standards” and “better quality of life”, therefore, 
are to be understood as economic dividends rather than as the 
achievement of ideals of social justice. The driving purpose appears to be 
to make it possible to distribute these gains in a fairer manner in order to 
ensure more growth and thus prosperity. It means taking more seriously 
the trickle-down theory of wealth creation and thus avoiding a direct 
confrontation with the neo-liberal values hierarchy of economic growth 
over social justice. 
 
There is another similarity, related to the above, between the politics of the 
Third Way and neoliberalism in New Zealand. As Colin James (2001) 
argues, Third Way politics is also “technocratic”: “it is concerned with ‘what 
works’, not ‘what should be’”. In other words, it is concerned with the 
positive, rather than the normative. “What works” is the new mantra of 
legitimation, especially in social policy areas. Effectiveness, rather than 
economic efficiency, is now the imperative for policy makers. The problem, 
however, is that these two approaches have the same risk of “goal 
displacement”, even if the things displaced may be quite different from 
each other. Effectiveness, just like efficiency, is likely to become an end in 
itself. The pursuit or rhetoric of things such as innovation or knowledge 
economy (read IT) often make them look suspiciously like a technological 
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fix for social and political problems. This will be discussed further in the 
discussion below in relation to the Managing for Outcome initiatives. 
 
If the values of New Zealand’s Third Way politics are similar to those of 
neoliberalism in important aspects, one might expect that their conceptions 
of social relations might not be entirely dissimilar either. The civil society or 
the community is offered as an alternative to the market as a coordinating 
mechanism for society. As a corollary, “partnership”, with its emphasis on 
trust, norms and reciprocity, takes the place of contract and competition. 
An implication of these changes is a shift from the consumer model, based 
on market relationships, to the stakeholder model. The adoption of these 
communitarian notions can be traced to the previous National Government 
under Jim Bolger, and many have featured in neoliberal discourse. 
However, they have undoubtedly gained momentum under an officially 
social democratic government.  
 
Nevertheless the “real” meaning of these notions in practice remains a 
contested subject for New Zealand commentators. Take for example 
“partnership”. For some, it is an important means, or at least a promising 
starting point, to overcome the neoliberal legacy (Walker 2004; Larner and 
Craig 2005). Other observers are more sceptical (Curtis 2003; Fitzsimons 
2000). Curtis (2003:7) claims that the Third Way “promised by Prime 
Minister Clark and increasingly operationalised by central government, 
local government and community groups” is best understood “in terms of 
continuity” with the neoliberalism begun by Labour in 1984. 
 
The latter claim may be slightly unfair although it does pick up an 
important point. The convergence of the two discourses is probably not an 
intentional result but an “unintended” consequence of reified notions of 
community, as discussed in chapter 2. To reiterate, just as the market 
discourse only captures a single dimension of social relations, the 
communitarian discourse transforms citizens into, in Fitzsimons (2000)’ 
words, “community subjects” under the mythical banner of community, 
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while community norms substitute for economic rationality as the basis of 
calculability and stability.  
 
A further problem, related to the reification, is its neglect of inequality 
within or between communities, or partners, not only collectively but 
ultimately between people themselves individually. Nor do catchphrases 
such as “networking”, “relationship-building” and “coordinating”, derived 
from notions of networks and partnerships, always provide an accurate or 
meaningful description of what actually is going on. Labour’s 
communitarian discourses feature “networks” and “partnership”, the 
“business community” and “public private” partnership, as well as trade 
unions and other social groups. But partnerships do not in themselves 
resolve the perennial conflicts between partners and are not necessarily in 
the interests of everyone. Vehement opposition from the business 
community over major issues such as the Employment Relations Bill, or 
more recently electoral finance and climate change, shows just how fragile 
the harmonious image presented by the Third Way discourse can be.  
 
A final point concerns politics itself. There is certainly a slow-down from 
the blitzkrieg approach in the previous Labour Government, partly thanks 
to the MMP environment. Moreover, there is an official acknowledgement 
of the need to put values back into politics (Maharey 2003). The 
incremental approach has led to significant changes over the years, for 
example with the re-nationalisation of ACC, the reform of the Employment 
Contracts Act, and Working for Families. But the communitarian discourse 
has a certain anti-political bias of its own, albeit more benign. It poses 
difficulties because values such as community or social capital – like terms 
such as democracy and accountability – are almost impossible to object to 
and in a sense are devoid of political substance. There are thus inherent 
limitations for purposeful political action and debate. In this regard, 
notably, the key pieces of legislation, including those underpinning the 
NPM reforms, have not been fundamentally changed, despite significant 
changes in the social policy area.   
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Along with the new style of politics there is an increasing awareness of the 
importance of trust, now often dressed in the garb of social capital (Walker 
2004). Third Way politics is certainly more “inclusive”, compared with the 
reform years. A shift has occurred away from particularised trust in 
institutional elites during the 80s and 90s to allow more participation by the 
general public through increasing use of “consultation”. It is harder to see, 
however, what has been done to restore the trust in political institutions 
depleted by the reforms. The tendency to take for granted that the trust is 
“organic” and therefore will thrive in the absence of external forces – both 
markets and the government – is noticeable in the New Zealand 
discourse, for instance, in Walker’s assertion that “trust is largely intuitive, 
and can only be engendered”. There is no conscious effort to make a 
distinction between “particularised” and “generalised” trust34. It precludes a 
more active attempt to overcome, rather than simply contain, the neo-
liberal legacy. Moreover, there is a risk that the discourse of trust can 
obscure the demand for a broader basis of political legitimacy. Without 
addressing such fundamental problems as socio-economic inequality that 
generate distrust, the kind of centrism that now dominates New Zealand 
politics is likely to fall short of expectations, even by its own standards. 
“Consultation fatigue” can be seen as a result of this failure to actually 
deliver on its promises. 
 
 
7.2 Post-New Public Management 
 
The new politics has important implications for the Public Sector. It does 
not mean, however, that the view of bureaucracy under the Third Way is 
any more positive than it was before. Quite the contrary, de-
bureaucratisation remains central to the Third Way agenda. It is part and 
parcel of the Third Way, goes the argument, to prevent “an overloaded, 
bureaucratic state” that is “not only unlikely to provide good public 
services” but is also “dysfunctional for economic prosperity” and in its 
                                                 
34
 see n.15 above. 
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stead to promote “state agencies [that are] transparent, customer oriented 
and quick on their feet” (Giddens 2003). What makes the new reform 
different, amongst other things, is that unlike the NPM reforms, as Gregory 
argues, it does not appeal to any formal theoretical knowledge. Or perhaps 
more accurately it does not rely on any explicit theoretical alternatives to 
those underpinning the previous reforms. There is certainly no reference to 
economic precepts such as rational self-interest and so on, but nor are 
these fundamental principles ever explicitly challenged. The system, it 
seems, is fundamentally sound, and what is necessary is simply 
modifications at the edge, to make it more effective as well as efficient.  
  
Managing for Outcomes 
 
A key theme of this new strategy is the shifting of focus from output-based 
management to the so-called “managing for outcomes” or MfO (Cook 
2004; Ryan 2004; Advisory Group 2001, 2002; SSC and Treasury 2003). 
At the risk of oversimplification, MfO can be defined broadly to mean 
“developing and managing policy and the policy process in a manner that 
seems most likely to be effective in achieving government’s desired goals 
and objectives” (Ryan 2004:1).   
 
In practice, the changes can be identified as a series of counterpoints with 
the previous output-based framework (Boston and Eichbaum 2007; 
Chapman and Duncan 2007; Mallard 2003; SSC 2003). They involve firstly 
broadening and refining the specification of outcomes, which in theory is a 
joint exercise between Ministers and chief executives. This evolves, in 
part, from the Strategic Result Areas/Key Result Areas (SRA/KRA) 
framework under the previous National government. Now strategic goals 
are to be framed in terms of a series of high level outcomes (key 
government goals) and intermediate outcomes on a departmental basis. 
Second, it means reformulating the respective spheres of management 
and politics. Not only are chief executives required to manage the 
production of outputs, they are expected to show how their management 
of outputs and resources contribute towards government outcomes, even 
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though they are not formally responsible for achieving outcomes. And 
lastly, it leads to a modified performance management system, which 
attempts to incorporate outcome targets in the circle of ex ante 
specification and ex post measurement. Critical to this process is the 
development of Statements of Intent (SOIs), medium-term documents that 
“provide a succinct, strategically-oriented description and explanation” of 
departmental plans for achieving and monitoring outcomes, including 
capability implications (SSC and Treasury 2005:8). These are in addition 
to requirements for output based forecast information against which the 
annual reports are assessed. The passing of the Public Finance (State 
Sector Management) Bill in 2004 formally cements these changes.  
 
The renewed stress on outcomes reflects, amongst other things, a 
deliberate move away from the singular emphasis on efficiency and 
economy towards a wider range of values. This is consistent with the so-
called “public value” theory, which has gained considerable popularity in 
New Zealand and elsewhere as an alternative to NPM (Moore 1995). 
Whereas NPM encourage officials to be more like managers in the private 
sector, the public values theory by contrast urges them to become “public 
entrepreneurs” in the business of “creating public value” with a particular 
emphasis on the distinctiveness that “emerges from within public 
organisations and networks rather than from outside” (Moore 1995; Ryan 
2004:105-106). This bears a striking resemblance to the Third Way 
rhetoric of social entrepreneurship and “social capital”.  
 
The difficulty with this approach, as with the discourse of social capital, is 
that the emphasis in reality often falls on the “entrepreneurial” rather than 
the “public”. And there is often a strong tendency to ignore potential 
conflicts between entrepreneurial norms and public values. Consider, for 
instance, Ryan (2004:106), who appeals to managers to “use their 
collective imaginations, savvy and courage, manage the risks, bend or 
workaround the rules, mix n’match resources, and do ‘whatever it takes’ to 
be effective – within the limits of cabinet approval and public sector ethics 
and probity”. Clearly there is an inherent contradiction between doing 
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whatever it takes and staying within the limits. And rhetoric such as this 
provides very little guidance on what is to be done to prevent the risk of 
“goal displacement” when officials are actually faced with a dilemma 
between the pursuit of instrumental effectiveness towards whatever ends 
and the choice of substantive ends themselves that prescribes limits of 
effectiveness. And perhaps more importantly, it risks undermining the 
distinctive “publicness” of the Public Sector, the peculiar tasks of which are 
fundamentally political and neither managerial nor entrepreneurial. Such 
tasks are characterised by values and beliefs held by people themselves, 
which are not “things” in their own right that can or need to be “created” by 
entrepreneurs. And these values imply unavoidable conflicts that cannot 
be simply “risk-managed” away. Rather, the resolution of value-conflicts 
must be subjected to certain constitutional rules in a democratic polity, 
which must not be bent or broken by officials for the sake of bureaucratic 
effectiveness. The pursuit of public interest plainly cannot be privatised as 
entrepreneurial activities of officials on their own. In other words, the 
danger of treating officials as “the new platonic guardians of the public 
interest” is that it is a role for which they are “not appointed, are ill suited, 
inadequately prepared and more importantly are not protected if things go 
wrong” (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:406).  
 
Similarly while the shifting focus on outcomes might have lessened the 
preoccupation with measurable and specifiable outputs – although 
specification of outputs remains a bottom line – it is far from clear that the 
shift actually has any impact on the mentality of measurement and 
specification, or the “commodity fetish” that accompanies it.  
 
What is notable indeed is an increase in measuring, rather than actually 
managing for, outcomes. The new zeal for measurement can be seen in 
the development of social indicators and more recently environmental 
indicators. Clear specification of outcomes is critical for the success of 
MfO (Cook 2004:12). Clarity of objectives remains the ideal, only that the 
objectives must now be specified and measured in outcome, rather than 
output terms. This is to be achieved by ever more sophisticated 
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performance indicators, such as benchmarks, to be included in the 
Statement of Intent (Treasury and SSC 2007). This is hardly a solution to 
the problem of NPM. Rather it simply glosses over the difficulty of 
measuring “outcomes”, which are by definition unmeasurable, of those 
organisations that are not the “production” type. The limit of this approach 
is that it never actually challenges the output/outcome bifurcation. In 
practice, managing for outcomes often becomes little more than managing 
outcomes as if they were really outputs. What can be measured, rather 
than what matters, still dictates what can be managed. So the rhetorical 
focus on outcomes inevitably has to be scaled back to something 
measurable such as “impacts” – “results that are directly attributable to the 
activity of an agency” – rather than outcomes as such (Treasury and SSC 
2007; Webber 2004). Craig (2006:207) concludes that the process yields 
“hairy outputs”, that is, “risk managed outputs framed in outcome terms”. It 
is not so much a shift as a roundabout.  
 
The emphasis on measuring outcomes is furthered by the application of 
intervention logic, which seeks to provide an “evidence-based, systematic 
and reasoned description of the causal links between outputs and 
outcomes” (Baehler 2002; 2007; Pathfinder 2003). The problem is that 
intervention logic belongs to a long line of technocratic “solutions” that 
“invariably acknowledge aspects of political reality that undermine the 
integrity of rational techniques, but having done so they proceed to speak 
and act if there were not really a problem” (Gregory 2003b; 2004b:308). 
Rather than acknowledging the limit of technocratic solutions, intervention 
logic simply ignores the fact that politics is not just about complexity and 
risk, but fundamental conflicts that cannot be managed away by clever 
techniques. “Stripping complexity down to its essential parts” (Baehler 
2002:14) might be easy; the real difficulty is for people to agree on what 
counts as “essential” and what all this is for in the first place, which are 
what makes political life at once “messy” and worthwhile.  
 
Finally, there are issues of power and legitimacy. Like its predecessor, 
MfO is filled with rhetoric of empowerment. For instance, public agencies 
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are urged to get more “citizen and community centred”, which, in practical 
terms, means things such as “moving from Wellington-centred to 
community-centred”, building “capability for ‘subsidiarity’ [sic] [including 
partnership in problem solving]; using enabling technology to simplify 
things for citizens” (Advisory Group 2002; also Ryan 2004; 2006a). 
 
Such rhetoric, if not reality, appears to be a positive move away from the 
truncated version of rights in the consumerist model that underlines the 
previous reform. However, despite its lip service to the concept of 
citizenship, the emphasis of MfO is clearly on a much more narrower idea 
of “responsiveness”, primarily if not exclusively in an instrumental sense, 
to certain defined or at least definable substantive values via technological 
means, as illustrated above.  
 
The problem is that the emphasis on “responsiveness” to citizens often 
comes with a tendency to avoid issues about political conflicts and power 
relations. It tends to assume that people can be and want to be rallied in 
support of some unambiguous long-term outcomes, against which conflicts 
are simply temporary and irrational. This makes it easier to prescribe a 
shopping list of what reasonable citizens really want, supposedly, such as 
one-stop shops and e-government. It is important to be responsive, but the 
question remains, responsive to whom? MfO has little to say in this regard, 
except by appealing to the vague ideas of “community” or “partnerships” 
that glosses over the divides between and within communities. Therefore 
techniques such as devolution or partnerships, whether or not dressed up 
in terms of empowerment, may continue to reflect the dominant culture of 
the 1980s and 1990s where the objective is to govern at a distance, rather 
than genuine power sharing (Larner and Mayow 2003; Cheyne, O’Brien 
and Belgrave 2004). 
 
One example of this is the current e-government initiative (Millar 2004; 
Gauld and Goldfinch 2006). The theory is that e-government is ”an out-of-
Wellington, citizen-first and service-based view of the business of 
government”, the “revolutionary impacts” of which had probably not been 
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thought about seriously enough by many of New Zealand’s 30000 public 
servants (Mallard 2002a; 2002b). It offers, supposedly, “a way of 
facilitating greater participatory and grass-root-type democracy” (Gauld 
and Goldfinch 2006). However, as Gauld and Goldfinch point out, 
experience with e-government projects in New Zealand show that 
“dangerous enthusiasm” for the scheme is often driven by idolisation of 
politicians and public servants, the myth of the technological fix, 
commercial incentives and last but not least, managerial fads, rather than 
the empowerment of citizens. This is not surprising, for e-government is 
after all, in Gregory (2007a:233)’s words, “the quintessential expression of 
rationalisation” and as such is inherently inadequate to addressing issues 
of political power and citizenship.  
 
What then of the power of politicians? Since 1999 the Labour Government 
has taken a more “hands-on” approach to public management, much to 
the dismay of advocates of NPM (Scott 2001). The MfO initiatives could be 
seen as part of this overall attempt to reassert political control. But 
exercise of direct control is the exception rather than the norm. Politicians, 
for their part, were ambivalent towards it. The distinction between steering 
and rowing is after all as central to the Third Way ideology as it was to the 
NPM reforms. As Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder put it, “the state 
should not row, but steer: not so much control, as challenge” (Blair and 
Schroeder 1999). 
 
This fits well with MfO. The truly significant change under MfO is not so 
much empowering politicians to do more “rowing” as about freeing officials 
to do more “steering”. Indeed, there is a discernable dislike of politics, for 
example, in the usual complaints about the “adversarial tone of 
Westminster derived polities” and “the need for rebalancing technical and 
political rationalities in favour of the former” (Ryan 2004:27). Arguments 
such as this reflect more of a pre-emptive attempt to head off political 
intervention than any genuine acceptance of the role of politics. It seems 
odd because if “technocracy” might be a problem, then arguably it would 
follow that rebalancing in the opposite direction, i.e. more politics rather 
  150 
than more technical rationality, is necessary. This perhaps explains why, 
as one independent evaluation found, despite the initial enthusiasm, 
Ministers showed little interest in the actual implementation of the MfO 
initiative (Economics and Strategy Group 2003). The evaluation on the 
contrary has “brought the outcome components of this framework 
significantly ‘closer’ to departments by involving them more explicitly in the 
selection of outcomes”. Thus rather than empowering politicians, public 
managers “are being asked to rebel against standard politics and usurp 
the democratic will of governments” (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413). It 
shifts the power balance further towards the bureaucracy. 
 
 
Managing in Networks 
 
The competitive order has also come under scrutiny in new waves of 
reform, as concerns are raised about the apparent “fragmentation” and 
“siloisation” of the public service. In some cases – for example, the merger 
of the Department of Work and Income and the Ministry of Social Policy 
(and later Child Youth and Family) into the Ministry of Social Development 
– separated agencies are put back together. But the reform has 
consistently and carefully avoided any suggestion of another wholesale 
restructuring, warning that structural changes are “not a panacea” and can 
be “blunt and excessive” (Advisory Group 2002). Reformers instead prefer 
softer initiatives such as “joined up governance” or a “whole-of-
government approach” to address the problem of a fragmented public 
service (Advisory Group 2002; Boston and Eichbaum 2005; Gregory 
2003c, 2005c; SSC 2007c). The means to deliver these initiatives, as the 
Review of the Centre recommended, are “circuit breaker teams” and 
“super-networks”. The former focuses on vertical integration of policy and 
operational agencies. It is supposed to “solve previously intractable 
problems in service delivery by drawing on front-line knowledge and 
creativity together with central technical support”. The latter is meant to 
work across policy areas by grouping and managing government agencies 
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in 7-10 “super-networks”, which would “represent a move towards 
substantial structural change” (Advisory Group 2002).  
 
Despite the lack of any overt appeal to theoretical knowledge, the 
approach clearly reflects the emerging theories of so-called “network 
governance”, as an alternative to an explicitly market-orientated 
institutional order (Considine and Lewis 2003; Rhodes 1997, 2007). It hits 
all the right notes of the fashionable discourse of “networks”: 
interdependency, voluntariness, informality, information sharing, trust, to 
name but a few.  
 
And central to this new model of governance is often an appeal to “public 
values”, which fits comfortably with the MfO initiative discussed above. 
Bardach, for instance, defines inter-agency collaboration as “activities by 
agencies intended to increase public value by having agencies working 
together rather than separately” (Bardach 1998:17). Yet there is a real 
difficulty with this instrumental recourse to “public values”, as if they were 
settled ends. It does not make sense to argue that network governance 
provides “better” means to achieve “public values” unless one can be 
reasonably certain what these values might be. The theory of network 
governance often invokes shared values, but what exactly does it mean for 
agencies to “work together” in the face of conflicting values which set the 
people themselves apart? Is “working together” still always necessary, 
desirable and possible without the presumption of consensus? The 
tendency to speak of “working together” or collaboration in the place of 
competition, as if they are ends in themselves requiring little more than 
what Bardach calls “managerial craftsmanship”, thus poses the same old 
problem of goal displacement. As Spicer (2007) argues, it is a peculiar 
characteristic of the network theory to embrace “the shop-worn politics-
administration dichotomy” while seeking to “transcend” it. It is not 
surprising that in practice the network type of initiative often puts weak 
constraints on organisational behaviour but strong constraints on politics, 
which “begs the question whether constraints on politics in partnership 
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form a barrier to organisations changing their behaviours in JUG [joined-up 
governance] compatible ways” (Davies 2007).    
 
Paradoxically this is why radical change towards a more unified 
hierarchical structure, as Greogry (2005c) advocates, may be necessary. 
This is not because a hierarchical structure is any better in delivering 
certain “public values” than the market or the networks. Conflicts will 
persist within a hierarchical structure. Because of this, however, it is 
important, symbolically and politically, to affirm the shared “publicness” of 
public institutions, despite their potentially conflicting organisational values, 
and to ensure that such conflicts can be overridden from “above” through 
the political process when they can or need to be settled. 
 
A second problem concerns the tendency of network governance to reify 
“networks” as if they are objective things independent of the organisational 
and individual actors constituting them. To be fair, not all theorists are 
ignorant of the problem. Rhodes, for instance, warns that “an anti-
foundational story of governing structures – of markets, hierarchy, and 
networks – must not hypostatize them; that is, represent them as a 
concrete reality” (Rhodes 2000). Yet, despite making this significant point, 
Rhodes himself tends to focus heavily on charting the contours of the 
network structure, rather than challenging its normative and subjective 
meanings (see Rhodes 1997; 2007). If a network is not simply what is, 
then it is important to identify those particular values and beliefs that 
distinguish the network actors from, and identify them with, say, market 
players. In other words, an “anti-foundational” view of network governance 
cannot treat it as merely a neutral, precisely “scientific” analytical tool that 
can be applied to any values and beliefs. And this in turn will inevitably 
question the legitimacy of different “stories” that can be told through the 
interpretive framework of network governance. It means one can no longer 
talk of network as an alternative to the market or something else without 
actually challenging the values and beliefs of market itself. But as Hay and 
Richard (2000) point out, the popularity of network theory is partly driven 
by the “strategic flexibility and adaptability” of the network concept. 
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Predictably, there is little desire for network practitioners and theorists to 
engage with political debates.  
 
It is not surprising then that network theories often consciously or 
unconsciously reproduce and reinforce the reified notions of “production” 
central to the competitive order. Despite the supposed paradigm shifts, 
network theorists continue to talk in distinctively market terms about 
dependency on resources, about process of exchange, and about the 
importance of defining property rights to reward cooperative behaviour 
(Rhodes 1997, 2007; Milward and Provan 2000). One still ends up where 
one started, with the superiority of the market in allocating scarce 
resources through carefully defined property rights.   
 
Finally, as is the case with virtually every Public Sector reform initiative, 
the network approach talks profusely about empowerment through the 
possibility of “power sharing” with various networks (Huxham and Vangen 
2005; Dovey 2003, Gray 2002, Majumdar 2006). But as practitioners are 
only too aware, power sharing is: 
 
not an easy concept to put into practice because no one likes to give 
up power, whether that power is explicit or implicit. Organizations, 
which are collections of individuals, are probably more resistant than 
individuals in giving up power. In New Zealand, top down contracting 
mechanisms have reinforced "power at the top" because the 
purchase paradigm requires the top to be the place where the 
decision making occurs about how much and what services to 
purchase (Dovey 2003:88). 
 
Dovey goes on to quote Judge Mick Brown in the review of Child Youth 
and Family that “while there may be some enthusiasm to hand over 
responsibility this is not accompanied by any great desire to hand over 
control”.  
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The problem is that network theories do not appear to offer any realistic 
alternatives. Dovey for instance urges officials to “learn to share the power 
that has been the reserve of public organizations for the last 100 years or 
more, with community groups and their representatives”. Leaving aside the 
accuracy of such a statement given the hollowing out of the Public Sector 
over the last twenty years, this seems very much a trite answer to a tough 
problem. For one thing, it says nothing about the imbalance of power 
between different communities and their representatives, as well as 
amongst public agencies. The simplistic yet popular notion of self-
enacting, or self-organising, networks tends to obscure how the game of 
power is played out on the ground according to the rules and relations 
hardwired by previous reforms, given that power will always be distributed 
unequally. The notion ignores the uncomfortable truth that managing 
collaborative networks may often require, in Huxham and Vagen’s terms, 
“collective thuggery” with leaders willing to actively shape networks 
through manipulating agendas and playing politics. This has important 
implications for practices of network governance. For instance, it highlights 
the potential of the “leadership” emphasis to reinforce the already powerful 
position of central agencies such as the Treasury, rather than facilitate 
power-sharing with smaller and less powerful ones. And above all it 
eschews the genuine empowerment that is necessary to enable less 
powerful agencies to participate meaningfully in different networks.  
 
There is a greater danger in the tendency of network governance to 
overlook issues of inequality of power, because it glosses over the “dark 
side” of networks that can not only undermine the legitimacy of networks 
themselves, but can also damage democratic governance (Greenway, 
Salter and Hart 2007; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Lowndes 2001; O’Toole 
and Meier 2004; Papadopoulos 2007). After all, the origin of network 
analysis can be traced back to the insights of so-called “iron-triangles” or 
“triple alliances”. All of these stories in the past suggest, like markets, 
networks might be structured to privilege those already powerful, while 
giving an appearance of openness and transparency.  
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Implicit in all this is another apparent case of “goal displacement”: instead 
of strengthening democratic governance, “network governance” becomes 
its replacement. Quite often, as O’Toole and Meier (2004) argue, such 
justification simply “re-enacts a network version of the venerable politics-
administration dichotomy”. According to them, the bulk of literature 
frequently relies on “instrumental logic” to explain network patterns, 
“typically with an emphasis on clients or clientele needs” and overlooking 
“important political issues about what networks do, how they perform and 
how they can be directed towards goal achievement”. But a more political 
interpretation is not without its problems. Ryan (2006b:44) argues, for 
instance: 
 
Formally, public servants participate in these policy networks as 
delegates of the Minister, but the very character of the network 
relationships, the internal interdependence of the members and the 
exploratory nature of the work, means that, to be effective, public 
servants cannot simply enact that role. They cannot act in removed 
or distant or controlling ways, preserving the pristine elements of their 
role as “public servants”.  
 
But surely the author does not mean to say that the public have no 
alternative but to accept potentially corrupt practices of public servants, 
which serve the private interests of closed private networks rather than the 
public, simply because of working in policy networks. The possibility that 
network relationships may conflict with the role of public servants as 
delegates of democratically elected government might simply mean that it 
may not be appropriate for public servants to engage in such networks.  
 
As Hansen (2005) argues, democratic governance would entail querying 
criteria for inclusion in networks, as well as “ensuring an ‘all’ embracing 
and ‘other’ regarding inclusiveness, constitutive to a democratic 
‘community of difference’”. Network governance, at least as it is currently 
presented and practiced, seems determined to escape such a challenge.  
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Therefore, it is necessary to heed the advice of Etizioni-Harvey, which 
bears a remarkable similarity to Helen Mercer’s observation: 
 
Network governance process may well privilege the more powerful 
interests by providing access for them, so that by the very process of 
empowering some, network governance may well disempower others 
(2005:114-115). 
 
 
Managing the Constitution 
 
Of the two pillars of the economic constitution, the Reserve Bank Act came 
under pressure from the appreciation of the New Zealand dollar in 2007 
but there was evident resistance by the major parties to significant change 
and the Fiscal Responsibility Act was absorbed into the new Public 
Finance Act. There has been no retreat from the economic constitution. 
Quite the contrary, the introduction of the Regulatory Responsibility Bill in 
2007 can actually be regarded as an attempt to extend the economic 
constitution even further. Although it is unlikely that the Bill will pass into 
law, the introduction of the Bill itself is indicative of the resilience of the 
economic constitution and, arguably, of the NPM reforms in a supposedly 
“post-NPM” era. Thus, a closer look at the debates around the Bill might 
help illuminate changes and continuity in public management reform.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting point about the Bill is the fact that, despite its 
conspicuously neo-liberal overtone and provenance35, it has managed to 
gain support from nearly all parties except the Greens. Opponents of the 
Bill argue that its introduction sends “a dangerous signal” that freedom of 
contract and property rights will be privileged above everything else36. 
While political pragmatism may explain part of the Bill, it also reflects the 
                                                 
35
 As Deborah Coddington, an ex-MP of the Act party points out, the Bill was in fact 
drafted by her based on a paper by Bryce Wilkinson of the NZBR, who has been a 
prominent advocate of the New Right (New Zealand Herald, 01 April 2007) 
36
 NZCTU  Submission on the Regulatory Responsibility Bill, August 2007 at 
http://union.org.nz/sites/union/files/Regulatory%20Responsibility%20Bill.doc accessed on 
January 2008 
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peculiar aversion towards, or even denial of, inevitable value conflicts in 
the Third Way. Characteristically, the assumed absence of substantive 
conflicts of values is reinforced by an explicit instrumental logic. According 
to the Bill’s sponsor, “all it does is require that a process be followed and 
information be supplied, which has to be a good thing”. And in this sense, 
the Bill simply does to law what the Fiscal Responsibility Act did to public 
finance, by making Parliament and Government “more transparent and 
more open about their lawmaking”37. Yet the difficulty remains, to what 
extent can the instrumental values of transparency and openness be 
separated from the conflicts of substantive values? How, for instance, can 
the regulators be “transparent” about the taking of private property, without 
subscribing to a certain conception of private property rights? These are 
old questions, which apply equally to the FRA as they do to the Bill. What 
is striking about the Bill, however, is an apparent willingness to downplay 
the centrality of these perennial value conflicts in spite of diversity of 
values in an MMP environment. The point is not that these conflicts are 
inherently irreconcilable, but rather the pretended consensus risks 
foreclosing opportunities for debate and thus genuine reconciliation of 
deep-seated differences.  
 
Predictably – this is the second point – the Bill overlays with the notion of 
“community” the reified economy at the centre of the two other pillars of 
the economic constitution. Indeed, there was not a single reference to the 
“economy” during the First Reading of the Bill, compared with several to 
“community”. But community, naturally, means different things to different 
people: to one MP, “a collective notion of the power of ordinary people to 
make a better world”, to another on the other end of the political spectrum 
“30-odd consumers”38. “The community is where we start from”, says the 
former. But whose community? Thus, despite the rejection of a reified 
notion of an economy, there appears to be a tendency to overlook and 
underestimate the problem of reification, only to reinvent it in different 
forms. Such a tendency manifests itself in other ways, for instance, in the 
                                                 
37
 NZPD, 27 June 2007 
38
 ibid.  
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discourse of regulation, with more than a hint of contradiction. On one 
hand, it is acknowledged by the Bill’s promoter that the red tape of one 
member “might be another member’s good law”. On the other, terms such 
as “cutting red-tape” or “improving regulatory quality” are talked about as if 
they are unambiguously good things in themselves, regardless of whose 
red-tape is to be cut, or whose quality of regulation is to be improved. It is 
as if regulation, like inflation, has certain generic and optimal “qualities”, 
which can be specified independent of the political conflicts they nearly 
always embody. 
 
And finally, issues of power and legitimacy are unsurprisingly absent from 
such a discourse. When power is talked about at all, it is conveniently 
associated with “the state” – another reification – and with an implied 
dislike. There is little discussion about power in other forms, such as 
power of the “financial markets”, or the power of various “communities”, 
against which the power of the “state” is a positive counterbalance. Yet, 
power remains at the heart of the issue. As a submitter on the Bill argues, 
commenting specifically on the compensation for property taking: 
 
The beneficiaries of any such provision would be mainly big business 
interests seeking to avoid regulatory restraint upon their exercise of 
market power at the expense of consumer and/or competitors, and 
seeking to portray state action in defence of the weak against the 
strong as in some sense an illegitimate extension of the appropriate 
state, and an encroachment upon the alleged property right of a 
monopolist to enjoy the fruits of its exercise of market power39. 
 
There is a broader point in this, that is, neglecting the issues of power risks 
reinforcing the inequality of power despite and often in direct contradiction 
to its rhetoric of empowerment. Indeed, one of the interesting, and perhaps 
unintended, consequences of the Bill is that for a measure designed to 
constrain the bureaucracy, it actually vests enormous power in 
                                                 
39
 Betram, G, Submission on the Regulatory Responsibility Bill, August 2007 
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bureaucrats as the de facto guardians of the regulatory constitution40. And 
this inevitably affects, as it did for the Reserve Bank Act, the relative 
priority between bureaucratic expertise and democratic legitimacy.  
 
To put it in another way, the difficulty with the Regulatory Responsibility 
Bill resonates with the paradox of the Public Sector reforms, that is, as one 
MP expressed it during the first reading of the Bill, it “feeds bureaucracy in 
order to slay it” (NZPD, 27 June 2008). And as such it illustrates the 
continuity between the present reforms and the previous NPM ones, not 
the least in their tendency to produce “unintended” perverse outcomes.  
 
 
7.3 Whither Westminster? 
 
 
What implications then will the new waves of reform have on New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, particularly given the gap between 
the new rhetoric and reality? Do the reforms put a stop to the erosion of 
the Westminster system of democracy or do they constitute new threats? 
Is it time to move on to what Ryan (2006b) calls a “post Westminster”, 
“Aotearoa/New Zealand way of governing”, whatever that means? These 
are the issues which will be explored below.  
 
Still Sovereign? 
 
In New Zealand parliamentary sovereignty was pushed to the front stage 
in 2004 as a result of a heated debate between the Deputy Prime Minister 
and the Chief Justice, together with submissions to the select committee 
on New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements (Cullen 2005, Elias 2003, 
                                                 
40
 s.7 of the Regulatory Responsibility Bill requires the chief executives of the regulatory 
agency, the chief executive of the Ministry of Economic Development (or the Solicitor 
General), and the Secretary of Justice independently to certify compliance with the 
principles of the scheme and the SSC to assess annually compliance with the Bill. 
Section 7 (2) (b) specifically states the Minister should give no instructions (other than 
those disclosed in the statement of responsibility) to the agency that is responsible for the 
administration of the Act or regulation concerning matters specified in section 6(3).  
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Constitutional Arrangements Committee 2005). The details of the debates 
themselves are not particularly relevant here. Nevertheless, they reflected 
anxiety about the ability of parliamentary democracy to provide certainty 
for values and rights believed “fundamental”. If the judges are justified in 
their concerns, then the compatibility of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty with the new reforms must also be in doubt. The notion of a 
network of public servants as constitutional guardians of public values, like 
the notion of judges as protectors of human rights, does not fit easily with 
the “sovereignty” of Parliament. Such tensions have several practical 
implications.  
 
In the first place, it suggests that Parliament’s legislative power might, and 
for some should, be constrained further, for example by means of a 
regulatory constitution, in the interest of good administration. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, there has been little enthusiasm to reassert 
legislative control over areas deregulated during the NPM reforms, 
including, for example, employment arrangements under the State Sector 
Act. The reformers seem to have accepted the “enabling, rather than 
prescriptive” approach of the reforms while reconstructing the subjects of 
“enabling” as “public entrepreneurs” rather than market actors. One can 
think of this approach as a new technology of “self regulation” of the 
government itself (Hood et al 2000; Bartle and Vass 2007). And as Bartle 
and Vass point out quite correctly, the new wave of “self regulation” is not 
to be equated with “deregulation”. Rather it allows the reforms to be 
delivered through largely executive-driven initiatives instead of new formal 
legislative mandates and, in some cases, takes the pressure off changing 
the original legislative framework41. In other words, the balance seems to 
remain strongly in favour of the executive, rather than Parliament.  
 
Secondly, the impacts of the new waves of reform on parliamentary control 
over finance have been highlighted during the controversy around the 
                                                 
41
 One example is the Government’s attempt to address the shortcomings of the 
Biosecurity Act 1993 through the Biosecurity Strategy in 2004, which preserves the 
essential aspects of the regime.  Another is the Building Act 1990, which by contrast was 
considerably tightened following the leaky home saga.  
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introduction of the Public Finance (State Sector Management) (PFSSM) 
Bill42. The Bill was a critical piece of second-generation reform. In the 
words of the Minister of Finance, the Bill would “strengthen the public 
service, make it more transparent and flexible, allow a more integrated 
response to complex social problems involving a number of state agencies 
and invigorate the culture of the state sector”. He went on to emphasize 
that the changes were “more technical than political” and therefore the 
Government would be seeking cross-party support for the Bill.  
 
For critics of the Bill, however, the proposed changes were anything but 
non-political. The Clerk of the House voiced strong opposition against a 
number of provisions in the Bill, and labelled various provisions as “a 
Trojan horse”, “virus-like”, and “post-modernism gone mad”, while 
Newberry and Pallot compare the Bill to “a wolf in sheep’s clothing” 
(McGee 2004; Newberry and Pallot 2005).  
 
The problem, according to Newberry and Pallot (2004), lies in “the folly of 
attempting to build on a constitutionally unsound base”. The proposed Bill 
does not change the basic features of the 1989 Act, such as the output 
based system, “sectoral neutral” accounting, the departmental baseline, 
surplus provisions and management of off balance sheet items, and in 
some cases, actually extends them (Newberry and Pallot 2005; 2006). The 
Minister of Finance argued, in the pre-introduction briefing on the bill, that 
the system was “fundamentally sound”, and what was needed was simply 
an enhancement of “flexibility for the Executive” and “accountability to 
Parliament”.  
 
The refusal to reconsider the fundamental principles of the Public Finance 
Act has created its own problems. For instance the proposal to allow 
aggregation of votes across portfolio and over multiple years, which 
reflects the new emphasis on cross-cutting outcomes, has been heavily 
criticised. The Clerk of the House observes that the rationale for this 
                                                 
42
 The Bill was passed in 2004 with significant amendments following public submissions. 
The discussion unless stated otherwise refers to the Bill as it was drafted.   
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provision seems to rely heavily on “departmental convenience”, rather than 
needs for parliamentary control. For Newberry and Pallot (2005; 2006), the 
proposal “may enhance cooperation, but it reduces individual responsibility 
and accountability”. But the difficulty is that to take the constitutional 
implications of these changes seriously inevitably raises broader questions 
about the Public Finance Act itself that the Bill sought to amend. While 
these specific changes could be undone – and they were, in the end – to 
change the official mentality that tends to view political and constitutional 
issues as simply irrelevant to public management is a much harder task, 
especially when such an attitude remains firmly entrenched in legislation 
that underpins the public finance system.  
 
The Bill raises further issues, which not only affect parliamentary control 
over finance, but also impact directly on its ability to scrutinise the 
Executive. The issues include clauses which would provide legal grounds 
for withholding information from Parliament, if such information could be 
withheld under the Official Information Act or if it would restrict the 
statutory obligation or right of officials to act independently. The Bill also 
contained proposals to remove the term of Estimates and supplementary 
Estimates, ostensibly in order to allow for “innovation” in the presentation 
of financial information. There were also attempts elsewhere in the Bill to 
restrict the convention of ministerial responsibility to those matters for 
which a Minister has legal control. The immediate effects of these 
provisions collectively on Parliament’s right to information, which is 
unlimited at least in constitutional theory, are obvious and potentially 
significant, but its flow-on impacts should not be overlooked too. As 
McGee argues, there is a danger that such provisions might be 
“unthinkingly duplicated as a standard clause in all legislation in the 
future”.  
 
This is not only an illustration of an extraordinary degree of constitutional 
illiteracy on the part of officials; it also reflects the same old paradox 
between the attempt to improve “transparency and accountability” through 
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managerial means, and the resultant erosion of democratic accountability 
to Parliament.  
 
Critics’ concerns appear to be confirmed by experiences with the new 
system over the last few years. The Auditor General, for instance, recently 
expressed his disappointment that data required for the review of 
information prepared by agencies in response to changes over 2002-2004 
is still “not prepared and reported on as robustly as it ought to be to serve 
external user needs” (Brady 2008). Parliamentarians themselves seem 
equally unmoved by the prospect of the reform. The Social Service 
Committee for instance appeared mildly enthusiastic about the new 
initiatives in its 2003/04 reports on Vote Child Youth and Family and 
devoted one entire paragraph to “managing for outcomes” and 
“intervention logic”. “Whole of Government” warranted two sentences two 
years later. But such enthusiasm, fragmentary as it was, soon receded. 
Parliamentarians seem preoccupied as ever with perennial problems 
ranging from staff turnover to the competing needs between children and 
their families, rather than the neatly devised strategy in the departmental 
Statement of Intent (CYF 2004, 2005, 2006).  
 
The advocates of the reform might argue that this is not necessarily a 
problem, as no single set of information is ever satisfactory for all potential 
users. Information on outcome, in this sense, is a better starting point than 
output or input and one step closer to what truly matters. This may seem 
indisputable for most. But it overlooks a fundamental point: the problem is 
not just what matters, but who decides what matters in the first place. This 
brings the difference between managerial and political perspectives to the 
forefront.  
 
The problem can be illustrated by examining more closely the claim of 
improved accountability and transparency. Ryan (2004:42) for instance 
maintains:  
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The value of MfO is that it enables managers and analysts to provide 
Ministers and parliamentarians with information on something they 
are vitally interested in – policy outcomes. The adversarial tone of 
Westminster-derived polities often disguises the fact that many 
Ministers and parliamentarians really are interested in outcomes – 
their arguments are often more about different platforms for achieving 
them than outcomes themselves. Meaningful outcome information 
also helps them to do their jobs and as MfO matures, there is more 
than a faint possibility that public debate and discussion will 
increasingly focus on substance rather than the form.  
 
Most, if not all, parliamentarians would no doubt dispute that it is a “fact” 
that the differences between them and their parties are concerned with 
means rather than ends, or form rather than substance. It is precisely such 
irreconcilable conflicts over ends of which little is “known” and settled that 
makes information and the right to know so critical for parliamentarians43. 
For this reason too they are legitimately concerned with every act of 
government, regardless of whether such acts or consequences are 
classified as inputs, outputs or outcomes.  
 
The new managerial vision, by contrast, has a different conception about 
what information is for and how it is to be provided. At its heart, “what 
matters” is taken for granted, if rarely explained. Provision of information, 
therefore, is “instrumental” in a sense that it tells a story the end of which 
is known. And, in spite of fashionable talk about a discursive turn, what 
matters is actually the doing rather than the talking. Hence the quality and 
quantity of information, as well as the means through which it is to be 
provided, can be specified so that “better” information can be provided. 
And more importantly it should be provided in a way that is consistent with 
the whole outcome focused managerial system. A right to information, 
under this view, is simply irrelevant, if not counter-productive.  
 
                                                 
43
 ‘How do I know what questions to ask and what papers to ask for if I don’t know what I don’t 
know?’ Jim Hacker Yes Prime Minister, BBC. 
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Therefore, improving provision of information to Parliament by removing its 
right to know does not make sense from a political perspective. It does 
make sense, however, if the objectives are really about steering 
governments towards good outcomes for which provision of information 
and parliamentary scrutiny are both means to that end. Thus, rather than 
assisting parliamentary scrutiny, the new initiatives, just like those that 
went before, risk undermining it.  
 
Accountability or Responsibility? 
 
Part of the new reforms is clearly an attempt to move beyond managerial 
accountability. While this opens up opportunities for reversing the erosion 
of responsibility, the difficulty is that such attempts are often conceived as 
an alternative to both managerial accountability and ministerial 
responsibility. Pressures are clearly mounting for constitutional 
conventions to adapt to the new “reality” (Ryan 2006b; 2008). What 
exactly then needs to be changed and to what ends? 
 
There have been many different attempts to move beyond managerial 
responsibility. The mainstream approach, consistent with the general spirit 
of the new reforms, does not require a fundamental revision of managerial 
accountability but argues that the focus must be shifted from outputs to 
outcomes and from individual agencies to collaborative networks. This 
means adding "a layer of accountability on top of the now familiar concept 
of accountability for delivering outputs: namely, accountability for 
‘managing for outcomes’" via techniques such as intervention logic 
(Baehler 2003). At the same time, the extension of accountability to 
outcomes and to networks implies a rebalancing of the notions of 
accountability as “blame and control” and as “strategic dialogue” and 
“collective learning” especially over outcomes themselves (Ryan 2003; 
2004).  
 
The subject of the new accountability (the “what”) is defined by the 
concept of “managing for outcome”. This in turn tends to predicate the 
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basis for assigning accountability on the standards of causality and 
controllability. Anderson and Dovey (2003:9), for example, argue: 
 
an agency should not be held formally accountable for things over 
which it has limited or no control. This is particularly important when 
considering how to design accountability arrangements under MfO … 
At the formal level, accountability needs to be (and is proposed to be) 
for the processes of managing towards outcomes, rather than the 
outcomes themselves. 
 
Hence the carefully made distinction between “managing for outcomes” 
and outcomes themselves. The former can be measured and causally 
linked to outputs formally under managerial control through performance 
indicators and intervention logic while the latter cannot. In this sense, the 
new accountability is not so much an alternative to the managerial mode of 
accountability as an extension of it. But managerial accountability can only 
be stretched so far since outcomes, such as improved health or wellbeing, 
are notoriously difficult to measure. The assumption that accountability 
necessarily diminishes with certainty poses a dilemma, that in order to 
make accountability relevant in the face of uncertainty and contingency 
where conclusive causal linkages are hard to find, there seems to be no 
choice but to dull the hard edge of accountability. Such an approach does 
not actually address the output/outcome bifurcation that underlies the 
accountability gap. While it might quite possibly narrow the gap between 
outputs and outcomes to some extent, it cannot close such a gap. There is 
a real risk that the new arrangement might, as Baehler (2003:32) puts it, 
“just transfer the current system’s fetishes and aversions … up the chain a 
few notches”.   
 
The attempts to locate managerial activities somewhere on a causal chain 
between outputs and outcomes and assign accountability accordingly 
often confuses as much as it clarifies. Ryan (2004:100) argues, for 
instance:  
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Managers can be held accountable for managing for outcomes, for 
managing for means for policy ends, for whether they did manage for 
outcomes, for whether or not they learned from their experiences and 
acted. 
 
This looks more like a statement of the problem than its resolution. In an 
apparent attempt to move away from “outputs”, it evokes the familiar 
dichotomies of means and ends, of management and policy. Such verbal 
lapse into dichotomous thinking, typical of mainstream advocates of the 
new accountability, reveals a fundamental hesitation in accepting the full 
implications of a genuine focus on outcomes.  
 
The rhetorical emphasis of the new accountability falls on its subject rather 
than its process. As far as the formal accountability system is concerned 
there appears to be little change. The new version of accountability, 
according to the Government’s Statement of Expectations of the State 
Sector, is to be based on “setting clear expectations of individuals and 
assessing performance and assessing performance against expectations”. 
The familiar system of matching ex-post reporting against ex-ante 
specification and ex-post reporting remains central to the new 
accountability, as it was during the NPM era.  
 
What is more interesting is the growing interest in the so-called learning 
paradigm or organisational learning (Anderson and Dovey 2003). Central 
to this paradigm are the ideas developed by Argyris and Schon (1978; 
1996). According to them, organisational learning can be classified as two 
types. The first, “single loop” learning, refers to detection and correction of 
errors i.e. the variance between achieved and expected outcomes. This 
can be seen as another way to describe the notion of accountability as 
verification, discussed above. The second, “double loop” learning refers to 
reflection on values, assumptions, actions and those goals themselves. 
The second type of learning is to be encouraged.  
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There can be no doubt that learning opens up new possibilities that a 
narrow concept of accountability as verification lacks. But the difficulty is 
that learning is often presented as a substitute for accountability itself. This 
is further complicated by the fact that in popularised accounts the concept 
of learning has become highly normative and (positively) value-laden, 
much like the once fashionable “management”. Fiol and Lyles (1985:803), 
for instance, state that “organisational learning means the process of 
improving actions through better knowledge and understanding”. Ryan 
(2003:9) similarly asserts that “the term [collective learning] refers to the 
common sense of collective experience, the knowing-how to make 
desirable and agreed things happen and to judge whether or not the 
strategies are working”. And it is reflected in practice by the currently 
fashionable emphasis on “know-hows”, “what works” and so on. Too much 
accountability, it seems, might be counterproductive because it crowds out 
valuable learning activites.  
 
This is a false antinomy, however. And it poses several difficulties. Firstly, 
the argument for learning often rests upon an instrumental premise in a 
sense that its importance is justified directly or indirectly by good 
outcomes, such as better policies. Whether these promised outcomes 
would be delivered notwithstanding, an immediate problem is that it does 
not and cannot override – at least not automatically – the priority of certain 
substantive values such as democratic legitimacy upon which the 
centrality of political accountability rests.   
  
Secondly, because of its instrumental nature, the concept of organisational 
learning cannot stand on its own. It has to be built on rich assumptions 
about substantive values. The liberal use (and sometimes abuse) of terms 
such as evidence, practical knowledge, common sense or reflection still 
raises questions about what counts as knowledge or evidence. It suggests 
that the process of learning is just as much vulnerable to taken-for-granted 
assumptions, unintended consequences and oversimplification as the 
policymaking or public management that it is supposed to improve. In 
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other words there is a danger in treating organisational learning itself as if 
exempted from the critical reflection of “double-loop” learning.  
 
Thirdly, as some critics have already pointed out, a fundamental flaw of 
the learning theory is its frequent unwillingness to face issues of power 
and control (Fielding 2001). Whilst most of these criticisms have focused 
on issues within private organisations, it is even more pertinent for the 
context of public bureaucracies. Learning for these organisations is 
necessarily about the exercise of coercive power. The metaphor of 
learning therefore must be applied with care. The society in which they 
operate is neither a laboratory nor a classroom. And policy-making is not a 
harmless pursuit for truth or knowledge, even if sometimes it may seem as 
such. Organisational learning, just like management, inevitably has 
political consequences. Learning does not excuse political responsibility 
for power, particularly in disasters such as Cave Creek, or even the 
Holocaust, whatever valuable lessons public organisations might learn 
from them.  
 
Finally the theory of organisational learning often – and sometimes 
unwittingly – exhibits a veiled anti-political tendency evident in many 
seminal texts on the subject such as Peter Senge’s fifth dimension (Smith 
2001). This partly reflects the private sector context in which the theory 
was developed, but there is also frequently an intimate underlying 
connection with communitarian political philosophy. This is unsurprising; 
perhaps only through such an approach can organisational learning 
circumvent the problems discussed above about power and legitimacy. 
The rhetoric of communities of practice with shared vision engaging in 
collective recursive learning through strategic dialogue typically glosses 
over conflicts between these communities.  
 
Thirdly, if NPM styled managerial accountability may actually reinforce the 
pathological “rule of nobody”, does the new wave of reform offer a clearer 
picture of who is accountable and responsible for bureaucratic actions, 
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and for spectacular failures like Cave Creek? The answer, as will be 
explained below, is no.  
 
This is not to say that reformers are unaware of the problems with 
managerial accountability. Quite the contrary, the reformers understand all 
too well that the shift to managing for outcomes and joint work clearly 
poses fundamental challenges to the allocations of discretely 
individualised accountability and responsibility, which is absolutely 
dependent on clear boundaries between outputs and outcomes, and 
between arms-length organisations. However, reformers seem unable, or 
even reluctant to go further than acknowledging the problems and the 
criticisms often fail to challenge the causal logic of control underpinning 
managerial accountability. Here lies the difficulty: the reforms often fade 
into a plea for new “things” to be included – outcomes, networks, 
community values – rather than a demand for change.  
 
None of these however make it any easier to answer the question of 
exactly who is or are accountable. The various attempts at devising a new 
system often appear to be variation of an old theme. SSC, for instance, 
argues:  
 
Outcomes are influenced by many factors. Some are in our control: 
others are not. Because of this, chief executives are not accountable 
for achieving outcomes but are held accountable for “managing for 
outcomes” [Italics added] (SSC 2005b:1). 
 
There is very little reflection on the commitment to “controllability” as a 
measure of accountability. As for networks, the response appears even 
more puzzling. Anderson and Dovey (2003:12) suggest that “burdens are 
shared when working together, so all with a substantial share will be part 
of the accountability process”.  
 
This seemingly simple solution raises more questions: what counts as a 
“substantial” share? Who should be responsible for how much of a share? 
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And it poses the risk that everybody’s responsibility can become nobody’s 
responsibility. This is not to suggest accountability must be divided 
mechanistically. Rather it is to argue that a better method is needed to 
locate personal responsibility for collective failures, and to recognise that 
these failures are nonetheless consequences of human actions. And a 
causal theory of responsibility is intrinsically inadequate for this task. It will 
simply create new rifts between culpability and lack of culpability. There is 
inevitably a sneaking suspicion that popular buzzwords such as “network” 
might just be another excuse for bureaucratic failures, like “systemic 
failure” for the tragedy at Cave Creek, while turning a blind eye to those 
persons whose roles are to prevent such failures in themselves and 
among their subordinates and who are given power and control by the 
people for precisely that.  
 
There are alternatives, of course and they are worth examining briefly. The 
first is a new formula of responsibility and accountability – almost the 
reversal of the famous misquote of “accountable but not responsible” – 
that requires chief executives “taking responsibility for, but not necessarily 
being held accountable for, the achievement of outcomes” (Cook 
2004:28). The idea that one should answer to one or another greater good 
rather than account to ordinary political institutions is nothing new in 
communitarian ideology. But this is a false and potentially harmful 
dichotomy. There can be no argument against bureaucrats having a 
certain sense of inner responsibility or moral principles of their own. In fact 
they always have. The real problem is rather the public legitimacy of such 
moral precepts. It is difficult to see how and indeed why a public official 
should claim that he or she has behaved responsibly yet refuse to give a 
full account of his/her actions to the public. And it is not difficult to identify 
the disastrous consequences of moral arguments of this kind – or to be 
exact, monologues – which are more self-righteous than public serving. 
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The War in Iraq is one example. The 1980s and 90s reform in New 
Zealand is another. 44  
 
The second and more promising suggestion is the concept of “vindicative” 
responsibility. According to Gregory (1998a:533), it refers to voluntary 
punishment and/or compensation confirming that “a governmental system 
is actually capable of caring about those who are victimized by its failings.” 
What is at issue here is not what went wrong and why, although they are 
important, but who should pay. This is not entirely different from a role 
conception of accountability as advocated by commentators such as Diana 
Woodhouse. However, the problem lies with its intimate connection with 
the communitarian philosophy, which places emphasis on the symbolic 
affirmation of “the community’s system of values” (Lucas 1993:98) for this 
might be interpreted as a dichotomy between political accountability and 
moral responsibility to a reified “community”. As Gregory cautions, 
vindicative responsibility is not to be confused with “cynical scapegoating” 
(1998a:534). Yet the question is why not. There is a danger that too much 
emphasis placed on symbolic sacrifice may just divert one’s attention from 
where real responsibility lies. Indeed, any cursory view of history would 
suggest that those who were scarified in traditional communities, however 
noble their nominal status, were rarely those with real power and control. 
The risk is that the vindicative concept simply legitimises blame-shifting 
when blame can and should be attributed to those at the top. Similarly, 
such political responsibility is not necessarily fulfilled by bureaucratic hara-
kiri. In fact it may well be an act of avoiding responsibility as in the case of 
German and Japanese war criminals playing to their dubious sense of 
moral responsibility. In other words, vindicative responsibility cannot be 
justified by abstract values such as “humanity” or “justice”, nor should it be 
ritualised in forms such as automatic resignation; it must ultimately be 
                                                 
44
 One is reminded of Gregory’s criticism of the so-called ‘public argument advising’ that 
attempts to justify both cases:  
The conditional statement here – ‘if presented’ – is surely contradictory. How can an 
example of ‘public argument advising’ be considered ‘stellar’ if in fact there is little or no 
public (as distinct from private discussions among the elite) argument that results from 
it? If, in other words, the advice is democratically sterile? (Gregory 2005b) 
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determined through the political process, for which accountability is 
necessary. Otherwise it will simply become an empty ritual.  
 
What one could conclude from the analysis above is that the invention of 
new concepts is unnecessary. The convention of ministerial responsibility 
addresses effectively the flaws discussed above. At the heart of it lies a 
very simple and straightforward answer to the question of who should pay 
and how: public officials should be held accountable and responsible for 
their roles in exercising coercive power and control to the extent, and in a 
manner, determined by the democratic process.    
 
  
A New Bargain 
 
The issue of “public service bargains” (Hood and Lodge 2006) – in 
particular, the principle of political neutrality – lurks behind the controversy 
surrounding the Madeleine Setchell affair in 200745. What is of interest 
here is not the particularities of the affair itself, which have been 
extensively covered elsewhere, but rather the broader issues raised in its 
aftermath.  
 
Perhaps the first point to note is that, as the State Service Commissioner 
puts it:  
 
None of the lessons outlined above are new. None of these reflect 
any new understanding of public service. None of them have been 
affected by any change in society, political processes or technology. 
They can all be found in guidance offered in recent and earlier years 
                                                 
45
 The details of the affair have been well covered by two inquiries (SSC 2007; Hunn 
2008). The central issue relates to the dismissal of Ms Setchell by the Ministry for the 
Environment as a result of her partner’s employment in the Leader of the Opposition’s 
office as senior Press Secretary. The affair involved the Chief Executive of the Ministry for 
the Environment, the State Service Commissioner, and the Minister, all of whom resigned 
in its aftermath. However, the minister’s resignation is arguably because he lied to 
Parliament over the affair, rather than misconduct in the affair per se. The resignation of 
the State Services Commissioner is not clearly tied to this episode either.   
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by myself or my predecessors, by the Auditor-General and in the 
Cabinet Manual (SSC 2007c:13). 
 
The Commissioner is right, in a sense. But it begs the question. The point 
is not so much about new lessons or new understandings, but rather why 
senior officials have chosen to put aside longstanding conventions and 
protections designed to help them manage precisely such difficulties, 
especially given the flurry of initiatives to restore public values, including 
political neutrality, as part of the reform.  
 
The Setchell affair, seen in this light, provides a timely reminder of the 
perils of ignoring old problems. And one such old problem is the tension 
between responsiveness and responsibility. As Eichbaum and Shaw 
(2008a) correctly point out, one aspect of the controversy is that “the 
actions of the Chief Executive of the Ministry for the Environment were 
more responsive (and less responsible) than they might have been”. This 
of course is not new. Indeed the behaviour of senior officials might 
become a little more understandable if one considers longstanding 
concerns about the implications of contractual pressures on public 
servants to be more responsive for their responsibility to be politically 
neutral (Boston et al 1996; Saunders 2008). So long as such contractual 
arrangements remain firmly in place, it is difficult to see how the effort to 
reinforce political neutrality and other distinctively public values can be any 
more than, as Hicks (2007) puts it, a “clip-on, confined largely to a code of 
minimal conduct”.  
 
The problem is reinforced by considerable confusion over the meaning of 
political neutrality. The old dichotomous thinking of “neutrality” as apolitical 
competency vis-à-vis political influences remains, for example, in Jane 
Clifton’s assertion that “the bureaucracy is there to implement policy, not 
politics” (Clifton 2007). What is more troubling perhaps is that the 
dichotomy is dressed in more respectable terms, such as Laking (2008)’s 
distinction between “advice” and “consult”, than the naked reality. Chief 
executives, as Tanner argues, are required to “ride the boundary between 
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the political role of the Minister and the administrative role of the 
department”. And for this reason “advice” simply cannot be regarded as 
reporting on fait accompli of something done in isolation but must 
inevitably be a part of dialogue between Ministers and chief executives. 
Such misunderstandings, old and new, simply add to the myth of “apolitical 
competency”, which arguably caused the tension between 
“responsiveness” and responsibility in the first place.  
 
The Setchell affair also raises question about the role of political advisors, 
although the controversy, as Eichbaum and Shaw (2008a) observe, 
probably has little to do with the actions of particular political advisors. 
Nonetheless it reflects the uncertainty and anxiety about the implications 
of the third force of political advisors for the bargain between Ministers and 
officials. The advent of political advisers does not necessarily change the 
fundamentals of the Westminster system, and may indeed serve a 
legitimate and useful function (Eichbaum and Shaw 2003; 2008b). Yet the 
question is whether reliance on political advisors is an adequate substitute 
for the political, but non-partisan, role of officials, as the Setchell affair 
highlights.  
 
What is perhaps still more troubling is the emergence of “communication 
advisers” from within the bureaucracy. As the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry observes during the inquiry into the Setchell affair: 
 
The role of “communication advisers” and “press secretaries” had 
developed to be very different from what it might have been in the 
past because it increasingly involved communication strategy (and 
sometimes highly political strategy) rather than mere reporting (Hunn 
2007:40).      
 
Yet paradoxically political communication has become increasingly less a 
“political conversation amongst citizens” and more a professionalised task 
of organisation and management in the “so-called media society” 
(Habermas 2006). The rise of communication advisors can be regarded as 
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a bureaucratic response to this general “de-politicisation” of political 
communication46. In the process it invokes the familiar dichotomy between 
politics and administration. The specific problem here is that attempts to 
depoliticise what is after all exercise of power itself creates a risk of 
politicisation from within, and such attempts inevitably increase the 
pressure of politicisation as politicians seek to re-establish control. Thus, 
while one might deplore the actions of politicians during the Setchell affair, 
an insistence on stopping politicisation from the outside while ignoring the 
problems posed by the role of communication advisors itself, will do 
nothing to resolve the dilemma.  
 
The upshot of all this is that it actually affirms the importance of political 
neutrality. Partisan political advisors or “apolitical” communications 
advisers cannot usurp the constitutional role that public servants play, as 
political actors. What is needed is not only to understand the emergence of 
“new” forces within the political arena, but to grasp and indeed insist on 
the old principle of political neutrality, that is, public servants must be non-
partisan, rather than pretending to be “apolitical”.  
 
Indeed it could be argued that the Setchell affair evidenced not so much 
“politicisation” as the failure of officials to fulfil the requirements of political 
neutrality in a more positive sense, that is, the duty of loyalty. The 
controversy is a reminder that sometimes the political needs of Ministers 
are better served by the courage of officials to offer free and frank advice, 
than the excessive responsiveness engendered by a contractual culture.  
 
Contractualism is not the only threat to free and frank advice, however. It 
may also come under pressure from the new reforms in which there is a 
tacit acceptance, if not expectation, of a role for officials independent from 
their political masters. The paradox is that the willingness of officials to 
publicly justify their own actions on their own, as occurred in the Setchell 
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 One of the protagonists of the controversy, Erin Leigh, has expressed this idea of 
‘depoliticised’ communication by arguing that ‘every memorable moment in history has 
started or ended in a speech. It is speeches, not politics that start and end wars; it is 
speeches, not policies that can bring about radical change within a nation’.  
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affair47, might actually undermine the collective responsibility of officials 
and Ministers. The attempts to construct a new and independent basis of 
bureaucratic legitimacy too often fall short of their promise and may have a 
deleterious impact on the legitimacy of the government as a whole. 
Consider, for instance, the proposal by Baehler (2005) of a “Public 
Argument” test, which requires officials simply to present “a coherent set of 
propositions that lead from premises to a policy conclusion” without regard 
for actual rationales behind particular policies that cannot be publicly 
justified. But as Gregory (2005b) argues, the hypothetical policy analysts 
still face “a compelling moral dilemma”, in hard cases such as the Iraqi 
War, either to be “willingly complicit in an act of public deception, or to 
refuse to be complicit in what they might consider a war crime”. The risk is 
that such “public arguments” might displace political arguments where 
moral claims can be discussed. It may actually expose officials who find 
themselves under greater political pressure to compromise with “the truth”, 
while allowing politicians to get away with “plausible deniability” by shifting 
responsibility and blame onto “independent” officials. The Iraq WMD affair 
and the “Children Overboard” affair illustrate the very real danger of this 
approach (Mulgan 2006). The point is that the safeguard of free and frank 
advice does not lie in the dichotomy between politics and administration.  
 
What then about leaking? This aspect of loyalty seems to have received 
least attention in the aftermath of the Setchell affair. Yet the central role 
played by the media and the apparent irrelevance of the formal channels 
of redress lend support to the observation by James (2001) that leaking is 
increasingly viewed more as a matter of course than an exception48. 
Arguably, both cases are not black-and-white cases where leaking is 
                                                 
47
 The attempt by the State Service Commissioner to diffuse the controversy by placing 
an op-ed piece in the Dominiion Post without consulting the minister is an example of this, 
which not only fails to address public concerns, but also creates unnecessary diversion 
and confusion about the lines of responsibility.  
48
 The Public Disclosure Act received no reference in the subsequent inquiries. Nor was 
there evidence of complaints being raised through internal processes against the actions 
of the Chief Executive or the alleged politicisation prior to the “dam bust” of media 
interests (Hunn 2008). The related controversy around the employment of Clare Curran at 
the Ministry for the Environment was first raised through the media as an exclusive 
interview, a year after the protagonist, Erin Leigh, resigned “in protest” at the alleged 
political appointment (TV3 21 November 2007). 
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unambiguously in the public interest. That is not to criticise the course of 
actions of the protagonists, but to argue that the moral ambiguities that 
leaking inevitably involves should not be ignored. It is questionable, for 
instance in the more “grey” case of the selective leak of potentially 
prejudicial information by a major daily on the alleged “terrorist” 
conspiracy, whether such leaks are intrinsically in the public interest.  
 
While the changes discussed above do not in themselves constitute a new 
bargain as such, unlike the previous NPM reforms, they do demonstrate 
clearly that the contractual bargain has not been seriously challenged by 
the new reforms. Moreover, the changes show signs of a new bargain, 
close to Hood and Lodge (2006)’s ‘trustee’ type, in which is slowly 
emerging a different role of officials as “platonic guardians of public 
interest” increasingly independent from their political masters. The analysis 
above shows however that the combination of these two assaults on the 
traditional bargain may have actually exposed the public service to 
greater, rather than lesser, risk of politicisation.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
Arguably the most important conclusion from this exercise in reconciling 
the tension between bureaucracy and representative democracy is that 
politics matters in the study of public management. Politics is more than 
just a “context”. It is the heart of the matter. And conversely, public 
management forms a distinctive, yet integral, part of politics.  
 
The thesis therefore began by asking what sort of politics is appropriate for 
a modern society. This question was pursued in chapter 2 with a defence 
of political liberalism against its libertarian and communitarian critics. It 
argued that a liberal political order that recognises a plurality of values, the 
dialectical relationship between individuals and society, and the centrality 
of politics, remains essential to maintaining the commitment to individual 
autonomy and social equality.  
 
Chapter 3 examined the role of bureaucracy within this liberal political 
order. It looked to Max Weber and J S Mill who wrote about bureaucracy 
from different angles. The lessons drawn from Weber’s and Mill’s analyses 
are still relevant. In the first instance, they show that democracy needs 
bureaucracy, both for its “efficiency” – that is, instrumental certainty – and 
its impartiality in the collective pursuit of democratically chosen ends. And 
yet, secondly, the problem is that these benefits of bureaucracy inevitably 
intensify tensions already inherent in liberal-democratic politics between 
autonomy of choice and a chosen “good life”, between individuals and “the 
collective”, and between democratic politics and authority. Weber and Mill 
show that it gives rise to new problems in forms of goal displacement, 
dehumanisation, and the displacement of politics by bureaucratic 
expertise, all of which serve to conceal these old fault lines. Such tensions 
are not irreconcilable. Quite the contrary, to interpret the problem of 
bureaucracy in these terms allows one to see the solution that is already 
there, namely, in reasserting the predominance of liberal democracy over 
bureaucratic expertise.  
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This leads to the Westminster constitution, discussed in Chapter 4, which 
provides the means to this end. This thesis defends the Westminster 
constitution because it best gives effects to the centrality of democratic 
politics, as liberalism demands, and highlights the importance of 
safeguarding these constitutional principles in constraining bureaucratic 
power. The discussion provides a reminder of a basic fact, which should 
not be ignored yet often is overlooked, that political power can only be 
controlled politically. What critics have often missed is that the point of the 
Westminster constitution, as a political constitution, is not to “control” 
bureaucracy as such, but to subject bureaucratic power to political scrutiny 
and therefore to political control. Indeed the pursuit of democratic control 
of bureaucracy by disregarding the very principles of liberal democracy – a 
case of “goal displacement” perhaps – would be not only futile but foolish. 
There is no effective substitute for politics and the political constitution in a 
liberal democratic order.  
 
Part I thus established a theoretical model that pulls together the political, 
bureaucratic and constitutional perspectives. The place of bureaucratic 
organisations in a liberal-democratic order is that it must be subjected to 
political control, exercised amongst other things through a political 
constitution. Moving on from this foundation, Part II turns the attention to 
the Public Sector reforms in New Zealand.  
 
Firstly, Part II located the public service reforms within the ideological 
shifts. It was argued that, instead of the label of “socialism without 
doctrine”, the Welfare State was to be understood as an experiment in 
liberal politics. This is not to say that the Welfare State itself was in any 
sense “liberal”, but rather the evolution of the Welfare State in New 
Zealand was partly driven by its commitment to liberal values, which 
sustained the legitimacy of different experiments by those on the left as 
well as the right.  
 
This journey is interrupted and indeed partly reversed, so the thesis 
argued, by the advent of the New Right in New Zealand. A perception of 
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crisis enabled the New Right to assert hegemonic control over a pluralistic 
polity with the slogan of “there is no alternative”. It attempted to rationalise 
the varied and contradictory values and aspirations of the Welfare State by 
appealing, paradoxically, to an eclectic collection of beliefs in the invisible 
hand of the markets, in “small town values”, and in the possibility of 
freedom of individuals alone. It tried to convince the people that there is no 
such thing as society, but markets, families and other institutions that, 
supposedly, simply exist and always have existed. And it practised a new 
style of politics that was more “business-like”, more technocratic and less 
concerned with the need for conciliation and compromise. The New Right 
promised certainty, but it extracted a high price – the elimination of the 
possibility of alternative values, of relations with others, and of political 
actions and political freedom.  
 
At the turn of the century New Zealand witnessed another change of 
direction from the New Right to the Third Way, this time less radical and 
more pragmatic. But there is no resumption of the journey towards liberal 
ideals. The communitarian rhetoric of the Third Way may have attempted 
to position itself as diagnostically opposed to the New Right. Yet in reality 
it is more of a “top up” than a radical departure. The poverty of politics 
limits the possibility of overcoming the New Right legacies.   
 
Secondly, it is perhaps easier to understand, against the decline of politics, 
the rise of bureaucratic power despite, and partly because of, the reforms 
to banish or to modernise, bureaucracy. The thesis began with 
reassessment of the traditional New Zealand public service under the 
Welfare State, and argued that it should be viewed critically. The 
traditional public service, although it embodied essential characteristics of 
the Weberian bureaucracy, was also a repository of political values and 
aspirations central to the Welfare State, which served to problematise and 
limit its bureaucratic side. Perhaps the most important point from this is 
that the traditional model evidenced the possibility of democratic control 
over bureaucracy by asserting the centrality of politics itself.  
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This prepared the ground for the arguments around the NPM reforms. The 
reforms were supposed to make the bureaucracy, above all, more 
“business-like” and like its predecessor in 1912 it looked to the private 
sector for ideas. The reforms radically changed the way bureaucracy 
operated. Public servants were transformed into managers; the command-
and-control departments became contracting and competitive agencies; 
and the volatile bureaucratic politics of the Welfare State gave away to a 
new Economic Constitution. However the attempts to “de-bureaucratise” 
the bureaucracy by making it more “rational” and “efficient” and 
simultaneously removing “irrational” political elements are, as this thesis 
demonstrated, oxymoronic. From a Weberian perspective, the focus of the 
reforms on instrumental values such as efficiency and certainty lent itself 
to “goal displacement”. The mechanistic approach, moreover, was 
vulnerable to problems of reification and dehumanisation by calculation 
and measurement. Aversion to politics rendered it open to “capture” by 
technocratic politics amongst others. In short, it made the public service 
more, rather than less, bureaucratic in the Weberian sense. But this is not 
simply because the NPM reforms had managed to break the shackles of 
politics, but rather, as this thesis has argued, the politics of the New Right 
had already undermined the vitality of liberal democratic politics and 
therefore enabled the deepening of bureaucratisation.  
 
The absence of political changes partly explains why the pragmatic 
changes after 1999 have failed to reverse deepening bureaucratisation in 
any fundamental way. Instead of efficiency, the new reforms seek in other 
values some source of instrumental certainty. Instead of mechanistic 
images of reified market relations, the reforms look to the icons of 
“organic” trust, networks and communities that say nothing about the 
human relations underpinning these imagined “organisms”. And in place of 
technocratic power based on neo-classical economics, they promise to 
empower everybody and anybody through ever more sophisticated 
technology such as intervention logic. Questions of power, according to 
these formulations, supposedly do not arise. The problem of the new 
reforms is as much their failure to reverse the deepening bureaucratisation 
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under the NPM reforms as their staving off possible challenges and 
alternatives. 
 
Thirdly, there are implications for the Westminster constitution, of which 
the public service is a constitutive part. The political constitution was 
ineffective, as this thesis has argued, under the Welfare State. However, 
the worst-case diagnosis of the political constitution is not justified. This 
thesis has argued that the ineffectiveness of the political constitution was a 
consequence of the paralysing of the process by majoritarianism, rather 
than the constitution itself. Also, even given the paralysis induced by the 
dominance of majoritarianism, the political constitution did ensure an 
ultimate check on bureaucratic power.  
 
Part of the appeal of the NPM reforms was their promise of strengthening 
the constitution by enhancing Parliament’s control over finance, by making 
Ministers and managers more clearly accountable, and by insulating 
managers from politics. This thesis has argued that those measures not 
only misinterpreted the rationale of the political constitution, but also fatally 
undermined it. The enhanced “transparency” of financial information did 
not compensate for Parliament’s loss of access to information useful in its 
political role as the scrutiniser of the government. The strengthening of 
managerial accountability similarly restricted the effective functioning of 
political responsibility by Ministers and public servants. The replacement of 
partisan-neutral public servants by apolitical managers was based on 
ignorance of the constitution leading to a misunderstanding of the meaning 
of political neutrality, opening the public service to politicisation by 
“apolitical” partisan ideologies. Again, this was by no means a result of the 
public service reforms, but rather a consequence of broader political 
changes.  
 
Perhaps because these threats to the political constitution are rarely 
acknowledged, there have been few attempts to address them in a 
supposedly post-NPM environment. Quite the contrary, modifications to 
the NPM changes take place largely without reference to the constitutional 
  184 
principles. There are improvements here and there. Yet attempts to build 
on a highly inadequate foundation have done very little to bridge the gap 
between the NPM reforms and constitutional expectations.  
 
Is there no escape from the “fate in our times”, as Max Weber bemoaned, 
that is “characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above 
all, by the disenchantment of the world” (Weber 1947:155)? The poverty of 
politics, the deepening of bureaucratisation and the erosion of the political 
constitution certainly seem to point to a discouraging tomorrow. The most 
important contribution this thesis has made, perhaps, is to suggest the 
possibility that such a fate is not inevitable. There is no need to retreat to 
the mythical realm – after all the fantasies of the market or the community 
had all been tried. Rather what is needed is “faith” in human beings 
themselves and in the possibility of politics, particularly at a time when 
politics has become increasingly subservient to the imperatives of “what 
we can afford” or “what works”. 
 
On a more practical note, this thesis suggests that, in order to rehabilitate 
the public service and public service reforms, it may be time to abandon 
the pursuit of efficiency or effectiveness or “good administration”; to reject 
the tendency to conceive human relations in reified terms; and to renounce 
the unquestioned faith in technocratic knowledge. Rather the reforms must 
be guided by asking how bureaucracy can work with democracy in order to 
maximise individual autonomy and social equality, to ascertain that the 
convenient shorthands invented to describe the complexity of collective 
actions remain in the end human, and to ensure that bureaucratic 
expertise does not usurp politics.  
 
This thesis is only a beginning towards this end, which given time and 
space constraints, has left undeveloped several lines of inquiry. It points to 
a future research agenda.  
 
In terms of the theoretical foundation, it would be useful to more fully 
conceptualise political liberalism in the context of “hard cases” and 
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investigate their implications on public management. In this respect, the 
study by Haque (2002) of the “War on Terror” on public management has 
already made some headway. In New Zealand, Maori-related issues, 
which have always posed challenges to liberal principles, open another 
opportunity to test these principles and practices.  
 
In terms of practical changes, the post-NPM reforms, as argued above, 
have already weakened the TINA mentality. The issue however is to 
ensure that the search for alternatives does not make the same mistakes 
as the previous reforms. It should include, for instance, questions such as: 
 
• How can the value-based approach to public management be aligned 
with the plurality of values in society, together with respect for 
democratic institutions, and not just consist of a different laundry list 
of presumed goals? 
 
• How might the new partnership paradigm be conceptualised to bring 
public servants closer to the people themselves, without the 
entrapments of reification, in a manner that is just, inclusive, and for 
all citizens? 
 
• How is it possible to restore public confidence in democratic politics 
and in the people themselves as political actors, especially given the 
seductive appeal of technological solutions to social problems? 
 
• How can Parliament, as the Hansard Society (2001) advocates, 
assert itself “at the apex” of a system of scrutiny over a fragmented 
and complicated polity? For instance, how can the role of select 
committees, which have proved to be an effective means of scrutiny 
and public engagement, be further enhanced? How can Parliament 
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rebuild its credibility while retaining its distinctiveness as a political, 
representative, and deliberative institution? 49 
 
• What can be done to improve the willingness of parliamentarians and 
the public themselves to hold the government responsible for its acts, 
and to encourage them to make use of existing channels of 
accountability and responsibility to do so? 
 
• What is needed to protect the principle of political neutrality 
particularly against more creative forms of partisan politicisation 
under the guise of “apolitical” neutrality? How is it possible to 
encourage positive attitudes towards politics in the public service 
while safeguarding political neutrality, properly understood? 
 
 
A future reform of the Public Sector, therefore, might focus less on how to 
reinvent the bureaucracy, but rather how to revitalise politics and political 
participation. Through this approach one might discover more effective 
ways of exerting democratic control over bureaucracy, and conversely 
reduce the risks of “bureaucratisation” of politics.   
 
 
                                                 
49
 McRae’s 1994 study “A Parliament in Crisis: The Decline of Democracy in New 
Zealand” (Wellington: Sheildaig Press) provides a good starting point but is in need of 
updating.  
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